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 ABSTRACT 
 
Carry trade is a strategy that takes advantage of interest rate differentials between 
currencies. The literature has shown that this strategy is very rewarding, generating 
similar returns to the S&P 500 with a better Sharpe ratio. While it is typically argued 
that the profitability of carry trade results from the failure of uncovered interest parity 
(UIP), it is suggested that this is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a 
profitable carry trade operation. If, as documented by some studies, currencies with 
high interest rates tend to appreciate against low-interest currencies, this failure of 
UIP results in double gains for carry traders, one of them being the interest rate 
differential and the other is foreign exchange gains. 
 
Carry trade thrives during the periods of high interest rate differentials and low 
exchange rate volatility. But exchange rate turmoil might come without warning, 
resulting in huge losses for carry traders, particularly because carry trade is described 
as a leveraged strategy. Projecting such volatile moves has proven to be extremely 
difficult. The literature suggests that VIX (ticker symbol for the Chicago board option 
exchange market volatility index) and difference between the 3-month USD LIBOR 
and T-bill which is known as (TED) are the most reliable indicators of high volatility. 
 
The literature shows that the use of emerging countries’ currencies in carry trade 
would lead to an improvement in returns. This research examines the validity of this 
conclusion by conducting carry trades using the currencies of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) against the currencies of developed countries’. The results obtained 
xii 
 
from this research are consistent with literature, showing positive returns when 
emerging countries’ currencies were used. 
 
In 1983, Meese and Rogoff published a paper concluding that no forecasting model 
can outperform the naïve random walk. Since then a comprehensive body of literature 
dedicated to unravelling what is known as the Meese-Rogoff “puzzle” has been 
unsuccessful in overturning these results. For a long time it was widely accepted that 
exchange rate models cannot outperform a naïve random walk in forecasting. 
However the Meese-Rogoff results can be overturned by using measures of 
forecasting accuracy other than those that depend on the magnitude of the forecasting 
error. The results presented in this study imply that the random walk can be 
outperformed in terms of profitability. 
  
Carry traders conduct the strategy assuming that exchange rates move in a random 
walk manner. Enhancing the process by embedding a forecasting element into the 
procedure led to an improvement in returns and a reduction in risk. The results from 
this research were in line with Meese and Rogoff findings that no forecasting model 
can overcome the random walk in terms of magnitude of error. But at the same time, 
results showed that the forecasting model used in the research produced better returns 
and standard deviation. This would indicate that our forecasting model outperformed 
the random walk in terms of returns, risk, and risk-adjusted returns. 
 
Carry traders assume that exchange rates move in a driftless random walk manner. 
This assumption is proven to be correct, but only in the short term. This study 
examines the 36 currency pairs under investigation and finds that there are statistically 
significant drifts in many of them. Taking these statistically significant drifts into 
xiii 
 
account when determining the carry trade position leads to an improvement in both 
profitability and risk. The results are also consistent with literature, showing that 
conducting the strategy using portfolios would lead to an improvement in returns and 
risk reduction.     
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 The Issues under Investigation 
This thesis investigates the profitability of carry trade using the currencies of the 
member countries of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC). The main objective is to 
find out if GCC currencies are suitable the purpose of generating profit from carry 
trade by using both currency pairs and portfolios. Three main questions are dealt with: 
(i) is carry trade in GCC currencies profitable?; (ii) would exchange rate forecasting 
enhance profitability?; and (iii) can exchange rate models outperform the random 
walk in forecasting.  
 
As far as the first question is concerned, carry trade is a well-known trading strategy 
conducted not only by major financial institutions but also by individual investors. 
The operation is carried out by borrowing a low-interest currency (called the funding 
currency), converting it into a high-interest currency (called the target currency), 
investing it at a higher yield, and at the end of the investment horizon converting the 
proceeds back to the funding currency to repay the loan. The main objective of carry 
trade is to take advantage of the interest rate differential between the two currencies. 
Carry traders base their investment decision entirely on the interest rate differentials 
and nothing else. Burnside et al. (2006) and Menkhoff et al. (2012) show that carry 
trade is highly rewarding over a long period of time, generating return that exceeds 
the return on the S&P 500. Return on a well-diversified highly leveraged carry trade 
portfolio can be up to 46% (Darvas, 2009).  
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With respect to the second question, movements in exchange rates can easily wipe out 
the gain from the interest rate differential, particularly that exchange rate volatility is 
high. It follows that the ability to capture exchange rate movements should boost 
profitability and reduces risk, as concluded by Moosa and Halteh (2012). Question 
(iii) is related to Question (ii) because if profitability is used as a measure of 
forecasting accuracy, and it turns out that a forecasting-based strategy is more 
profitable than a straight carry trade operation, then this means that the underlying 
forecasting model can outperform the random walk. Straight carry trade is essentially 
a forecasting-based strategy where the forecasts are derived from the random walk 
(no-change forecasts). 
 
The ability of exchange rate models to outperform the random walk is an issue that 
has been debated since Meese and Rogoff (1983a) demonstrated that no exchange rate 
model can outperform the random walk in out-of-sample forecasting. The work of 
Meese and Rogoff has produced a puzzle as to why firms spend money on forecasting 
if no model can outperform the random walk. Leitch and Tanner (1991) question the 
feasibility of paying for forecasts by profit maximising firms which invest millions in 
forecasting models that are proven to be useless according to conventional wisdom. 
However, the underlying evidence is mixed. Eun and Sabherwal (2002) point out that 
the majority of the banks they examine show some evidence of outperforming the 
random walk. Corte et al. (2009) conclude that strategies based on combined forecasts 
yield larger economic gains over the random walk benchmark. This would indicate 
that profit maximising firms look for something in forecasting models other than the 
magnitude of the forecasting error. One objective of this thesis is to examine other 
3 
 
measures of forecasting accuracy, such as direction accuracy and the profitability of 
forecasting-based trading, as suggested by Boothe and Glassman (1987). 
 
Conducting this kind of research using the currencies of developed countries is not 
new—there are numerous studies of carry trade applied to developed countries’ 
currencies. But there is very little work when it comes to the currencies of emerging 
and developing countries. Most of the work that is conducted on the currencies of 
developing counties is focused on currency crashes and the reasons behind them. 
Academic and professional economists are becoming increasingly interested in other 
aspects of emerging markets and that interest is growing rapidly.  
 
Traditionally, little is known about emerging markets because the political and 
economic structure inhibits attempts by foreign investors to explore these markets. 
Since the end of the last century, emerging markets have been providing international 
investors with new possibilities for portfolio diversification and better risk-return 
trade-offs, particularly following financial liberalisation in these countries as 
suggested by Amihud et al. (1997), Levine and Zervos (1998), Henry (2000), Gelos 
and Werner (2001), and by Beim and Calomiris (2001). Bekaert and Harvey (2003) 
found that despite the growing reports of irrational behaviour of foreign investors in 
emerging markets, the emerging market portfolio of U.S. investors outperformed a 
number of benchmarks.  
 
The liberalisation of emerging markets from government constrains opened new 
investment horizons for international investors in these markets, although emerging 
economies are often viewed as volatile and unpredictable, particularly during 
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turmoils. Studies by Bekaert and Harvey (1997) and Kim and Singal (2000) show that 
there is no significant relation between financial liberalisation and volatility and that 
volatility is stabilised in the long run. Errunza (1983), Wilcox (1992), Claessens et al. 
(1993), and Harvey (1995) found that returns and risks in emerging markets are 
highly related to what is found in developed markets but they are less correlated, 
making it possible to construct low-risk portfolios (Bekaert and Harvey, 2003). Low 
correlation between the two sets of markets encourages investors to enter emerging 
markets to diversify assets and reduce risk. The difference is that high returns in 
emerging markets tend to be temporary in nature as seen in Asian markets (1997-
1998), Mexico (1995), Russia (1998) and China (2008). This indicates that emerging 
markets tend to be more volatile than developed markets, which contradicts the 
findings of Bekaert and Harvey (1997) and Kim and Singal (2000).  
 
The collapse of the Asian tigers in 1997, the Mexican Peso in 1994, and the 
Argentinian Peso in 2002 cast a shadow of doubt on the feasibility of investing in 
emerging markets. Earlier studies by Krugman (1979) and Flood and Garber (1984) 
suggested that inconsistent policies are the main cause of speculative attacks on the 
currency, whereas Bekaert and Harvey (2003) agree with Keynes in saying that 
speculative attacks are caused by “animal spirits”. When speculators attack one 
currency successfully, they will be tempted to attack another.  Others, such as Klein 
and Marion (1997) and Goldfajn and Valdes (1997), consider the over-valuation of a 
currency as an important factor in speculative attacks. Agenor et al. (1992) consider 
speculative attacks to be natural and anticipate the demise of an inconsistent policy 
regime. Speculative attacks on emerging and developing markets currencies give rise 
to reluctance among international investors to enter such markets. The question that 
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we address in this thesis is whether or not GCC countries follow the roller-coaster 
path of emerging markets’ exchange rates. 
 
1.2 Motivation 
Following the global financial crisis, U.S. interest rates reached record low and 
economic fundamentals deteriorated in the immediate aftermath of the crisis. As a 
result, the U.S. dollar became increasingly attractive as a funding currency, 
particularly because U.S. Treasury officials announced that interest rates will not rise 
in the near future. With GCC currencies being pegged to the U.S. dollar, except for 
Kuwait, and with no intention of abandoning this regime any time soon, using GCC 
and non-dollar currencies in carry trade would be something worth looking at. There 
is nothing of this sort in the literature (and in practice), perhaps because of the 
illiquidity of GCC currencies, which would result in significant bid-offer spreads. 
Chuhan (1992) considers poor liquidity as one of the main reasons why institutional 
investors are reluctant to invest in emerging markets. However, illiquidity would not 
be a matter of concern in this case, as GCC central banks sit on $1.7 trillion in cash 
reserves. They would usually quote a 10-pip spread between the bid and offer rates 
while local banks typically quote lower spreads, as low as 2 pips.  
 
Another reason for concern is the fear of default by these countries. Hamlin (2013) 
argues that a hundred-year look into the past throws up hundreds of cases of emerging 
country defaults, but over the past ten years, they have been less frequent. Since the 
late 1990s, emerging currencies have, on average, been appreciating against the 
currencies of developed countries, offering the long-term investor another layer of 
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profit on top of the yield spread. Those who believe that some emerging currencies 
are undervalued may see potential for further appreciation. 
 
It has been found that conducting carry trade operations in emerging markets provides 
higher risk-adjusted return and Sharpe ratio than what can be obtained in developed 
economies (for example, Hamlin, 2013). Mayer (2010) demonstrates that carry trade 
is a profitable strategy with low downside risk if conducted on multi-currency 
portfolios, particularly if the portfolios are “enriched” with emerging market 
currencies. Bekaert and Harvey (2003) found that U.S. investors investing in 
emerging market portfolios outperformed a number of natural benchmarks. 
Furthermore, the currencies of emerging countries (including GCC countries) are 
typically non-floating, which would make them interesting to examine. This exercise 
may well have value added in terms of better understanding of GCC currencies for 
both academics and practitioners. 
 
1.3 GCC Countries: Economic Background 
The Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) was established on 26 May 1981 to promote 
co-ordination between member states in all fields in order to achieve unity. The 
member countries are Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates 
and Oman. These countries are viewed as a homogenous group not only from an 
economic perspective but also because they share common language, religion, culture 
and political views.  
 
GCC countries are located in west Asia on the west side of the Arabian Gulf with a 
native population of 26.833 million. Total GDP for the GCC countries combined is 
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$1.546 trillion, with Saudi Arabia representing 47.04% and Bahrain the lowest at 
1.75%. GDP per capita is $34,950, with Qatar having the highest level at $103,900 
while Bahrain has the lowest level at $29,200. Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2 exhibit GDP 
and GDP per capita, respectively. In terms of area, Saudi Arabia is the largest and 
Bahrain is the smallest. The total area of the six GCC countries is only 1.73% of the 
world size. Despite the small size of these countries, they account for 24% of the 
world oil production as shown in Figure 1.3. Furthermore, these countries control 
30% of the world oil reserves, they produce 11% of the world natural gas, and they 
have 23% of the world natural gas reserves (Figures 1.4, 1.5 and 1.6). 
 
Figure 1.1: GCC Countries’ GDP ($ billion) 
 
 
 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
Saudi Arabia UAE Qatar Kuwait Oman Bahrain
8 
 
Figure 1.2: GDP per Capita (U.S. Dollar) 
 
 
Figure 1.3: GCC Oil Production Relative to the Rest of the World 
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Figure 1.4: Distribution of Oil Reserves 
  
Figure 1.5: Distribution of Natural Gas Reserves 
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Figure 1.6: Distribution of Natural Gas Production 
 
The economic structure of the GCC countries used to be extremely similar in the 
sense of being predominantly dependent on gas and oil as the main source of income. 
But with oil price fluctuations and with oil price reaching $12 a barrel in the late 
1990s, GCC countries stared feeling the heat, which led them to embark on a 
programme of diversification and reduction of dependence on oil and gas. The 
situation is shown in Table 1.1. 
 
Table 1.1: Distribution of Income Sources 
Year Oil and Gas Non-Oil and Gas 
2007 55% 45% 
2008 49% 51% 
2009 61% 39% 
2010 57% 43% 
2011 51% 49% 
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At the county level, Bahrain has the lowest dependence on oil and gas at only 26% of 
its GDP, while Kuwait is the most dependent on oil and gas by 54% (Table 1.2). 
Income generated from the service sector accounts for 67% of the non-oil account, 
while the manufacturing sector accounts for 33%.   
 
Table 1.2: Income Sources by Country  
Country Oil and Gas Non-Oil and Gas 
Kuwait 54% 46% 
Qatar 52% 48% 
Saudi Arabia 50% 50% 
Oman 47% 53% 
U.A.E 34% 66% 
Bahrain 26% 74% 
 
Since the fall of Saddam Husain in 2003, and the consequent easing of security 
concerns, in the region, rapid economic growth fuelled by higher oil revenue led to 
the emergence of inflationary pressure. The average inflation rate in GCC countries 
was in the vicinity of 10% in 2008, with significant inter-country differences (Table 
1.3). The factors that are believed to have driven up inflation in GCC economies 
include increasing domestic demand and rapid money and credit growth as well as 
rising import prices (Sturm et al., 2008; Central bank of Oman, 2008).  
 
Rising import prices in the GCC economies can be attributed partially to the 
depreciation of the U.S. dollar against the currencies of major trading partners, mainly 
the Eurozone. The GCC currencies have witnessed significant depreciation since 
2002, due mainly to the dollar’s weakness against the currencies of the trading 
partners of GCC countries, even though a significant share of imports comes from 
economies whose currencies are pegged to, or highly influenced by, the U.S. dollar 
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and to a lesser extent from the U.S. Some economists argue that pegging to the U.S. 
dollar helped GCC countries maintain low inflation rate averaging 0.8% in 1999 and 
1.7% in 2002 (Al-Yahyaei, 2011). Table 1.3 reports inflation rates in individual GCC 
countries while Figures 1.7 and 1.8 show the distribution of imports and trade.   
 
Table 1.3: Inflation Rates in GCC Countries 
Year Kuwait Saudi 
Arabia 
Oman Qatar U.A.E Bahrain 
1991 8.13 4.56 4.60 4.42 5.50 0.93 
1992 -0.32 -0.37 0.96 3.06 4.31 -0.29 
1993 0.60 0.84 1.14 -0.87 5.23 2.62 
1994 2.37 0.65 -0.66 1.32 5.72 0.42 
1995 2.53 5.05 -1.13 2.96 4.37 3.13 
1996 3.04 0.87 0.50 7.26 2.98 -0.19 
1997 0.81 -0.43 -0.36 2.60 2.95 -4.59 
1998 0.60 -0.17 0.43 2.92 1.96 -0.42 
1999 3.08 -1.31 0.51 2.16 2.10 -1.26 
2000 1.57 -1.10 -1.20 1.68 1.36 -0.73 
2001 1.45 -1.14 -0.84 1.44 2.80 -1.18 
2002 0.80 0.23 -0.33 0.24 2.92 -0.50 
2003 0.99 0.59 0.17 2.26 3.12 1.68 
2004 1.26 0.36 0.67 6.80 5.04 2.25 
2005 4.12 0.63 1.85 8.81 6.20 2.62 
2006 3.09 2.31 3.44 11.83 9.29 2.04 
2007 5.47 4.11 5.89 13.76 11.65 3.25 
2008 10.50 9.87 12.61 15.05 11.54 3.53 
2009 3.95 5.06 12.56 -4.87 1.56 2.79 
2010 4.10 5.35 3.54 -2.43 0.88 1.97 
2011 4.70 5 4.10 1.9 0.90 -0.40 
Average 2.99 1.95 2.31 3.92 4.40 0.84 
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Figure 1.7: GCC Major Import Partners 
 
 
Figure 1.8: GCC Major Trading Partners 
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1.4 An Outline of the Thesis 
This introductory chapter is followed by nine chapters. Chapter one covers the issues 
under investigation, the motives behind writing this thesis, and the countries under 
investigation. Chapter two is about exchange rate regimes in GCC countries. The 
chapter also deals with the unified GCC currency and the alternative exchange rate 
regimes available for the individual national currencies and for the unified currency. 
 
The literature is reviewed in chapters three, four, and five. Carry trade is defined in 
chapter three, explaining how it is conducted, its size, and currency crashes. Interest 
rate parity, which includes covered and uncovered interest parities, is discussed in 
chapter four where the reasons for the failure of the parity condition are outlined. 
Chapter five examines the Meese and Rogoff (1983a) puzzle and the failure of 
forecasting models. The revival of forecasting models, using new forecasting 
evaluation measures, is discussed in that chapter.  
 
In chapter six, the methodology is presented, describing the selection process for carry 
trade and the forecasting-based strategy as well as the measurement criteria. A 
preliminary examination of the data is presented in chapter seven that includes the 
data sources and description as well as a graphical description and basic statistics. The 
empirical results of both conventional carry trade and the forecasting-based strategy 
are presented in chapter eight. These results are then compared in terms of risk and 
return. Finally, a performance comparison between carry trade and the forecasting-
based strategy is conducted for periods of financial crises. 
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Some extensions are presented in chapter nine. Conventional carry trade is conducted 
on the basis that exchange rates behave like a random walk without drift. It has been 
concluded by researchers that exchange rates do follow a random walk without drift in 
the short run. In long-term horizons, the drift factor becomes statistically significant. 
Also examined is the possibility of utilising the drift factor in terms of profitability, 
error, direction accuracy and risk. Furthermore, the chapter examines the possibility 
of ability of enhancing risk-adjusted return for both strategies when carry trade is 
conducted on portfolios. These portfolios weights are determined by the Sharpe ratios 
of the components. A recapitulation of the findings in chapters eight and nine are 
presented in chapter ten and both main and supplementary findings are stated with 
concluding remarks.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Studying exchange rate regimes is essential for conducting carry trade operations. 
GCC countries, except Kuwait, peg their currencies to the dollar, which has two 
implications: (i) foreign exchange risk does not arise by taking a short position on the 
dollar and a long position on a GCC currency (or vice versa); and (ii) the interest rate 
differential would be typically zero, otherwise the situation would involve a “free 
lunch”. This means that carry trade cannot be conducted on a pair of currencies 
involving the dollar and a GCC currency. However, conditions (i) and (ii) do not hold 
between a GCC currency and a floating non-dollar currency, because GCC currencies 
are as volatile against non-dollar floating currencies as the dollar is. We must bear in 
mind the distinction between what countries announce and what they actually 
practice, which gives rise to a difference between de facto and de jure regimes. 
Rogoff and Reinhart (2002) have found that many countries tend not to practice what 
they declare, perhaps because of the fear of floating, but also because of the fear of 
pegging. 
 
2.2 The IMF’s Classification of Exchange Rate Regimes 
The IMF publishes the exchange rate arrangements reported by its member countries 
every year according to its classification. As of 2 February 2009, the IMF changed the 
classification scheme to establish a system consisting of four de jure and ten de facto 
arrangements. As stated in the Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions 2013, the IMF de jure arrangements include (i) hard pegs (such 
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as exchange arrangements with no separate legal tender and currency board 
arrangements); (ii) soft pegs (including conventional pegged arrangements, pegged 
exchange rates within horizontal bands, crawling pegs, stabilised arrangements, and 
crawl-like arrangements); (iii) floating regimes (such as free floating); and (iv) a 
residual category comprising other managed arrangements assigned to countries 
whose exchange rate arrangements do not meet the criteria for any of the other 
category. De facto classifications, on the other hand, include (i) hard pegs with no 
separate legal tender, (ii) hard pegs with currency board arrangement, (iii) soft pegs 
with conventional pegged arrangement, (iv) soft pegs with horizontal bands, (v) 
crawling pegs, (vi) stabilised soft pegs, (vii) soft pegs with crawl-like arrangements, 
(viii) managed floating, (ix) free floating, and (x) a residual category for other 
managed arrangements.  
 
The classification reported by the IMF is based on declarations by member countries, 
which are required to declare any changes in their exchange rate regimes within 30 
days. In its 2013 annual report on exchange arrangements and exchange restrictions, 
the IMF defines de jure arrangement as “the official announced or estimated 
parameters of the exchange arrangement”. A de facto arrangement is determined by a 
backward-looking approach that relies on past exchange rate movement and historical 
data. The difference between the announced regime and the practiced one can be 
attributed to the fear of floating or lack of credibility. Rose (2011) argues that the de 
jure classification is untrustworthy much of the time and that many countries that 
claim to follow floating may intervene in the foreign exchange market to smooth the 
exchange rate. Calvo and Reinhart (2002) relate the intervention in the exchange 
market of some countries that announce a free floating regime during high volatility 
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period to the credibility of that country’s economy. Moosa (2005) argues that 
currency depreciation may be seen by the market as a sign of economic and monetary 
fragility. On the other hand, Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenergger (2005) show that some 
countries announce a system of pegged exchange rate, while in fact it carries out 
frequent changes in parity. This behaviour is called “fear of pegging”. Other than that, 
many countries that face high inflation and capital controls and state that they adopt 
pegged regime have their currencies traded at a deep discount on the black market.  
 
Nitithanprapas and Willett (2002) argue that the IMF classification suffers from two 
problems: (i) it does not distinguish between all major exchange rate regimes, and (ii) 
it is based on the official announcement of the underlying governments. Kawai (2003) 
argues that the reporting countries do not always give the accurate description of their 
actual practices of exchange rate policies nor provide sufficient information in that 
regard. Eichengreen (1999) found out that a number of countries report a limited or a 
managed flexible regime but practice a narrow or a pegged regime.  
 
Kawai (2003) classifies exchange rate regimes based on volatility into three categories 
(i) pegged, (ii) intermediate, and (iii) flexible. A regime is classified as pegged if 
volatility is less than 0.75%. If volatility is 0.75-1.5%, then it is classified as 
intermediate. And if volatility is more than 1.5% then the regime can be classified as 
flexible. Shambaugh (2004), on the other hand, looks at the monthly change in 
exchange rate for the past 12 months. He classifies regimes, based on the change, to 
four categories: no change, within 1% band, within 2% bands, and no peg. Table 2.1 
reports the exchange rate regimes corresponding to the currencies used in this study. 
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Table 2.1: Exchange Rate Regime Classification 
 CHF GBP JPY SGD CAD KRW SAR QAR OMR BHD KWD AED 
Average 1.31 0.60 110.21 1.59 1.29 1139.75 3.75 3.64 0.38 0.38 0.29 3.67 
SD 0.24 0.06 14.40 0.16 0.20 152.41 0.0020 0.0075 0.0001 0.0002 0.0115 0.0004 
Volatility 
% 
18.03 9.76 13.06 10.37 15.84 13.37 0.05 0.21 0.02 0.05 3.91 0.01 
Kawai 
(2003) 
Flexible Flexible Flexible Flexible Flexible Flexible Peg Peg Peg Peg Flexible Peg 
Shambaugh 
(2004) 
 
No peg No peg No peg No peg No peg No peg within 1% 
band 
within 1% 
band 
within 1% 
band 
within 1% 
band 
No peg within 1% 
band 
IMF  
De Jure 
(2009) 
Other 
Managed 
Arrangement 
Floating 
Regime 
Floating 
Regime 
Soft Peg Floating 
Regime 
Floating 
Regime 
Soft Peg Soft Peg Soft Peg Soft Peg Soft Peg Soft Peg 
IMF  
De Facto 
(2009) 
Other 
Managed 
Arrangement 
Free 
Floating 
Free 
Floating 
Crawl-like 
Arrangement 
Free 
Floating 
Floating Conventional 
peg 
Conventional 
Peg 
Conventional 
Peg 
Conventional 
Peg 
Conventional 
Peg 
Conventional 
Peg 
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2.3 Exchange Rate Regimes in GCC Countries 
One of the main objectives for the GCC is to achieve monetary unity among its members. 
Pegged exchange rates are typically considered to be unsustainable in the long run, as 
their average life-time is less than five years (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995). Oman, 
Bahrain, Qatar, U.A.E, and Saudi Arabia had their currencies pegged to the SDR (de 
jure) and to the U.S. dollar (de facto) since the early 1970s, except the Kuwaiti currency 
that has been pegged to an undisclosed basket of currencies since 1975 (with just a brief 
period in which it was pegged to the U.S. dollar). It was not until 2003 that these 
countries formally adopted the U.S. dollar as their monetary anchor in a first step towards 
a full monetary union.    
 
The choice of pegging to the U.S. dollar does not come without cost. Speculators 
occasionally take a swing at these currencies, particularly when there is a sufficient 
interest rate differential with the U.S. dollar. Saudi Arabia was hit with two speculative 
attacks in 1998 and 2007 as a result of the interest rate differential between the Saudi 
riyal the U.S. dollar (Figure 2.1). The difference in interest rates was caused by 
inflationary pressure in Saudi Arabia when a choice was made not to follow the U.S. 
Federal Reserve in cutting interest rates. The problem of imported inflation does not 
bother the GCC central banks much since they see it as a temporary problem. These 
incidents show that GCC currencies are not immune from speculative attacks, which 
make this study more interesting.  
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The idea of a unified currency was born in the early 1970s when the Central Bank of 
Kuwait hired Robert Mundell, a Nobel Prize winning economist and the founder of the 
notion of “optimum currency area”, to study the possibility of creating a unified currency 
in order to maximise economic efficiency. In 1975 Mundell presented his vision for the 
new currency, without including Saudi Arabia and Oman, by suggesting that the new 
currency should be called “dinar” and its parts “dirham”, based on the historic Islamic 
currency names. It was recommended that the new currency should not replace existing 
currencies and that no date should be set a date for conversion. 
 
Figure 2.1: The SAR/USD Exchange Rate (January 2007 – December 2009) 
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While GCC officials think that a monetary union is a step in the right direction, others 
think the opposite. Laabas and Limam (2002) found that GCC countries do not meet the 
pre-requirements to establish monetary union due to their oil-dependence, small intra-
trading among its members, and the lack in convergence in macroeconomic 
fundamentals. Jadresic (2002) concluded that launching a monetary union for the GCC 
countries will produce many benefits, yet these benefits are not significant enough to 
establish successful economic integration. Shotar and Shams (2005) found that GCC 
countries follow different economic policies and that significant differences exist that 
may limit the expected benefits of the monetary union. Darrat and Al-Shamsi (2005) 
concluded that GCC countries are compatible enough to establish a monetary union and 
that failure to do so is due to socio-political factors that have troubled the process towards 
the monetary union. By using three different testing methods, Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn 
(2006) concluded that the GCC countries are not yet ready to establish a monetary union. 
 
The proposed unified currency, officially called Khaleeji dinar, is faced with the 
challenge of choosing the optimal exchange rate regime that would achieve 
macroeconomic and financial stability in the face of real and nominal shocks. Between 
the two extreme regimes (firm fixing and free floating) there exist intermediate regimes, 
which are normally referred to as “soft pegs”, including limited flexibility in comparison 
to the two extreme regimes. A soft peg is defined as “exchange rates that are currently 
fixed in value (or a narrow range of values) to some other currency or basket of 
currencies, with some commitment by the authorities to defend the peg, but with the 
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value likely to change if the exchange rate comes under significant pressure” (Fischer, 
2001). Several alternative exchange rate regimes are suggested—these are described in 
the following section. 
 
2.4 Alternative Exchange Rate Regimes for GCC Countries 
The literature on exchange rate regime choice leads to the conclusion that no single 
exchange rate regime is good for all countries at all times. Alternative regimes have pros 
and cons as the following discussion reveals. The alternative regimes are discussed in 
turn. 
 
Single Currency Peg 
A country that follows a fixed or pegged exchange rate arrangement is “any country in 
which its central bank or monetary authority sets a fixed buying and selling rate of its 
currency against a foreign currency, known as the anchor currency, and pledges to trade 
in unlimited amounts at that rate” (Caramazza and Aziz, 2000). Shambaugh (2004) 
classifies a currency as pegged if its official exchange rate varied + 2% in the past two 
years. Looking at the USD/KWD exchange rate over the period from 1 April 2010 to 1 
April 2012, it can be clearly seen that it fluctuated more than + 2%, simply because the 
KWD is not pegged to the U.S. dollar but rather to a basket of currencies.  
 
All GCC countries, except Kuwait, have their currencies pegged to the dollar, which 
(presumably) provides stable macroeconomic conditions and helps them avoid nominal 
shocks arising from geopolitical risk. Despite the fact that intra-trade among GCC 
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countries does not exceed 6% of GDP, it helps eliminate the foreign exchange risk arising 
from dealing with each other. Furthermore, the simplicity of this regime makes it suitable 
for countries that do not have to have sophisticated and experienced central banks. Out of 
26 countries in which oil exports account for more than 50% of total exports, 18 
(including GCC countries) have a pegged exchange rate regimes. The downside of such a 
regime is that when a country pegs its currency to another then it is abandoning its 
monetary independence and is forced to mirror the monetary policy of its anchor 
currency, otherwise it will suffer dearly on the hands of speculators. Also, the value of its 
currency would depend on the shape or the health of the anchor currency’s economy 
rather than its own economy. For example, GCC countries suffered from high inflation as 
a result of the weakness of the U.S. dollar despite having good economic fundamentals of 
their own as a result of high oil prices. Frankel (2003b) adds the dollar-induced 
overvaluation problem that caused many currency crises such as Mexico (1994), Thailand 
and Korea (1997), Russia (1998), Brazil (1999), and Turkey (2001), even though none of 
these countries had a formal rigid links to the Dollar. 
 
Kenen (1994) concluded that the floating regime is only suitable for countries that are 
sufficiently diversified in production, implying that countries with concentrated 
production should peg their currencies. Juhn and Mauro (2002) argue that small countries 
should adopt fixed exchange rates while big countries should go with floating. But then 
China, which has the largest population in the world and a strong economy as well as 
being considered the world factory, has a fixed exchange rate, whereas Seychelles (which 
has a population of 88,000) has a floating exchange rate regime (Rose, 2011). Meissner 
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and Oomes (2009) consider trade network externalities as the main factor determining the 
anchor currency—the choice is determined by the volume of trade with countries having 
the same anchor currency.  
 
The point made by Meissner and Oomes (2009) may be valid for GCC countries if we 
examine trade statistics. Based on the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics, Japan is the 
largest trading partner, accounting for 16.2% of the exports, while the U.S. comes in 6
th
 
place, accounting for only 6.5%. On the imports side (which is what matters) the 
European Union is the largest partner, accounting for 24.2% of total imports, while the 
U.S. comes in 4
th
 place after India and China with a 9.9% share. Considering that the 
Chinese yuan is pegged to the U.S. dollar, that would make the U.S. (in a way) the largest 
trading partner. This conclusion, however, must be qualified because it is typically 
assumed that Chinese exporters use the dollar as the currency of invoicing, which is not 
necessarily the case. Furthermore, the policy of pegging to the U.S. dollar was abandoned 
in July 2005, although it was resumed for a short period of time during the global 
financial crisis. Since then China has been on what looks like a crawling peg and, more 
recently, a basket peg.   
 
Managed Floating 
Having a floating exchange rate regime would help GCC countries smooth their business 
cycles faster by using interest rates and allowing them to absorb real shocks more easily. 
Abed et al. (2003) argue that GCC countries have become more diversified with respect 
to their sources of income, which makes a flexible exchange rate policy more desirable in 
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order to ensure the competitiveness of non-oil exports. However, despite diversification, 
the share of non-oil exports in total exports is still insignificant, which casts a shadow of 
doubt on the validity of this argument.   
 
Khan (2009) suggests that a floating exchange regime is not the best policy, given the 
lack of experience of GCC central banks. Furthermore, diversification is still limited as 
GCC economies depend largely on oil as their main source of income, in which case 
volatile fluctuations in oil price would lead to huge fluctuations in the exchange rate, 
which might force central banks to intervene in the foreign exchange market to smooth 
out exchange rate movements. In addition, there is a lack of well-developed financial 
markets and liquid financial instruments in the region—these are required as hedging 
instruments against exposure to foreign exchange risk. Finally, corporate sector 
investment depends largely on government projects, which reduces the role of interest 
rate as a tool of macroeconomic policy that can be used to control the economic cycle and 
inflation. Converting directly from a pegged regime to a floating regime is not advisable 
as Gudmundsson (2005) argues that the move from a single anchor currency peg to a 
basket peg can be an important step on the way to a flexible exchange rate regime. 
  
Pegging to a Basket of Currencies 
Pegging to basket of currencies would be a useful way for the GCC countries to introduce 
some flexibility in the new currency exchange rates but that, unlike pegging to a single 
currency, would require more involvement from the monetary authorities. One possibility 
is to peg the new currency to the SDR, a system that has been used by most of the GCC 
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currencies. Pegging to the SDR, for example, would reduce the volatility of oil export 
receipts in comparison with a dollar peg. Horngren and Vredin (1989) argue that having a 
basket with an undisclosed components and weights would increase the uncertainty of 
exchange rate movement, leading to higher foreign exchange risk. Khan (2009) suggests 
that for basket pegging to be efficient, the basket components should not be disclosed. 
Horngren and Vredin (1989) argue that adopting a basket peg reduces exchange rate 
fluctuations, provides balance of payments stability and might help contain imported 
inflation. 
 
A basket peg requires the choice of the weights of the baskets components. Pegging the 
common GCC currency to a currency basket based on the trade volume with the major 
partners would provide an alternative to the U.S. dollar peg to meet the economic 
challenges in the long run. On the other hand, the central bank would lose the interest rate 
as a tool of macroeconomic policy, since the interest rate for the unified currency would 
be the weighted average of the interest rates on the basket currencies. Kuwait abandoned 
the U.S. dollar peg regime and went back to pegging its currency to an undisclosed basket 
of currencies in reaction to the inflationary pressure arising from the weakness of the U.S. 
dollar. However, Khan (2009) argues that the impact on inflation of the move from U.S. 
dollar peg to a basket peg was limited. In a report by Al-Arabiya News (2011), John 
Sfakianakis, Chief Economist of Banque Saudi Fransi, agreed with Khan (2009) by 
saying that “the experience in Kuwait, where the currency is now managed against a trade 
weighted basket, shows that the dollar accounts for at least 65 precent of the currency 
basket and inflation remains a problem”.  Abed et al. (2003) compare the dollar peg to a 
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dollar-euro basket peg as alternative exchange rate regimes for improving the external 
stability of GCC countries. It remains to say that moving from a dollar peg to a basket 
peg where the dollar is still the dominant component is bound to produce the result 
envisaged by Khan. The only way to eliminate the imported inflation resulting purely 
from changes in exchange rates is to peg the currency to an import-weighted basket. 
 
Pegging to the Price of Oil 
Frankel (2003a) suggests what is known as “pegging to export prices” (PEP). This simple 
form of exchange rate regime, whereby the domestic currency is pegged to the price of 
main export commodity, would be suitable for small open economies and emerging 
markets. If, for example, the GCC currency is pegged to the price of oil, then if the oil 
price moves by 5% from $100 to $105, then the GCC currency should appreciate by 5% 
against the U.S. dollar. The process would be very transparent and the market would not 
have to rely on economic data that are in most cases unreliable (Christensen, 2012). In his 
study of oil exporters for the period 1970-2000, Frankel (2003b) concluded that these 
countries would have been better off by pegging their currencies to oil rather than to the 
U.S. dollar. He argues that pegging to the main export commodity would have provided 
both the stability that dollarisation is supposed to deliver and the automatic adjustment to 
terms of trade shocks that floating rates are supposed to deliver. It can be argued, 
however, that the PEP is mainly suitable for small economies specialising in the 
production and export of mineral and agricultural commodities—GCC countries would 
not fall in this category since they account for a sizable part of the world total oil exports. 
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Other than that, high volatility in the oil market would lead to huge swings in the 
exchange rate, which would have adverse ramifications on other sectors in the economy.      
 
2.5 The Pegging Controversy 
One of the main targets for the GCC to achieve monetary union was to create a unified 
GCC currency in 2010. Although that date came and went, the idea of creating the unified 
currency is still there, and although it might be late the goal is still alive. In considering 
the unified currency, the GCC has to choose one of four alternative exchange rate 
regimes: (i) pegging to a major currency, most likely U.S. dollar; (ii) pegging to a basket 
of currencies; (iii) pegging to the price of oil; and (iv) managed floating. Since floating 
(managed or otherwise) can be justifiably ruled out, the choice is among the three 
pegging systems. 
 
Choosing one of the alternative regimes would not be a very simple task for the GCC. 
Rose (2011) states that there are no compelling linkages between the exchange rate 
regime and economic growth. Baxter and Stockman (1989) and Flood and Rose (1995) 
failed to detect any significant difference between fixed and floating rates except for the 
volatility of the real exchange rate. For decades, GCC countries (with the exception of 
Kuwait) pegged their currencies to the U.S. dollar and before that to the SDR. The fixed 
exchange rate regime seemed to serve them for many years in maintaining economic 
stability. Based on a report published in Elaph Newspaper (2009), Robert Mundell (the 
architect behind the unified currency) strongly supported keeping the single currency peg 
regime and opposed moving to a basket of currencies and floating. Abed et al. (2003) 
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agreed with Mundell by concluding that pegging the new currency to the U.S. dollar 
would be the best choice since policy management would continue to remain on already 
familiar grounds. By looking at the IMF 2013 annual report it can be seen that 44 out of 
the 191 countries use the dollar as an exchange rate anchor.  
 
Pegging to the U.S. dollar has served both the United States and the GCC countries well 
for decades, both economically and politically. Keeping the GCC currencies pegged to 
the U.S. dollar would be their best choice, particularly if the inflationary problem is seen 
as temporary. Husain et al. (2005) found that developing countries adopting fixed 
exchange rates are exposed to lower inflation than developing countries with flexible 
regimes. By analysing the effect of exchange rate regime on inflation and output in South 
Eastern and Central Europe for the period 1994-2004, De Grauwe and Schnabl (2005) 
revealed significant impact of fixed exchange rate on both low inflation and real growth. 
Rogoff et al. (2003) also concluded that fixed exchange rate regimes offer some anti-
inflation credibility gain without compromising growth objectives.  
 
Pegging to the U.S. dollar can be justified in terms of the status of the U.S. dollar as a 
safe haven currency during crises. It is noteworthy that the dollar appreciated during the 
global financial crisis although the crisis was American in origin—that was because 
(among other reasons) the status of the U.S. dollar. The same can be said about the 
resurgence of the dollar in late 2014 and early 2015—the bullish trend is continuing at the 
time of writing. Frankel (2007) states that the U.S. government and financial markets 
have long been accustomed to viewing the U.S. dollar and U.S. bonds as a safe haven, 
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where money flees when risk perceptions shoot up. However, if Asian and oil-exporting 
countries start switching their reserves out of the dollar, the currency may lose the safe 
haven status. This is exactly what happened to the pound in the first half of the last 
century. 
 
Kaul and Sapp (2006) define a safe haven currency as a currency that behaves like a 
hedge for a reference portfolio of risky assets conditional on movements in global risk 
aversion. Ranaldo and Soderlind (2010) create a list of economic, political and natural 
disaster events by a news search and study the performance of several major currencies 
on those dates. The economic disasters include financial crises, defaults and bankruptcies, 
while political disasters include wars, terrorism and bombings. Natural disasters include 
hurricanes, tornados, tsunamis and earthquakes. All currencies depreciate against the U.S. 
dollar in times of disasters, which confirms the safe haven status of the U.S. dollar as 
documented by Maggiori (2011). Table 2.2 is a list of recent disasters. 
 
The choice of an anchor currency does not have to be based on economic benefits alone. 
Frankel (2003b) considers the political effect to play big role in choosing the anchor 
currency. The GCC is made of small countries located in a very unstable region with little 
population that cannot defend themselves. This makes security one of the top priorities 
for the ruling families there. The United States was the first to take advantage of the 
potential threat by creating what is known as “petrodollar”. The origin of the petrodollar 
system was detailed in an article by Robinson (2012) who wrote: 
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In 1973, a deal was struck between Saudi Arabia and the United States in which every 
barrel of oil purchased from the Saudis would be denominated in U.S. dollars. Under this 
new arrangement, any country that sought to purchase oil from Saudi Arabia would be 
required to first exchange their own national currency for U.S. dollars. In exchange for 
Saudi Arabia’s willingness to denominate their oil sales exclusively in U.S. dollars, the 
United States offered weapons and protection of their oil fields from neighbouring 
nations, including Israel. By 1975, all of the OPEC nations had agreed to price their own 
oil supplies exclusively in U.S. dollars in exchange for weapons and military protection. 
This petrodollar system, or more simply known as an “oil for dollars” system, created an 
immediate artificial demand for U.S. dollars around the globe. And of course, as global 
oil demand increased, so did the demand for U.S. dollars. 
 
Table 2.2: A List of Disasters 
Date Event Type 
12/3/1993 Storm of the Century Nature 
20/12/1994 Tequila peso crisis Finance 
2/7/1997 East Asia financial crisis Finance 
27/10/1997 Global stock market crash Finance 
23/8/1998 Russian financial crisis Finance 
10/3/2000 Dot.Com bubble burst Finance 
4/6/2001 2001 Atlantic hurricane Nature 
11/9/2001 World Trade Center Attacks Terror & War 
2/12/2001 Enron accounting scandal Finance 
1/11/2002 SARS Nature 
20/3/2003 Second Gulf War Terror & War 
1/8/2003 European heat wave Nature 
11/3/2004 Madrid bombing Terror & War 
24/9/2004 Hurricane Rita Nature 
26/12/2004 Tsunami Nature 
7/7/2005 London bombing I Terror & War 
27/7/2005 London bombing II Terror & War 
23/8/2005 Hurricane Katrina Nature 
8/10/2005 Kashmir earthquake Nature 
12/7/2006 Lebanon War Terror & War 
27/2/2007 Sell-off of China shares Finance 
1/8/2007 – 30/4/2009 Global financial crisis Finance 
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Peter Morici, a professor of international economics at the University of Maryland, states 
that “the other thing is the United States guarantees the security of Saudi Arabia” 
(Franceschi, 2008). Other than that, the GCC governments and private investors hold an 
estimated $140 billion in U.S. stocks and $200 billion in long-term U.S. treasuries. Add 
to that China, which is in a way pegged to the U.S. dollar, is the largest holder of U.S. 
debt (holding $1.1449 trillion according to the Department of the Treasury, 2012). 
Abandoning the U.S. dollar as an anchor currency might cause a free fall of the U.S. 
dollar, leading to catastrophic losses for many countries, particularly GCC countries. 
They would not only lose on their investments, but they also sit on $1.6 trillion in cash 
reserves, mainly U.S. dollar, as mentioned by Moody’s credit research report (2013). The 
priceless thing that these countries will be gambling on by abandoning the U.S. dollar 
will be their security.   
 
The single currency pegging regime may be costly in some case. In August and 
September 1998 strong credit demand forced SAMA (Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency) to 
increase the interest rate on the Saudi Riyal to tighten liquidity. In September 1998 the 3-
months interest rate on the Saudi Riyal went up to 6.21% and in March 1999 it was 
6.85%, creating 1.95% interest rate differential with the U.S. dollar and giving carry 
traders a golden opportunity to make easy profit since the Saudi riyal is pegged to the 
U.S. dollar with no band to move (Azzam, 2002). Since that increase was not inflation 
related, it did not last long, and when the interest rate differential started to get narrow, 
carry traders started unwinding their Saudi riyal positions. As a result of the unwinding, 
SAMA had to intervene in the foreign exchange market to prevent the Saudi Riyal from 
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collapsing at the cost of $1 billion. That was a very high price to pay, particularly that the 
price of oil at that time was $12 per barrel. Another attack happened after the U.S. 
Federal Reserve cut interest rate on 18 September 2007 but the SAMA decided not to 
follow as a result of inflationary pressure. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
Staying pegged to the U.S. dollar might be the most desirable choice for the GCC 
countries at the moment but, as Frankel (1999) believes, no single exchange rate regime 
is appropriate for all countries or at all times. Many factors justify this choice, such as 
their dependence on oil (which is invoiced in U.S. dollar) and the simplicity of such a 
regime since GCC countries do not have sophisticated and experienced central banks. 
However, this regime can be costly some times, as documented by Azzam (2002), and 
would take away the monetary independence from these countries. It might also cause 
imported inflation. GCC countries, except Kuwait, seem to be comfortable with the 
regime as they consider the inflation problem to be temporary.  
 
The unified currency project had some hits since the agreement was made in 2002. In 
December 2006 Oman withdrew from the project, arguing that it would not be able to 
comply with the convergence criteria (inflation, interest rates, reserves, fiscal balance, 
and public debt). Due to inflationary pressure, Kuwait abandoned its peg to the U.S. 
dollar and went back to the basket of currencies on 20 May 2007. The final blow came in 
May 2009 when the United Arab Emirates decided not to participate in the new currency 
as a protest against the location of the Gulf Central Bank in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia (John, 
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2011). This is how fragile the union is, which makes the future of the GCC unified 
currency unclear and ambiguous. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
CARRY TRADE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE 
 
3.1 The Concept of Carry Trade 
Carry trade is a well-known strategy conducted not only by major financial institutions 
but also by individual investors. Despite the simplicity of the strategy, it is rather risky. 
Although some economists and practitioners consider carry trade to be a primitive and 
naïve strategy, there are some indications that it can be profitable—for example, 
Flassbeck and La Marca (2007) describes carry trade as “profitable and risky, but 
attractive”. Hochradl and Wegner (2010) define carry trade as “a strategy in which an 
investor finances a long position in a high-yield currency by borrowing in a low-yield 
currency, betting that exchange rate will not change in such a way as to offset the profits 
made on the interest rate differential”.  
 
Frankel (2007) gives a broader definition of carry trade covering any investment strategy 
that involves shifting out of low-interest-rate assets into everything else: emerging market 
debt, equities, real estate, commodities, etc. However, the simplest and narrowest form of 
carry trade is conducted by borrowing low-interest currency (called the funding 
currency), converting it into a high-interest currency (called the investment/target 
currency) through foreign exchange, investing it at a higher yield, and at the end of the 
investment horizon converting the proceeds back to the funding currency to repay the 
loan. This action would allow the trader or the investor to take advantage of the interest 
rate differential between the two currencies. But it is not that easy—in order for carry 
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trade to be profitable, the investment/target currency should not depreciate against the 
funding currency by more than the interest rate differential.  
 
Having the interest rate differential as the major factor in the carry trade selection 
process, carry traders look for the reasons of such differentials. Central banks would raise 
interest rates for two reasons, either to stop capital from going out of the country’s 
financial system or to fight inflation. Carry traders would be interested in the inflation 
induced interest rates rather than capital flight, because interest rates caused by capital 
flight have a higher chance of deteriorating at a great speed and with little warning. But if 
a country has an extremely high inflation rate relative to the rest of the world, its currency 
will depreciate very rapidly (Zimbabwe is an obvious recent example of the effect of 
hyperinflation) confirming the Flood and Rose (2002) finding that UIP works better for 
“crisis” countries.  
 
Differences in inflation rates across the developed world are very small—hence, they do 
not have much of an impact on a country’s competitiveness. Apurv (2010) documents the 
increasing role of inflation in the a section of currency returns and the increase in carry 
returns due to the presence of differentially inflation targeting central banks. Clarida and 
Waldman (2008) found that “bad news for inflation is good news for the exchange rate”, 
while Apurv (2010) found that bad news for inflation is not only good news for a specific 
currency carry return but it also helps sort carry returns in the cross section.  
 
  
 
38 
 
As carry trade has a huge effect on the exchange rates of the currencies involved, it poses 
significant implications not only for investors but also for policy makers. This is 
particularly true in developing countries whose economic performance relies largely on 
exports. Capital inflows induced by carry trade and the resulting currency appreciation 
affects competitiveness. As a result, the monetary authorities have to intervene to prevent 
their currencies from appreciating too fast. At the same time, they have to prepare for the 
upcoming carry trade unwinding; an event which would be equally disastrous for the 
economy because of the high volatility in the foreign exchange market that would follow.  
 
3.2 Who Conducts Carry Trade? 
Carry trade is conducted by both financial institutions and individuals, particularly as 
barriers to international currency investments are becoming smaller. Jylha and Suominen 
(2011) found that hedge funds are the biggest active player in carry trade. The operation 
is conducted for two reasons. First, it is used to fund the purchase of an asset 
denominated in the investment currency through actual borrowing of the funding 
currency. This kind of operation is typically conducted by those who invest in real assets 
or even stocks. In some cases, when the slope of the of the yield curve of the funding 
currency is positive, they might take a step further by not matching the maturities of the 
investment with funding to take advantage of the interest rate differential between short 
and long-term borrowing in the funding currency, creating a “funding gap”. In this case 
the investor is faced with another kind of risk, which is the interest rate risk resulting 
from the possibility that the funding currency interest rate moves up.  
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The second reason is purely speculative—to take advantage of the interest rate 
differential. Fama’s (1984) “forward premium puzzle” induces traders to envisage that 
the exchange rate will not move or even move in their favour. Here the dealer would buy 
the investment currency forward (which is an over-the-counter product) or futures 
contracts that are traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, hoping that the exchange 
rate does not go beneath the present forward (futures) price. One feature that financial 
institutions look at, when dealing in a regulated market is the minimising of counterparty 
risk. Institutional carry traders prefer to speculate in forward markets rather than going 
through the process of borrowing and lending for a number of reasons, including the 
leveraging available in the forward market, that the trader would not have to exhaust the 
available credit line, and that many of the forward market products are off-balance-sheet 
items.  
 
The behavioural side of carry traders plays an important role in the process. Kaizoji 
(2010) classifies carry traders based on their behaviour into two types: (i) rational 
investors who undertake such a strategy to maximise profit at the end of the investment 
horizon using asset-pricing models; and (ii) those who account for most of carry trade 
activities, the carry traders who try to maximise their profit by exploring the market. 
Carry traders usually conduct such a strategy based on the expected payoff from carry 
trade or/and are influenced by the decisions of other carry traders in a “follow the herd” 
process. Pedersen (2009) describes carry trade as “discretionary trading”, meaning that 
the decision to buy or sell is at the traders’ discretion, based on their past experience and 
information. 
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3.3 The Profitability of Carry Trade 
Some economists argue that carry trade tends to be a rewarding strategy most of the time, 
unless some unfortunate dramatic event comes along. Jorda and Taylor (2009) found that 
the so called “naïve carry trade” on average produced positive returns for long periods. 
Burnside et al. (2006) found that for the period from 1977 to 2005 the cumulative return 
realised from carry trade was very similar to investing in the S&P 500 index. Supporting 
the Burnside et al. (2006) findings, Moosa (2008) conducted a study between six pairs of 
currencies (two funding currencies, JPY and CHF, and three investment currencies, USD, 
GBP, and CAD) for the period from 1:1996- 4:2006. He shows that carry trade can be 
profitable over long period of time, but it involves a higher degree of risk. Menkhoff et al. 
(2012) found that carry trade leads to large and significant unconditional excess returns of 
more than 5% p.a. even after accounting for transaction costs and market turmoils. Jylha 
and Suominen (2011) conducted a study of 11 major currencies for the period from 
January 1979 to December 2008 and found that the simplest form of carry trade produced 
a mean monthly return of 0.47% and a standard deviation of 2.06%, implying a monthly 
Sharpe ratio of 0.228 (0.789 annualised). Not only does carry trade produce returns that 
exceed the return on the S&P 500—as confirmed by Burnside et al. (2006), Moosa 
(2008), and Menkhoff et al. (2012)—but it is also less risky than the stock market.  
 
Gyntelberg and Remolona (2007) show that the annualised average daily return on the 
Australian dollar/yen carry trade was 12.5% per year during the period 2001-September 
2007, compared to 3.6% for the S&P 500 index. The dilemma is that researchers have 
failed to establish statistically significant correlation between the payoffs of carry trade 
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and the traditional risk factors. Barroso and Santa-Clara (2013) argue that conventional 
stock market risk factors do not explain carry trade returns at all—the same conclusion is 
reached by Burnside et al. (2011a) as they contend that the high payoffs on carry trade 
represent a compensation for bearing a risk. They argue that it is difficult to explain the 
profitability of carry trade with conventional risk factors. Moosa (2008) points out that, 
unlike stock market investment, high Sharpe ratios do not necessarily represent 
compensation for risk because the payoff is not associated with standard risk factors. 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen, (2009) conclude that carry trade returns are much less 
variable than stock returns, with an annualised standard deviation of about 5% (compared 
to about 15% for stocks)—as a result the Sharpe ratio of the carry trade is double that of 
stock.  
 
The use of developing countries’ currencies in carry trade also produced encouraging 
results. Applying carry trade to emerging markets currencies provides higher risk-
adjusted return, as measured by the Sharpe ratio, than developed countries’ currencies, as 
concluded by Hamlin (2013). Bhatti (2012) conducted a study using the Pakistani rupee 
(PAK) against U.S. dollar, Swiss franc, and Japanese yen for the period 1:1995 – 6:2010 
and found that carry trade against the U.S. dollar produced better return than when the 
operation is conducted against the CHF and JPY. One reason for the relatively higher 
profitability of carry trade in the PAK with the U.S. dollar is that the PAK exchange rate 
vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar is relatively more stable than the PAK exchange rates vis-à-vis 
the Japanese yen and Swiss franc. His samples produced average annualised return of 
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12.03% to 16.70% compared to -3.4% to 7.19% for the S&P 500, Swiss, and Nikkei 225 
stock market indices. 
 
Returns on carry trade can be boosted with leveraging and well diversified portfolios as 
illustrated by Darvas (2009) who showed that with a well-diversified highly leveraged 
carry trade portfolio, the annualised return is about 46% for the period from 1976 to 2008 
compared to 5% for less leveraged carry trade portfolios. However, with all the success 
and popularity of carry trade among traders and investors, “the reasons for the success of 
the carry trade remain a bit of a mystery” as noted by The Economist (2007). 
 
Carry trade tends to be pursued only when the interest differential is wide enough to 
compensate for foreign exchange risk (Gyntelberg and Remolona, 2007). Although the 
interest rate differential is the only factor carry traders look at when conducting the 
operation, it does not mean that a bigger interest differential would produce higher profit.  
Olmo and Pilbeam (2009) conducted a study using the JPY, EUR, USD, GBP, and CHF 
and found that the GBP/USD pair produced a consistent excess return despite having the 
lowest interest rate differential. Moosa (2008) argues that the interest rate differential is 
not a good indicator of return on carry trade. Using six pairs of currencies (JPY/USD, 
JPY/GBP, JPY/CAD, CHF/USD, CHF/GBP, and CHF/CAD) for the period 4:1995 – 
4:2006, he demonstrated that the pair with the lowest interest rate differential, CHF/CAD, 
produced an annualised return of 4.83% which was not the lowest return.  
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Carry trade thrives on high interest rate differential and low exchange rate volatility. 
Galati et al. (2007) provide evidence indicating that foreign exchange trade volumes are 
positively correlated with higher domestic interest rates. Hattori and Shin (2007) find 
evidence indicating that volumes in carry trade involving the yen are higher when interest 
differentials against the yen are high. Jylha and Suominen (2011) find that the number of 
speculators increases as the interest rate differential goes higher. Galati et al. (2007) state 
that interest rate differentials have been a driving force behind exchange rate movements 
in recent years. However, Moosa and Halteh (2012) suggest that there is no clear-cut 
relation between the interest rate differentials and movement of exchange rates.  
 
3.4 The Size of Carry Trade 
Around $5 trillion is traded in the foreign exchange market every single day, according to 
a survey conducted by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in 2013, up from $4.7 
trillion in October 2011. This compares with global trade of goods and services of $18.3 
trillion a year, or about $50 billion a day. The difference between the $5 trillion and $50 
billion is accounted for by speculation in the foreign exchange market, of which carry 
trade is a part.  
 
According to a BIS report, the outstanding foreign exchange contracts (not counting those 
on futures exchanges) had a gross notional value of trillions of dollars. It is widely 
assumed that hedge funds use derivatives contracts to enter carry trade positions. The 
foreign exchange market is not only huge, it is more powerful than central banks. 
Observers still remember 16 September 1992, what is known as Black Wednesday, when 
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George Soros forced the British government to withdraw from the European Exchange 
Rate Mechanism (ERM) following failure to keep the pound exchange rate above its 
agreed lower limit. Even when Alan Bollard, the Governor of the Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand, repeatedly warned FX market participants that the New Zealand dollar (NZD) 
was significantly overvalued against the Japanese yen during the periods 2004-2005 and 
2007, but his warning had no or little effect on speculators. Figure 3.1 shows the 
exchange rate between the Japanese yen in New Zealand dollar over the period 2004-
2007. There was a similar reaction to the few instances the Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
intervened in the currency market, failing to slow down the sharp appreciation of the New 
Zealand dollar. The question is that out all of the money exchanged in both foreign 
exchange markets and over-the-counter derivative, how much is used in carry trade? 
 
Carry trade is a widely used strategy—hedge funds and investment banks use it and sell it 
to investors in the form exchange traded funds (ETF), index linked notes and so on. It is 
widely assumed that hedge funds use derivatives contracts to enter carry trade positions. 
To some extent, pension funds, charitable endowments, investment banks, and wealthy 
individuals may also be engaged in carry trades through derivatives. Most measures do 
not allow the segregation of transactions associated with carry trade from other types of 
investment activities, which makes it difficult to measure the size of carry trade. Jylha 
and Suominen (2011) argue that hedge funds are so powerful that they have the ability to 
move the foreign exchange and the fixed income markets. They found that the total hedge 
fund industry’s assets under management are close to 6% of the M2 money supply of 
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their sample countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherland, Canada, Japan, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States).   
 
Figure 3.1: JPY/NZD Exchange Rate (January 2004 – December 2007) 
 
 
Curcuru et al. (2010) tried to measure the volume of carry trade by looking at exchange-
traded funds (ETF’s), exchange-traded notes (ETN’s), data from U.S. Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) showing net open exchange rate futures position 
traded in Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), and cross-border lending. They admitted 
the difficulties of finding the correct size of carry trade because the majority of carry 
trade transactions are done over-the-counter and they are off-balance-sheet items. They 
attribute the difficulty of estimating the size of carry trade to the absence of segregation 
of transactions associated with carry trade from other transactions. Galati et al. (2007) 
tried to estimate the size of carry trade using BIS data but reached the same conclusion of 
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not being able to distinguish carry trade transactions from others. The BIS (2007) makes 
the observation that estimating the size of the positions associated with carry trade and 
assessing their impact on exchange rates is notoriously difficult. When trying to measure 
the carry trade activity in the Japanese yen for the period 1997 to 2007, Gagnon and 
Chaboud (2007) concluded that the available data on off-balance sheet (derivatives) 
positions do not provide much information on carry trade activity.  
 
Becker and Clifton (2007) found that hedge funds are a major player in carry trade and 
that they tend to fund their positions through cross-border bank lending. Capital under 
management in hedge funds increased by almost threefold between 2002 and 2007 to 
over $1.5 trillion. Since most of these funds are located in offshore banking centers, this 
would explain the difficulties of obtaining reliable information on their size. McGuire and 
Tarashev (2006) show that cross-border claims in Japanese yen at the end of 2005 on a 
year-on-year basis of $21.1 trillion (JPY/USD was very popular pair at that time), but still 
they could not determine how much of that amount is related to carry trade. The deputy 
governor of the People’s Bank of China estimated U.S. dollar carry trade to be $1,500 
billion during the World Economic Forum in Davos (Switzerland) in January 2010, up 
from $1,000 billion in 2007 (Garnham, 2010). Despite ambiguity and the controversy 
among academics, central bankers, and practitioners on the size of carry trade, there is a 
unanimous agreement among them that carry trade is huge.    
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Carry trade speculation positions are fuelled by high interest rate differentials and low 
exchange rate volatility. Brunnermeier et al. (2008) argue that there is clear positive 
correlation between the average interest rate differential and the average net futures 
position of speculators in the respective currency. The BIS (2007) points out that “against 
the background of low exchange rate volatility, the continuing build-up of carry trades is 
an important mechanism through which interest rate differential plays a role”. Adrian et 
al. (2009) confirm the effect of carry trade on the exchange rate market by stating that the 
carry trade channel is a strong factor in determining exchange rate movement. 
Brzeszczynski and Melvin (2006) study carry trade between the U.S. and Europe and 
measure volume by the number of trades in the foreign exchange market per time period. 
They find that changes in target interest rates do not significantly affect the number of 
trades per day. Nishigaki (2007) focuses on the flow of yen carry trade into the U.S. 
Using a structural VAR model, he finds that the effect of interest differential between the 
U.S. and Japan on carry trade volume is not statistically significant. On the other hand, 
what affects volume the most is economic conditions in the U.S. as measured by the S&P 
500 index. Galati and Melvin (2004) use growth in exchange market turnover to analyse 
carry trade volume in Australia, Canada, the Eurozone, U.K., Japan, and Switzerland and 
find significant effects from both interest rate differentials and exchange rate movements. 
 
3.5 Leveraged Carry Trade 
Carry trade is defined by Sy and Tabarraei (2009) as a “leveraged cross-currency position 
to take advantage from interest rate differentials and high Sharpe ratio of this market”. 
Trying to capitalise on the failure of UIP, carry traders look for new ways to maximise 
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return on carry trade positions. Gagnon and Chaboud (2007) argue that, in general, 
investors use leverage to raise the expected return on their capital, but higher return 
comes at the cost of greater risk. Jylha and Suominen (2011) conclude that hedge funds’ 
investments, which include carry trade, are typically highly leveraged. Liu et al. (2012) 
state that the use of leverage is an essential feature of carry trade. Hattori and Shin (2009) 
characterise leverage as a double-sided sword as it can magnify losses as well as gain.  
Although carry trade is a leveraged strategy, dealers have pushed it to become even more 
leveraged than before. Seduced by margins as low as 2%, dealers started leveraging their 
positions further, since large position are required for carry trade to yield sufficient return 
(Darvas, 2009). Such extra leverage would yield a higher return (or loss), leading to 
bigger bonus at the end of the year if the position goes in the desired direction or to a 
termination letter if it goes the other way. Return is an inverted U-shaped function of 
leverage: when leverage is small an increase in leverage boosts return, but over a certain 
leverage value return starts to drop. 
 
The work of Dunis and Miao (2007), Pukthuanthong et al. (2007), and many others 
examines carry trade at its minimal leveraging form, showing how profitable the strategy 
can be in the long run. However, Darvas (2009) shows how catastrophic extensive 
leveraging could be if the market does not go the right way, but at the same time he 
shows that, with a well-diversified highly leveraged carry trade portfolio, the return is 
much greater, reaching 46% on an annualised basis for the period from 1976 to 2008 
compared to 5% for less leveraged carry trade. In its annual report, the Bank of 
International Settlements (2007) highlights the role of carry trade, arguing that since carry 
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traders are typically highly leveraged, they could be forced to unwind positions very 
quickly in response to changing market conditions, which might have a large impact on 
exchange rates, particularly in smaller markets. Gagnon and Chaboud (2007) point out 
that carry trade is characterised as a high leverage strategy, making the positions more 
vulnerable for any foreign exchange movements.  
 
Adrian et al. (2010) document evidence showing a strong positive relation between 
changes in leverage and changes in balance sheet size. During booms the balance sheet is 
leveraged and vice a versa—the key here is credit rating, which is associated with the 
cost of funds. Balance sheet size is closely related to the overall market risk appetite 
which is measured by VIX (the ticker symbol for the Chicago Board Option Exchange 
market volatility index) or, as they call it, the “fear index”. Larger balance sheet means 
greater risk appetite, which means that having higher returns from leveraged carry trade 
positions comes with a high price tag. Darvas (2009) argues that while leveraged carry 
trade may boost profitability, it boosts downside risk substantially. Gagnon and Chaboud 
(2007) reach the conclusion that following the collapse of Long-Term Capital 
Management (LTCM) in September 1998, many banks endeavoured to cut back on the 
leverage of their hedge funds, putting more pressure on the JPY/USD rate, as seen in 
Figure 3.2. 
 
  
  
 
50 
 
Figure 3.2: The JPY/USD Exchange Rate (August 1998-November 1998) 
 
 
3.6 Do Traders Lose in Carry Trade? 
The Economist (2007) describes carry trade as “picking up nickels in front of 
steamrollers: you have a long run of small gains but eventually get squashed”. 
Deterioration can occur suddenly, thus wiping out carry trade profits. Carry trade is 
described by Burnside et al. (2011b) as a speculative strategy, which means that despite 
the generous payoff dealers get from exploring the market through carry trade, the market 
punishes them from time to time for their greed, in which case they incur huge losses. 
Baillie and Chang (2011) warn that carry trade involves excessive risk over long 
horizons, which makes currency traders vulnerable to any sudden unanticipated changes 
in exchange rates. This punishment is referred to by Plantin and Shin (2006) as “the day 
of reckoning”. 
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Jorda and Taylor (2009) describe carry trade as a naïve strategy that has seen very high 
returns for long periods, followed by large crash losses caused by the depreciation of 
investment currencies. These losses can be exceptionally high when no stop-loss-order is 
present. Flassbeck and La Marca (2007) states that speculators suffer from crash risk and 
“the likelihood of extreme events” that cannot be diversified away. Plantin and Shin 
(2006) state that “not only does uncovered interest parity fail, but a currency with a high 
interest rate tends to exhibit the classic price pattern of “going up by the stairs, and 
coming down in the elevator”. During the 1990s the interest rate in Japan was near zero, 
which encouraged traders to borrow JPY and invest in USD-denominated assets—that 
strategy worked well, leading to a currency bubble of almost $140 billion of open 
positions. In the period 5-9 October 1998, the U.S. dollar crashed against the Japanese 
yen, as the JPY/USD rate went down from 134.54 to 117 (that is almost 13%) in five 
days. By the end of the month, the USD lost almost 20% against the JPY as seen in 
Figure 3.2—carry trade was blamed for that crash. In late 2008 the Japanese yen 
appreciated almost 45% against the Australian dollar (a popular carry trade pair at that 
time). Between 21 July 2008 and 27 October 2008 the exchange rate went from 104.18 to 
56.97 as seen in Figure 3.3—again, carry trade way blamed for what happened. 
 
Carry trade unwinding should not be completely blamed for such crashes. The triggering 
of stop-loss orders would create a domino effect in the market, causing both carry traders 
and foreign exchange speculators who are not involved in carry trade to square up their 
positions and stop their losses. The damage caused by unwinding positions is amplified 
by the degree of leverage in the foreign exchange market, where in some cases traders 
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would require a margin of as low as 2% for trading by a common inexperienced person. 
These low margins and higher volatility trigger margin calls quickly, causing traders to 
abandon their positions and stop their losses. 
 
Figure 3.3: The JPY/AUD Exchange Rate (July 2008—October 2008) 
 
 
Brunnermeier et al. (2008) found that high interest rate differentials predict positive 
speculator positions where speculators go long on a high-interest currency and short on a 
low-interest currency. Curcuru et al. (2010) state that carry trade thrives in periods of low 
exchange rate volatility and high interest rate differentials, but the atmosphere of low 
volatility can be deceiving many times. The false feeling of calmness encourages traders 
to build up larger positions, giving rise to huge losses when the turmoil stars, particularly 
when these positions are highly leveraged. Becker and Clifton (2007) argue that with 
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hedge funds being highly leveraged, their positions are sufficiently large to cause 
volatility in the foreign exchange markets if they decide to unwind their positions. They 
point out that in March 2006, hedge funds reversed their carry trade positions in the New 
Zealand dollar and Icelandic krona—since these currencies are significantly less liquid 
than the major six currencies, the movements were exacerbated even further. Jorda and 
Taylor (2009) refer to a 2007 report in The New York Times on the “disastrous losses” 
suffered by the “FX Beauties” club and other Japanese retail investors. During an episode 
of yen appreciation, one highly-leveraged Japanese housewife lost her family’s entire life 
savings within a week. By the fall of 2008 attention was focused on bigger yen moves 
against the AUD over 2 months by 60%, and up 30% against GBP (including 10% moves 
against both in five hours on the morning of 24 October). Figure 3.4 shows the JPY/GBP 
exchange rate in the relevant period. 
 
On 3 June 2007, The Daily Telegraph reported the prediction of Jim O'Neill, chief global 
economist at Goldman Sachs, who had said of the carry trade that “there are going to be 
dead bodies around when this is over”. According to the head of Britain’s financial 
regulator Adair Turner, the current carry trade could be destructive to emerging 
economies and that if the trades were reduced “the world would be a better place” (The 
Times, 30 January 2010). Coudert et al. (2013) state that when risk aversion rises on 
global financial markets, carry trades suddenly unwind and emerging currencies typically 
plummet along with the most risky assets across the board. In times of financial turmoil, 
pegs may turn impossible to defend. This confirms the Bank of International Settlements’ 
view in its annual report of 2007 where the role of carry trade is highlighted, arguing that 
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since carry traders are typically highly leveraged, they could be forced to unwind 
positions very quickly in response to changing market conditions, which might have a 
large impact on exchange rates, particularly in smaller markets. 
 
Figure 3.4: The JPY/GBP Exchange Rate (September 2008-October 2008)  
 
 
Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, risk aversion became the 
dominant fundamental force. This shock created a wave of de-leveraging, fearing default 
and causing high-interest currencies to depreciate against the funding, low-interest 
currencies. Some of the hot currencies during that period were the Indian rupee (INR) 
that had an interest rate of 5% with a very promising economic future, the Brazilian real 
(BRL) with interest rate of 8.75%, the Russian ruble (RUB) that had an interest rate of 
8.25% and the Turkish lira (TRY) that had an interest rate of 6.5%. As seen in Figures 
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3.5-3.8, the U.S. dollar appreciated against these currencies due to risk aversion and de-
leveraging. The appreciation momentum did not last long and carry traders started 
coming back to their old strategy. The U.S. dollar has become the funding currency of 
carry traders since late 2008 (Curcuru, et al., 2010). Carry traders enjoyed a profitable run 
until the third quarter of 2011. However, despite the attractive interest rate differential 
between the U.S. dollar and these currencies at that time, the U.S. dollar started 
appreciating, causing a panic attack among traders and huge losses. When conducting a 
study on the Euro stability during the 2009-2010 crisis, Hui and Chung (2011) found that 
the creditworthiness of a country can affect market expectations on the stability of its 
currency. Movements of the Indian rupee (INR), Brazilian real (BRL), Russian ruble 
(RUB), and Turkish lira (TRY) all affected the creditworthiness of these countries. 
 
Figure 3.5: The INR/USD Exchange Rate (July 2008-December 2011) 
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Figure 3.6: The TRY/USD Exchange Rate (July 2008-December 2011) 
 
Figure 3.7: The RUB/USD Exchange Rate (July 2008-December 2011) 
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Figure 3.8: The BRL/USD Exchange Rate (July 2008-December 2011) 
 
 
Tosborvorn (2010) found empirical evidence for a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between carry trade volume and interest rate differentials. The effect of 
changes in interest rate differentials appears to be larger in developed countries than in 
developing countries. Exchange rate movements have very small effect on carry trade 
volume, a result that contradicts some of the previous findings, but it is likely due to the 
difference in the countries included in the sample. He also found that a country’s credit 
rating correlates positively with carry trade volume and that this relationship is much 
stronger in emerging economies. These findings suggest that developed countries are 
more prone to carry trade speculation than developing countries. While this might seem 
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natural (because the risk of investing in developed countries is generally lower due to 
larger trade volume and deeper markets and because of better developed market 
structures) the results also imply that the risk of carry trade unwinding is greater in 
developed countries. Furthermore, as developed countries tend to have stronger economic 
linkages with the rest of the world, carry trade unwinding in these countries could easily 
translate into another global financial crisis. 
 
The co-movement of several major currencies with stock markets has been explored by 
Campbell et al. (2010) and Ranaldo and Soderlind (2010). Campbell et al. (2010) find 
positive correlation of the exchange rates of the Australian dollar and Canadian dollar 
with global equity markets and negative correlation for the euro and the Swiss franc (the 
Japanese yen, British pound and U.S. dollar fall in the middle of the two extremes). The 
high-frequency analysis of Ranaldo and Soderlind (2010) uncovers a similar pattern: the 
Swiss franc and Japanese yen (and to a lesser extent the euro) appreciate when the U.S. 
stock market goes down, while the opposite is observed for the British pound. The “safe 
haven” properties of the Swiss franc and Japanese yen are confirmed in periods of 
political, natural or financial disasters. As a result of correlation between currencies and 
stock market, any crash in the stock market would have negative effect on these 
currencies. 
 
3.7 Predicting Currency Crashes 
Although carry trade looks very attractive and rewarding most of the time, it is not 
always rosy because the market might move against carry traders, causing them to endure 
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huge losses. Predicting a currency crash is not an easy task and no model can predict the 
precise time of a crash. Olmo and Pilbeam (2009) point out that “in some asset markets 
(e.g., stock markets), casual observation suggests that long series of negative returns 
followed by a sudden boom are less common than the ‘bubble and crash’ pattern”. This 
confirms the finding of Mitchell et al. (2007) that capital arrives slowly such a currency 
appreciates gradually, occasionally disrupted by a sudden depreciations as speculative 
capital is withdrawn. 
 
Brunnermeier et al. (2008) discuss some factors that might lead to a currency crash, 
demonstrating a positive relation between currency crash and negative skewness. They 
establish a positive relation with VIX. As seen Figure 3.9, the VIX reached new highs 
during the financial crisis in October 2008, confirming the positive relation between VIX 
and the severity of the crisis. They also find a positive relation between market crash and 
the TED spread, which is the difference between London 3-month USD interbank offer 
rate (LIBOR) and the assumingly risk-free U.S. 3-months T-bill rate. The behaviour of 
the three variables is shown in Figure 3.10. While the difference between 3-month 
LIBOR and 3-month TB rate ranges 30 and 50 basis points, TED reached 200 basis 
points in 2007 during the subprime mortgage crisis. On 17 September 2008 it reached 
300 basis points and on 10 October TED set a new record by hitting 457 basis points, the 
highest ever and higher than the record of 300 basis points registered on Black Monday in 
October 1987. Figure 3.11 shows the behaviour of TED and its constituent components 
during the global financial crisis. Apurv (2010) concludes that TED is more effective in 
predicting unwinding than VIX. 
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Figure 3.9: VIX Index  
 
Figure 3.10: Behaviour of LIBOR, Three-Month T-Bill Rate and TED 
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Figure 3.11: TED and its Components during Global Financial Crisis 
 
 
Brunnermeier et al. (2008) find that the price of protection against a crash in the 
aftermath of one increases despite the fact that a subsequent crash is less likely. 
Furthermore, they document that currency crashes are positively correlated with increases 
in implied stock market volatility and that higher VIX predicts higher carry returns going 
forward.  
 
Liu et al. (2012) conclude from their study of yen carry trade against USD, EUR, GBP, 
AUD and NZD for the period from January 2003 to December 2009 that equity indices 
have more influence on exchange rates than the implied volatility (VIX) index. Kaizoji 
(2010) adds traders’ psychological behaviour and the risk appetite. Garleanu and 
Pedersen (2007) find liquidity to be a major factor in currency crashes. Kyle (1985) 
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depth (the sensitivity of the price to the size of the trade), and resilience (the speed at 
which the market price recovers from a demand/supply shock). Adrian et al. (2009) show 
that foreign exchange markets are influenced by liquidity conditions. Apurv (2010) 
supports the liquidity factor by indicating that when banks face liquidity problems, the 
TED spread typically goes up and the T-bill yield often falls due to a “flight-to-liquidity” 
or “flight-to-quality”, linking TED with liquidity. Flassbeck and La Marca (2007) 
explains the role liquidity constraints play as speculators are forced to liquidate their 
position in the high yield currency when the exchange rate drops below the required 
margin. Adrian et al. (2009) argue that while the carry trade channel appears to be a 
strong factor in determining exchange rate movements, this channel is dependent on the 
funding liquidity channels. 
 
Negative conditional skewness can be interpreted as a measure of “crash risk” or 
“downside risk”. Flassbeck and La Marca (2007) shows that high-yield currencies are 
“negatively skewed” and have “fat tails”. This means that high-yield currencies 
appreciate a little most of the time, but sometimes depreciate significantly. Many other 
factors represent symptoms of currency crashes but they cannot be used to determine 
when the crash will happen. In general, high-yield currencies appreciate in tranquil times 
and sharply depreciate during episodes of global volatility and liquidity shortage. Sy et al. 
(2009) state that the bigger interest rate differentials are, the more negative is skewness 
and the more positive is kurtosis. La Marca (2009) points out that it is important to notice 
that lack of proper international monetary and exchange rate system that generates 
international financial instability. 
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Looking at the relation between currency movements and the stock market, Dobrynskaya 
(2010) finds that the co-movement of several major currencies with the stock market (or 
the market risk of currencies) has been explored by Campbell et al. (2010) and Ranaldo 
and Soderlind (2010). He concludes that high-interest currencies tend to crash together 
with the stock market while low-interest currencies are a “safe haven‟. Brunnermeier et 
al. (2008) indicate that safe haven currencies tend to appreciate with VIX and TED. 
Menkhoff et al. (2012) find that high-interest currencies are negatively related to 
innovations in global FX volatility (thus delivering low returns in times of unexpected 
high volatility) whereas low-interest currencies provide a hedge by yielding positive 
returns.  
 
The factors mentioned above work as indicators for currency crashes but when it comes 
to carry trade returns, carry traders prefer calm markets where volatility is low in both 
currency and equity markets. Hui and Chung (2011) identifies the macro-financial factors 
affecting volatility as (i) U.S. dollar volatility measured by the U.S. dollar index (DXY), 
(ii) global risk appetite as measured by the CBOE VIX, (iii) funding liquidity constraints 
measured by TED, and (iv) macro financial conditions measured by stock market indices 
such as the S&P 500 and the Dow Jones indices. Menkhoff et al. (2012) contend that 
volatility and liquidity are somewhat correlated, demonstrating that the correlation 
coefficient between VIX and TED for the period January 1997 to December 2011 (the 
sample period used in this study), the correlation coefficient was 0.384.  Figure 3.12 
shows the behaviour of VIX and TED over the sample period. 
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Figure 3.12: Behaviour of VIX and TED over the Sample Period 
 
 
Low volatility can be deceiving. Curcuru et al. (2010) show that carry trades tend to take 
place when exchange rate volatility is low, demonstrating concern that some investors fail 
to understand that volatility can rise, and hence are not taking into account the full risk of 
these trades. If this is the case, then as investment in a carry trade builds up, the funding 
currency may depreciate in excess of what is implied by fundamentals, accompanied by 
excessive appreciation of assets denominated in the target currency. Gagnon and 
Chaboud (2007) argue that following the March 2007 meeting of the ECB Governing 
Council, President Trichet warned that recent low levels of volatility might have lulled 
traders into a false sense of security about the risk and return of carry trade. He implied 
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that the underlying currency exchange rate only appreciates gradually, occasionally 
disrupted by sudden depreciation as speculative capital is withdrawn, casing huge losses 
for carry traders. 
 
Apart from low volatility, high interest rate differentials constitute a major force in 
building carry trade positions. Brunnermeier et al. (2008) find a negative relation between 
average exchange rate skewness and the average interest rate differential. Hottori and 
Shin (2007) find evidence indicating that the volume of carry trade involving the yen is 
high when the interest differential against the yen is high. Brunnermeier et al. (2008) 
show that there is a strong negative relationship between interest rate differential and the 
exchange rate. On the other hand, Moosa and Halteh (2012) argue that there is no clear-
cut relation between the interest rate differential and movement of exchange rates. 
 
Hamlin (2013) contends that historical stress testing can be used to gauge currency risk, 
suggesting that the worst case for the past ten years indicates currency risk. Brunnermeier 
et al. (2008) found that currency crash risk increases with the interest rate differential, 
past carry trade returns, carry futures positions, and a decrease in price of insurance, 
whereas the price of insurance increases with the interest rate differential and past carry 
trade losses. Krugman (1979) and Flood and Garber (1984) argue that if governments 
follow policies that are inconsistent with the currency peg, a speculative attack is 
unavoidable. Klein and Marion (1997) and Goldfajn and Valdes (1997) find that real 
exchange rate over-valuation is an important factor in predicting currency crises. Johnson 
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et al. (2000) show that countries with lower equity corporate governance were hit harder 
during the Asian crisis of 1997.  
 
Hamlin (2013) suggests that a basket of emerging currencies could easily provide two or 
three times the yield spread of a G10 currency without leverage. Credit risk in currencies 
can involve country default, leading to depreciation, or the default can be the bank. The 
yield on emerging currencies can also be seen as partly a reward for the risk of country 
default, which has often been one event associated with currency collapses. However, the 
relationship between default risk and interest rates is not one-for-one. Depreciation is not 
the only risk of emerging currencies because when and if governments restrict 
convertibility, it can become difficult or impossible to trade them. This was reported to 
have happened with the Malaysian ringgit some years ago. Pedersen (2009) shows how 
“liquidity spirals” amplify and spread the initial shock when selling leads to more selling, 
higher margin requirements, tighter risk management, and withdrawal of capital. This is 
consistent with the evidence from the 2008 crisis. 
 
3.8 What Makes Carry Trade Profitable? 
Theoretically, carry trade is closely associated with the interest parity conditions: 
uncovered interest parity (UIP), which was first mentioned by J.M. Keynes in 1923 
(Arias, 2001), and covered interest parity (CIP). If the UIP condition is valid, then carry 
trade would not be profitable because the high-yielding currency would depreciate 
against the low-yielding currency by an amount (a percentage) that is equal to the interest 
differential. Covered interest parity (CIP) describes the equilibrium condition between 
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interest rates and the spot and forward currency values of two countries. Uncovered 
interest parity is derived by combining covered interest parity with the unbiased 
efficiency hypothesis postulating that the forward rate is an unbiased predictor of the 
future spot rate.  
 
Sy et al. (2009) state that although carry trade is conducted in short-term periods, most of 
the times, UIP holds (if it does hold) for periods longer than five years as mentioned by 
Chinn and Meredith (2004). Meredith and Chinn (1998) and Fujii and Chinn (2001) and 
others confirm in the proposition that as the horizon gets longer (three years and more) 
the rejection of the UIP hypothesis becomes less decisive. Baillie and Chang (2011) 
found that UIP is more likely to hold in a regime where volatility is unusually high. Two 
things must be borne in mind here (i) the evidence is overwhelmingly against the validity 
of UIP because unbiased efficiency does not hold; and (ii) the failure of UIP is a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for carry trade to be profitable.  
 
The failure of uncovered interest parity is symbolised by the so-called “forward premium 
puzzle”, which was identified and formulated by Fama (1984).  Based on their past 
experience and the literature that unanimously agree on the failure of UIP, carry traders 
believe that the UIP does not hold. Although traders bet on the failure of UIP when 
conducting such strategy, it does not necessarily mean that the failure would produce 
profitable position. Remolona and Schrijvers (2003) show that UIP fails particularly 
when the investors hold their investments for long periods. Furthermore, it is observed 
that the investment currency tends to appreciate against the funding currency, which is 
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inconsistent with UIP. Frankel and Engel (1984) show that a simple CAPM has difficulty 
explaining deviations from UIP. 
 
Burnside et al. (2008) suggest that “market participants take advantage of the failure of 
uncovered interest rate parity to speculate in currency markets”. Baillie and Chang (2011) 
argue that carry trade is merely speculation against uncovered interest rate parity. These 
views imply a link between the failure of UIP and the profitability of carry trade. Again, 
it must be emphasised that while the failure of UIP is a necessary condition for a 
profitable carry trade, it is not a sufficient condition. The failure of UIP means that: 
       
       
  
           (3.1)        
where    is the interest rate on target currency,    is the Interest rate on funding currency, 
   is the exchange rate at time t where the target currency is the base currency in the pair, 
and      is the exchange rate at the end of the operation (at time t+1). If the depreciation 
of the target currency is more than the interest rate differential, the violation of UIP 
condition is met, but no profit is made. Olmo and Pilbeam (2009) show that the implied 
empirical failure of the UIP condition does not necessarily generate excess return. For 
carry trade to be profitable, the following condition must be satisfied: 
       
       
  
                                                    (3.2)        
 
Several explanations can be put forward for the failure of UIP. For example, Burnside et 
al. (2008, 2011) refer to the peso problem as an explanation for the high average payoff 
to carry trade. The peso problem is a generic term for the effects of small probabilities of 
large events on the results of empirical work. Their approach relies on analysing the 
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payoffs to a version of the carry trade strategy that does not yield high negative payoffs in 
a peso state. Burnside et al. (2008, 2011) use the peso explanation to attribute high carry 
trade returns to the possible realisation of extreme events (that is, to crash risk or disaster 
risk). The peso event is defined by Burnside et al. (2011a) as a rare event in which there 
are either large negative payoffs to carry trade or unusually high values of the stochastic 
discount factor. This explanation is also adopted by Rietz (1988), Barro (2006) and 
Weitzman (2007) who point out that the possibility of rare but extreme disasters is an 
important determinant of risk premia in asset markets. Burnside et al. (2008) also link 
political risk to carry trade returns as seen in the Hong-Kong dollar carry trade and 
mainland China. 
 
Farhi et al. (2009) refuted Burnside et al. (2008, 2011) and others by showing that 
approximately 25% of carry trade returns in advanced countries can be derived from 
exposure to crash risk. This finding, however, still leaves a significant proportion of such 
returns largely unexplained and casts doubts on the economic relevance of the 
explanation. They put forward four possible explanations for the profitability of carry 
trade to: (i) time-varying risk premia, (ii) the peso problems, (iii) expectations errors, and 
(iv) illiquid markets. Jurek (2014) investigates the possibility that excess return on carry 
trade is due to exposure to currency crash, producing results showing that the crash risk 
premium explains 30-40% of excess return. 
 
Menkhoff et al. (2012) find that carry trade leads to large and significant unconditional 
excess returns of more than 5% p.a. even after accounting for transaction costs and 
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market turmoil. They explain these returns by a single factor, which is global exchange 
rate volatility. These returns cannot be explained by standard measures of risk and seem 
to offer a free lunch to investors (for example, Burnside et al, 2006). Jurek (2014) uses 
options data to show that crash risk in itself cannot be used to justify the expected return 
on carry trade, particularly that the cost of insuring the carry trade portfolio against major 
crashes of the carry currency reduces excess returns by 30-40%. Pedersen (2009) reaches 
the conclusion that one of the components of carry trade return is compensation for 
liquidity risk. Finally, Burnside (2007) re-examines the most prominent works, 
particularly those applying an asset pricing approach with factor mimicking portfolios. 
The conclusion is that linear stochastic discount factors built from traditional models 
(such as the CAPM, the Fama-French three factor model and the consumption-CAPM) 
fail to explain return on carry trade. 
 
3.9 Conclusion 
This chapter surveys the literature on carry trade. We found that although it is described 
as a naïve strategy by some researchers, the literature shows that carry trade is a 
rewarding strategy. It is also stated that carry trade yields a similar return to the S&P 500, 
but with a higher Sharpe ratio as documented by Burnside et al. (2006), Mankhoff et al. 
(2012) and others. The work of Bhatti (2012) and Hamlin (2013) shows that using 
emerging market currencies generate higher returns and lower risk, particularly when the 
operation is conducted by using portfolios. The reason behind the success of carry trade is 
the failure of uncovered interest parity. It has been well documented that currencies with 
high interest rates tend to appreciate against low-interest currencies, thus contradicting 
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UIP. But as the horizon gets longer (three years and more), UIP becomes more valid as 
documented by Fujii and Chinn (2001), Chinn and Meredith (2004) and others. 
 
Attractive returns have led to the expansion of carry trade to a level that is threatening the 
stability of the currency market. Carry trade is a leveraged strategy, meaning that it bears 
huge risks—one of the main risks is the foreign exchange swings during financial 
turmoils. These swings are magnified by the huge size and highly leveraged carry trade 
positions, making these swings so powerful that they are capable of destroying not only 
the accumulative profits but also the capital (Darvas, 2009). Capturing such swings is not 
an easy task—researches show that VIX and TED provide the best indication for 
currency crashes as concluded by Brunnermeier et al. (2008), Apurv (2010), Liu et al. 
(2012) and others.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
INTEREST RATE PARITY 
 
4.1 Interest Rate Parity Conditions 
The concepts of covered interest parity (CIP) and uncovered interest parity (UIP) can be 
traced back to Keynes’ theories of the 1920s (Isard, 2006). Interest in covered and 
uncovered interest parities grew after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in 
August 1971 and the Smithsonian Agreement in 1973 as floating exchange rates provided 
new opportunities for empirical work. But, with the failures and the inability to predict 
exchange rates under the new system, disappointment entered the UIP literature 
beginning in the early 1980s as Shafer et al. (1983) wrote that “evidence began to 
accumulate as early as late 1976 that the uncovered interest parity condition might not 
hold or that the expectations for which it held were not rational”. 
 
Burnside et al. (2011b) state that CIP and UIP conditions imply that the forward 
exchange rate is an unbiased forecaster of the future spot rate. Despite the theoretical 
significance of UIP, the empirical support for this condition is weak. It has been known 
since Bilson (1981) and Fama (1984) that forward-rate unbiasedness fails empirically. 
Mishkin (1984) and Cumby and Obstfeld (1984) found little support for the parity 
condition. Frankel (2007) states that the statistical evidence against UIP is probably 
stronger than the statistical evidence in favour of most other theories in economics.  
 
Interest parity is also used for measuring the integration among the world’s financial 
markets where there is an inverse relationship between market integration and interest 
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parity deviation, as mentioned by Wu and Chen (1998). They emphasise the importance 
of interest parity as a building block for exchange rate models. Evidence by Shafer et al. 
(1983) and Sachs (1985) shows a strong relationship between real interest differentials 
and real exchange rates. 
  
On the other hand, the real interest rate differential model introduced by Frankel (1979) 
implies that UIP holds in the long run when the exchange rate reaches its long-run 
equilibrium. Using data from 28 developed and emerging economies, Ravi and Magnus 
(2000) conclude that the forward premium puzzle is not a pervasive phenomenon and is 
instead limited to high-income economies, and in particular only to states when the U.S. 
interest rate exceeds foreign rates. Moreover, the puzzle does not seem to be present in 
emerging economies. There seems to be a close relationship among GDP per capita, 
average inflation, inflation volatility, country ratings, and the presence of the forward 
premium puzzle. 
 
4.2 Covered Interest Rate Parity (CIP) 
Covered interest parity (CIP) is among the most researched topics in the field of 
international finance. The earliest written discussion of CIP was published in the early 
1920s by John Maynard Keynes, first in an article in a British newspaper (Keynes, 1922) 
and subsequently in a monograph on monetary economics, Tract on Monetary Reform. 
Keynes (1923) wrote: 
 
Forward quotations for the purpose of the currency of the dearer money market tend to be 
cheaper than spot quotations by a percentage per month equal to the excess of the interest 
which can be earned in a month in a dearer market over what can be earned on the 
cheaper.  
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The term covered interest parity refers to a condition whereby the relationship between 
interest rates and the spot and forward currency values of two countries are in 
equilibrium. Moosa (2004) defines it as “an equilibrium condition that determines the 
configuration of the interest rates on and the exchange rates (spot and forward) between a 
pair of currencies”. As a result, there are no interest arbitrage opportunities between those 
two currencies. Basically this says that high-interest currencies should be traded at a 
discount in a forward market while low-interest-rate currencies should deal in premium. 
The premium/discount (or the forward spread) is calculated as 
                   
   
 
 (
 
 
)      (4.1) 
where   is the forward rate and   is the spot rate. Covered interest parity is the focal 
point of many researchers for numerous reasons: (i) its use in measuring the degree of 
international capital mobility; (ii) its link between interest rates and the structure of the 
forward rates; (iii) its importance from a policy perspective since it implies that financial 
resources are allocated around the world in an optimal manner; and (iv) CIP is important 
from a business perspective because of its implications for financing decisions, short-
term investments, and hedging. 
 
The concept of CIP is illustrated in Figure 4.1, where the investor who has initial capital 
(K) is faced with two alternatives. The first is to invest in domestic assets and earn 
domestic interest (i) to receive        at the end of the investment period. The second 
is to convert the initial investment from the domestic currency to a foreign currency, 
obtaining 
 
 
 units of the foreign currency and investing it in foreign assets to earn the 
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foreign interest (   . At the end of the period, the investor receives 
 
 
      , which is 
covered at the forward rate to receive  
  
 
      . 
 
Figure 4.1: Covered Interest Parity 
 
 
CIP is represented by the following condition 
  
 
                 (4.2) 
By expressing the condition in terms of one unit of domestic currency, it will appear as 
      
 
 
           (4.3) 
The following regression is used to test this: 
(     -   ) /    = α+ β (   -   ) /   +         (4.4) 
 
Using data obtained from the London foreign exchange market between USD/GBP and 
DM/USD for the one-, three-, six-, and twelve-month maturities, Taylor (1987) found 
overwhelming support for the market efficiency hypothesis by confirming the covered 
interest rate parity condition. Taylor and Branson (2004) found that the size of no-
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arbitrage appears to rise and the strength of arbitrage appears to fall as the length of the 
maturity gap in the yield curve arbitraged increases, suggesting increasing reluctance of 
arbitrageurs to tie up funds for increasingly longer periods of time.  
 
Using a daily time series from 1983 to 2005 of currency prices in spot and forward 
USD/JPY markets and matching equivalent maturity short-term U.S. and Japanese 
interest rates, Szilagyi and Batten (2006) found evidence of considerable variation in CIP 
deviations from equilibrium. These deviations diminished significantly and by 2000 had 
been almost eliminated due to the introduction of electronic trading platforms. Batten and 
Szilagyi (2007) identify a significant decline in the deviations from CIP in recent years. 
These deviations appear to have been almost eliminated by 2000—they attribute this 
finding to the effects of electronic trading such as the Reuters D2000 and EBS trading 
platforms and connected product-pricing systems, which have improved the efficiency of 
foreign exchange markets. Bhatti and Moosa (1995) found evidence that financial 
markets are highly integrated, which supports the CIP after applying cointegration 
analysis using quarterly data on the three-months treasury bills’ rate for 11 currencies 
against the US Dollar for the period January1972 to March 1993.  
 
4.3 Observed Deviations from Covered Interest Parity 
Although Flood and Rose (2002), Moore and Roche (2009) and others suggest that 
deviations from CIP do not provide profitable arbitrage opportunities when it comes to 
developed countries’ currencies, deviations start to grow when emerging countries’ 
currencies are involved. Thornton (1989) refers to deviation of the estimated forward rate 
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(calculated from interest rate differentials) from the actual forward rate that exists 
simultaneously in the market. Daniel (1989) states that there are two types of empirical 
investigations of CIP; (i) testing the deviation between actual premiums and what is 
implied by CIP; and (ii) finding out whether CIP holds on average—that is, whether 
domestic and foreign interest rates and spot and forward exchange rates respond in a way 
that is consistent with CIP.  
 
Several explanations have been put forward for the observe deviations from CIP—these 
are discussed in turn. 
 
Transaction Costs 
Transaction costs introduce a “transaction band” into the CIP equation. As long as 
departure from CIP stays within a specific band’s borders, arbitrage is not profitable. 
Once the deviation goes beyond that band that makes it large enough to cover transaction 
costs, arbitrage profit opportunities would exist. Frenkel and Levich (1977), Fratianni and 
Wakeman (1982), Clinton (1988) or Balke and Wohar (1998) found that taking into 
account transaction costs attributes high efficiency to money markets. The reason is that 
deviation from CIP hardly ever leaves the band. This means that as soon as arbitrage 
opportunities arise, they are exploited by attentive arbitrageurs. Keynes (1922) asserted 
that the covered margin must exceed some minimum amount before arbitrage becomes 
profitable, estimating that minimum amount to be half a percentage point. Einzig (1937) 
suggests that the minimum arbitrage opportunity should be of the order of 50 basis points 
on an annualised basis. Studies by Cody (1990), Moosa (1996) and Balke and Wohar 
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(1998) on the relationship between CIP and transaction costs concluded that transaction 
costs play a part in explaining deviations from CIP. 
 
Capital Mobility 
Arbitrage opportunities should not exist in an efficient market. Frankel (1992) believes in 
using deviation from CIP as a gauge for international capital mobility. He refers to 
studies that show a statistically significant decrease in departure over recent years, which 
he reads as evidence for ongoing capital flow liberalisations. Ma et al. (2004) produce 
evidence for large differentials between Chinese onshore and Chinese offshore interest 
rates that are calculated from non-deliverable forwards on the Renminbi (CNY) and are 
traded outside of China. If capital were free to move, such spreads would disappear by 
force of arbitrage. China, however, maintains a battery of capital flow restrictions, which 
prevents exploitation of riskless profit opportunities. On the other hand, Moosa (2004) 
contradicts that and argues that the CIP holds regardless of market efficiency, and for that 
reason cannot be used as a measure of capital mobility. 
 
Tax Difference Considerations 
There may be differences in tax rates on interest income and foreign exchange 
losses/gains in different countries. This difference contributes to the non-substitutability 
of investments in different countries and makes investing in one country more desirable 
than in another. Departure from CIP might come from what is called “fringe benefits,” 
which are tax advantages offered when investing in certain currencies and which are not 
reflected in interest rates. Things become very complicated if new or higher taxes are 
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introduced or if tax codes do not apply to all investors alike. These results regarding 
different perceptions about the “return plus fringe benefit” vary on the same asset. 
Studies by Levi (1977) and Kupferman and Levi (1978) show that if market participants 
are faced with different tax rates based on residency criteria, simultaneous two-way 
covered interest arbitrage could occur. 
 
Political Risk 
Aliber (1973) states that deviation from CIP might also arise due to political risk, which 
involves freeze, inconvertibility, default, or even confiscation. He argues that the money 
market assets used to test CIP should be identical in terms of political risk. He indicates 
that while Eurocurrency assets satisfy the comparability criterion, domestic assets do not 
because they are issued under different political jurisdictions. Moosa (1996) attributes the 
deviation in CIP between Australia and New Zealand in the mid-1980s (after the 
abolition of capital control) to the political risk that either country would reimpose capital 
control. n their study on the Russian ruble and U.S. dollar, Taylor and Branson (2004) 
show that arbitrageurs would need 70-300 basis points on an annualised basis to 
compensate for political risk and trigger arbitrage. Dooley and Isard (1980) state that 
deposits from different countries are not comparable if investors expect the introduction 
of capital control measures or if a country is expected to default. If investors do not 
account for differences when comparing deposits, deviation from CIP will be observed.  
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Liquidity Risk  
Moosa (2003) states that liquidity is judged by how cheaply and quickly an asset can be 
converted into cash. The more uncertainty, the higher premium required, which leads to a 
higher deviation. Griffoli and Ranaldo (2011) find that funding liquidity constraints are 
strongly related to CIP deviations, particularly after the collapse of Lehman Brothers.   
 
Legal Restrictions and Regulations  
Frankel and MacArthur (1988) found minor deviations from CIP in a set of countries 
where cross-border capital flows are restricted by law. Gultekin et al. (1989) examine 
return differentials between Euro/yen investments traded in London and interest rates on 
comparable yen deposits traded in Tokyo. Since the deposits were identical except for 
their trading location, differentials provide evidence for deviation from CIP. They report 
large interest rate differentials between 1977 and 1980, a period during which Japan 
imposed restrictions on capital flows. These differentials disappeared quickly following 
the removal of restrictions in 1981. Similar results were found by Daniel (1989). 
 
Measurement Errors 
Minor deviations from CIP might occur due to inaccurate data. Agmon and Bronfeld 
(1975) emphasise difficulties related to bid-ask spreads, whereas Taylor (1987) points to 
complexities related to contemporaneous sampling and emphasises that there are 
differences between published and actual tradable rates. By personally sampling high-
frequency data from the London foreign exchange market through dealers, Taylor found 
strong support for CIP. Moosa (2002), used quarterly data for three currencies (U.S. 
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dollar (USD), Canadian dollar (CAD) and British pound (GBP)), for the period January 
1978 to April 2000, and concluded that the deviation from UIP was due to measurement 
errors. 
 
4.4 Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP) 
Uncovered interest parity (UIP) can be defined as a condition in which the difference in 
interest rates between two countries is equal to the expected change in the exchange rate 
between the countries' currencies. If this parity does not exist, there is an opportunity to 
make profit. The difference between UIP and CIP is based on the assumption that the 
forward market is used to cover foreign exchange risk. While variables in the CIP 
equation are realised values, in UIP, there are no covers against foreign exchange risk. 
Transactions are conducted only in the spot market. The change in spot exchange rate is 
estimated based on its expected value. Under the Fisher hypothesis, nominal interest rate 
differentials between assets that are identical in all respects except for the currency of 
denomination can be explained by the expected change in the spot exchange rate between 
those currencies over the holding period (Fisher, 1930). 
 
What makes UIP so widely researched is that the condition links the exchange rates and 
interest rates of different countries. It is a basic assumption in many economic models, 
such that the validity of these models relies on UIP's validity. In addition, UIP implies the 
equality of returns on investment in different countries, and this equality means an 
exclusion of arbitrage opportunities. Therefore, the failure of UIP may indicate arbitrage 
opportunities in international financial markets, which means a great deal for 
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international investors. Deviations from the UIP equilibrium imply a lack of integration 
among capital markets. According to Flood and Rose (2002), “deviations from UIP are 
the basis for interest rate defence of fixed exchange rate”. Since the interest rate defence 
of fixed exchange rates is similar to the use of interest rate policy to stabilize an exchange 
rate, the failure of UIP also ensures the effectiveness of interest rate policy to stabilise the 
exchange rate. Flood and Rose (1994) conclude that a large part of the forward discount 
puzzle vanishes for regimes of fixed exchange rates, and that the deviation seems to vary 
based on the exchange rate regime. 
 
The concept of UIP is illustrated in Figure 3.2, where the investor who has initial capital 
(K) is faced with two alternatives. The first is to invest in domestic assets and earn 
domestic interest (i) and at the end of the investment period receives      . The 
second is to convert the initial investment from the domestic currency to a foreign 
currency, obtaining     units of the foreign currency and investing it in foreign assets to 
earn the foreign interest rate (   . At the end of the period the investor receives   
        . In this case, the investor faces foreign exchange risk since he will wait until 
the end of the investment horizon to cover the position at the spot rate. He will be 
converting the foreign currency back to the domestic currency at the expected spot rate to 
obtain 
   
 
      . The equilibrium condition that would eliminate any arbitrage 
opportunity would be obtained when: 
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Figure 4.2: Uncovered Interest Parity 
 
 
 
   
 
                           (4.5) 
The expected excess return on a deposit in foreign currency corresponds to the expected 
deviation from UIP, which is defined by Kohler (2008) as follows: 
  (         )        
                                                 (4.6) 
where   (         ) represents expected deviation from UIP between   and    , if 
  
 
,     
 
 is the foreign nominal interest rate and   ,      the corresponding domestic rate. 
   denotes the log of the current spot exchange rate, whereas          is the log of the 
expected spot rate for time      . Consequently, speculating on interest rate differentials 
boils down to a bet on           If UIP holds,           would be zero, implying that 
exchange rate movements precisely countervail interest rate differentials. 
 
In order for UIP to stand, the following condition must be satisfied: 
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       [
    
     
]     (4.7) 
where    is the spot rate,     is the future rate, i is the interest rate for domestic currency 
and    is the interest rate for foreign currency. Chaboud and Wright (2005) and Batten 
and Szilagyi (2007) stated that over very short time horizons the uncovered interest parity 
hypothesis is supported. 
 
4.5 The Failure of Uncovered Interest Parity 
Flood and Rose (2002) state that “a strong consensus has developed in the literature that 
UIP works poorly”. Chinn and Meredith (2004) argue that “few propositions are more 
widely accepted in international finance than that uncovered interest parity (UIP) is at 
best useless – or at worst perverse – as a predictor of future exchange rate movement”. 
UIP tends to fail at a time horizon of less than 5 years (Gyntelberg and Remolona, 2007; 
Engle, 1996; Flood and Rose, 2002; Chinn and Meredith, 2004). But Froot and Thaler 
(1990) and Chinn and Meredith (2004) found that UIP might work better over longer 
horizons. However, low R square in all regressions suggests that UIP is still likely to 
explain only a very small proportion of variation in exchange rates. Agreeing with them, 
Brunnermeier et al. (2008) found that the investment currency appreciates a little on 
average but with a low predictive R square. McCallum (1994) examined the relationship 
between the UIP condition and forward exchange rate using a variety of economic 
models, and found sufficient evidence to reject the hypothesis of forward rate 
unbiasedness—however, there was insufficient evidence to support the hypothesis of UIP 
failure. 
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Chaboud and Wright (2005) found that UIP is consistently rejected by the data as the 
higher yielding currency appreciates rather than depreciates, as theory would suggest. 
Anh (2010) found strong evidence for Australia and New Zealand that there is a negative 
relationship between interest rate differentials and exchange rate depreciation in the short 
run. Platin and Shin (2006) state not only that UIP fails but also that a currency with high 
interest rates will exhibit the classic price pattern of “going up by the stairs, and coming 
down in the elevator.” Gagnon and Chaboud (2007) found that high-interest currencies 
tend to appreciate against low-interest-rate currencies over short and medium horizons, 
although the predictive power of this effect is quite small. Jylha and Suominen (2011) 
show that UIP does not hold in equilibrium, as real interest rates differ across countries 
due to variations in inflation risks and money supply. Menkhoff et al. (2012) indicate that 
a number of empirical studies show that exchange rate changes do not compensate for the 
interest rate differential.  
 
The failure of UIP is linked to the “forward rate puzzle” identified by Fama (1984). Berk 
and Knot (2001), Razzak (2002) and Chinn and Meredith (2004) find that the validity of 
UIP increases with the time horizon of the investment. Baillie and Chang (2011) 
conclude that UIP is more likely to hold in a regime where volatility is unusually high, 
which may be explained by previous theoretical work that linked momentum trading to 
increased volatility and more pronounced reversion to fundamentals. Floor and Rose 
(2002) conclude that UIP works for countries in crisis, where exchange rates and interest 
rates display high volatility. Chaboud and Wright (2005) conclude that the UIP 
hypothesis holds over very short windows of overnight period data but may not be 
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compatible with conventional data frequencies, such as monthly, quarterly, and annual. 
Gagnon and Chaboud (2007) point out that the most robust empirical prediction about 
exchange rates is that, over periods of many years and even decades, exchange rates tend 
to move in line with inflation differences across countries.  
 
Under the assumption of rational expectations, UIP is tested in a form of equality 
between the realised change in spot exchange rate and interest rate differential. Studies of 
UIP can be classified into two categories: The first is to explain UIP’s empirical failure 
by considering violations to its basic assumptions. These violations include the irrational 
expectations, as indicated by Frankel and Froot (1990), and time-varying risk premia, as 
argued by Fama (1984) and Malliaropulos (1997). In summary, these studies give mixed 
evidence for the validity of UIP. Using the U.S. dollar against the Japanese yen spot and 
forward rates for the period 1993 to 2007, Farooqui (2012) concludes that the monetary 
policy response hypothesis is the main cause of bias in the forward rate and the apparent 
failure of the UIP condition. This means that the return on the U.S. dollar against the 
Japanese yen carry trade was due to the actions of the governments of the U.S. and Japan.  
 
The other type of UIP studies is based on the intuition that UIP is actually a long-run 
relationship obscured by short-run exogenous shocks. Economists have used methods that 
can extract long-run information to study this feature. Their tools include cointegration 
analysis (Moosa and Bhatti, 1995) and using long-run average data (Lothian, 1998). Most 
of these studies yield results favoring a long-run UIP relationship. Other factors include 
the Farhi et al. (2008) illiquid markets and Kaminsky’s (1993) peso problem (the 
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possibility for rare events to explain investors’ expectations about the exchange rate). 
Olmo and Pilbeam (2009) consider the econometric rejection of UIP as evidence 
indicating that the foreign exchange market is inefficient.  
 
In explaining the failure of UIP, Froot and Thaler (1990) use a survey of 75 published 
estimates, and reported few cases where the sign of the coefficient on interest rate 
differential is consistent with UIP. Fama (1984), Hodrick (1989), and Dumas and Solnik 
(1995) explain foreign exchange movements in terms of compensation for risk. Olmo and 
Pilbeam (2009) show that the most popular explanations for the failure of UIP are risk 
premium, irrational speculation, the peso problem, nonlinearities in the exchange rate, or 
some mixture thereof. Menkhoff et al. (2012) agree with Olmo and Pilbeam (2009) by 
considering the time-varying risk premia compensation as the reason for the failure of 
UIP. Wagner’s (2012) empirical results show that UIP holds in a speculative sense and 
that exchange rate dynamics comprise a time-varying risk premium, the omission of 
which causes the forward bias in the Fama regression. Chaboud and Wright (2005) find 
that UIP holds over very short windows of overnight period data. Chinn (2007) attributes 
the failure of UIP to three causes (i) invalidity of the rational expectation hypothesis, (ii) 
issues of econometrics implementation, and (iii) the existence of an exchange risk 
premium. 
 
4.6 Interest Arbitrage 
When covered and uncovered interest parities fail to hold, then an arbitrage opportunity 
emerges. The following is an exposition of covered and uncovered interest arbitrage. 
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Covered Interest Arbitrage 
When CIP does not hold, then covered interest arbitrage will come into action and 
continue until the resulting changes in the supply and demand for the underlying assets 
lead to the restoration of the equilibrium condition implied by CIP. Many economists 
tested CIP to find out if there are profitable arbitrage opportunities and they found some 
deviation, implying the presence of profitable arbitrage operations. Taylor (1987) found 
no deviations from CIP (or zero covered margin), and that even if there was any deviation 
it was not a profitable one due to the bid-offer spread and brokerage fees. He attributed 
deviations to measurement errors. The same conclusion was stated by Vasiliki (2010) 
after applying the conventional augmented Dickey Fuller test and T-bar test that was 
developed by Im et al. (2003). He found that the validation of CIP implies zero arbitrage 
opportunities and in turn efficiency of capital markets and integration amongst them. 
Einzig (1937) suggested that the minimum arbitrage opportunity should be of the order of 
50 basis points on an annualised basis in order to be enough to make profit. Under the 
efficient market hypothesis, covered interest arbitrage should not exist. In order for 
covered interest arbitrage to happen, the following condition must be satisfied  
   [
    
     
]        (4.8) 
where   is the forward rate,   is the spot rate,    is the foreign currency interest rate, and 
  is the domestic currency interest rate. The objective of arbitrage is to utilise the interest 
rate differential while eliminating foreign exchange risk. Covered interest arbitrage is the 
transfer of liquid funds from one monetary center to another to take advantage of higher 
rates of return or interest, while covering the transaction with a forward currency hedge. 
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The mechanism of covered interest arbitrage if conducted from domestic currency to 
foreign currency is illustrated in Figure 4.3. The arbitrage starts with borrowing the 
domestic currency at the interest rate (i) so at the end of the operation the investor will be 
required to pay back         The investor, after borrowing the domestic currency, would 
then convert it to the foreign currency at     where S is the spot rate. The investor then 
invests it in foreign assets at   so at the end of the period he will get 
 
 
 (1+    and at the 
same time cover it in the forward market at (F). As a result, the profit (π) from the 
covered arbitrage would be:  
   
 
  
                  (4.9) 
 
The same steps can be undertaken when starting with foreign currency and investing in 
the domestic one. 
 
Figure 4.3: Covered Interest Arbitrage 
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The models that were used by Grauer et al. (1976), Stockman (1978), Frankel (1979), 
Fama and Farber (1979), and Roll and Solnik (1979) imply that, under uncertainty, the 
forward rate is in general different from the expected value of the future spot rate. That 
difference may be the result of the existence of a risk premium. This premium depends on 
people's attitudes towards risk and some characteristics of the probability distributions of 
the variables included in the model. Batten and Szilagyi (2007) conclude that while CIP 
arbitrage opportunities persisted in the yen forward market for many years, these 
opportunities have diminished and, since 2000, almost disappeared. Bhansali (2007) 
documents that currency carry trade strategies implemented with forward contracts have 
payoff and risk characteristics that are similar to those of currency option strategies that 
sell out-of-the money put on high-interest currencies. Officer and Willet (1970) suggest 
that total covered arbitrage activity does not depend solely on the value of the covered 
differentials, but also on its composition and on the state of speculative expectations. By 
following what they call “portfolio balance theory” they point out that “failure of interest 
rate parity to occur need not imply either disequilibrium or market imperfections”. 
 
Uncovered Interest Arbitrage 
Uncovered interest arbitrage is a somewhat similar strategy to covered interest arbitrage. 
The difference is that the exchange rate risk is not covered, so it is not a true arbitrage 
strategy. Rather it is more like speculation.  
 
The mechanism of uncovered interest arbitrage if conducted from the domestic currency 
to a foreign currency is illustrated in Figure 4.4. The arbitrage starts with borrowing the 
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domestic currency at the interest rate (i) so at the end of the operation the investor will be 
required to pay back         After borrowing the domestic currency, the investor, would 
convert it to the foreign currency to obtain 
 
  
 where    is the spot rate. The investor then 
invests it in foreign assets at   so at the end of the period he will get 
 
  
 (1+   . The 
investor would wait until the end of the investment horizon to know the future spot rate 
  . As a result, profit (π) from the covered arbitrage would be:  
  
  
  
                 (4.10) 
 
Figure 4.4: Uncovered Interest Arbitrage 
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Basically we would have an arbitrage opportunity if 
      (
  
  
)                                                            (4.11) 
 
According to Sarno et al. (2006) the empirical results indicate that UIP does not hold 
most of the time but (expected) deviations from UIP are economically insignificant—that 
is, too small to attract speculative capital.  
 
4.7 UIP and Carry Trade 
The success of carry trade is associated with the failure of UIP. Baillie and Chang (2011) 
argue that carry trade is merely speculation against uncovered interest rate parity. 
Gyntelberg and Remolona (2007) describe carry trade as “essentially a bet against UIP.” 
Based on UIP, carry trade should not be profitable because the high-interest-rate currency 
should depreciate against the low-interest-rate currency by the interest rate differential 
(Gyntelberg and Remolona, 2007). Meredith and Chinn (1998) and Fujii and Chinn 
(2001) and others confirm that as the horizon becomes longer (three years and more), the 
rejection of the UIP hypothesis becomes less decisive.  
 
Looking at most of the literature on carry trade, such as Burnside et al. (2008) suggest 
that “market participants take advantage of the failure of uncovered interest rate parity to 
speculate in currency markets”. Moreover, Baillie and Chang (2011) describe carry trade 
as merely a speculation against uncovered interest rate parity. All of them tend to imply a 
link between the failure of UIP and profitability, even though that may not actually be the 
case. Darvas (2009) states that when UIP fails, carry trade may or may not offer 
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significantly positive returns, both in a statistical and an economic sense. The failure of 
UIP means that the interest rate differential is not equal to the percentage change in the 
exchange rate. 
 
Moosa and Halteh (2012) posit that while the failure of UIP is a necessary condition for 
the profitability of carry trade, it is not a sufficient condition. If the depreciation of the 
target currency is more than the interest rate differential, then the violation of the UIP 
condition is met, but no profit was made; on the contrary, the trader would lose despite 
the failure of UIP. For the carry trade to be profitable, the interest rate differential must 
be smaller than the percentage change in the exchange rate. 
 
In order to make a profit, the carry trader would have to wait until t+1, which means that 
during the period from t to t+1 he is exposed to foreign exchange risk. This confirms the 
Baillie and Chang (2011) description of carry trade as merely speculation against 
uncovered interest rate parity. It is stated by Kitchen and Denbaly (1987) that the absence 
of risk is the major factor that differentiates arbitrage from speculation.  
 
4.8 Conclusion   
Interest rate parity covers both covered and uncovered interest rate parity. Covered 
interest rate parity (CIP) states that currencies with high interest rates should deal at a 
discount against low-interest currencies, and vice versa. Uncovered interest rate parity 
(UIP) states that high-interest currencies should depreciate against low-interest-rate 
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currencies. Interest parity is used to measure integration among global financial markets 
and is also seen as a cornerstone for any exchange rate model. 
 
It has been found since the early 1980s that interest rate parity does not stand as 
mentioned by Shafer et al. (1983) and others. Researchers came up with many 
explanations for that failure, such as transaction costs, capital mobility, political risks, 
liquidity risk, measurement errors, and other reasons. This failure encourages traders to 
explore deviations and exploit arbitrage opportunities. While these deviations worked 
well for traders in creating riskless profits in the past, the introduction of the new 
electronic trading platforms in the early 2000s led to the dramatic reduction in riskless 
profit. Carry trade is described as nothing more than speculation against UIP. Carry 
traders make profit as a result of the failure of uncovered interest rate parity, but the 
failure of UIP, although a necessary condition for the success of carry trade, is not a 
sufficient one, as stated by Moosa and Halteh (2012). 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
EXCHANGE RATE FORECASTING AND THE MEESE-ROGOFF PUZZLE 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Under the floating exchange rates system, exchange rate forecasting has become a crucial 
element in the decision-making process for international business firms. These decisions 
affect various activities including speculation, hedging, investment, strategic planning, 
financing, and so on. Making the forecast correctly, or at least coming close to the actual 
exchange rate, would reduce uncertainty and help these firms boost their returns while 
reducing the risk of losses. 
 
Forecasting is the process of generating expectations, where these expectations are used 
as input in the decision-making process. Despite the importance of forecasting, it is not 
that easy to do. In its 29 January 2003 issue, the Australian Financial Review quoted U.S. 
Federal Reserve Chief Alan Greenspan as saying that exchange rates are forecast with 
less success than almost any other economic variable. He also described exchange rate 
forecasting as being “remarkably difficult.” Chatfield (2000) states that a true model does 
not exist and that the main task is to find a model that provides as adequate an 
approximation for the given data as possible. 
 
5.2 The Concept of Random Walk  
In order for a forecasting model to have a perfect forecast it should have a deviation or a 
forecasting error of zero. 
               ̂              (5.1) 
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where    is the error,  ̂  is the forecasted exchange rate at time t, and    is the actual 
exchange rate at time t. It has been well documented that exchange rate forecasting 
models do not perform well. Meese-Rogoff’s (1983a) reach the conclusion that economic 
models are no better than tossing a coin and that the empirical exchange models of the 
1970s tend to perform well in-sample but do very poorly out-of-sample. Meese and 
Rogoff created a challenge, and researchers from that time on have tended to compare 
their econometrics models to the random walk. As a result, any failure for an economic 
fundamental-based model in predicting the future exchange rate is considered a success 
for the basic random walk.  
 
More than 30 years since the publication of their highly cited article, the Meese-Rogoff 
result is yet to be comprehensively overturned. It is argued that their findings established 
a puzzle and a serious weakness in the field of international finance. Many economists 
consider the Meese-Rogoff findings to have had a damaging impact on international 
economics and finance. For example, Frankel and Rose (1995) argue that the puzzle has a 
“pessimistic effect” on the field of exchange rate modeling in particular and international 
finance in general. Neely and Sarno (2002) consider the Meese-Rogoff conclusion to be a 
“devastating critique” of the monetary approach to exchange rate determination and to 
have “marked a watershed in exchange rate economics.” Abhyankar et al. (2005) describe 
the Meese-Rogoff findings as a “major puzzle in international finance” while Evans and 
Lyons (2005) comment that the Meese-Rogoff finding “has proven robust over the 
decades” despite it being “the most researched puzzle in international macroeconomics.” 
Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006) describe the “puzzle” as most likely the major 
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weakness of international macroeconomics. Fair (2008) describes exchange rate 
equations as “not the pride of open economy macroeconomics” and argues that the 
“general view still seems pessimistic.” Engel et al. (2007) describe the current position of 
forecasting models by stating the “explanatory power of these models is essentially zero.” 
 
Copeland (2000) states that a time series follows a pure random walk if the change from 
one period to the next is random and unpredictable. The naïve random walk model 
predicts no change from period to period, which is consistent with weak-form efficiency 
in the foreign exchange market (Moosa, 2000). The random walk model is represented as 
follows: 
                                                          (5.2) 
where    is completely random and displays no pattern over time. Since the random walk 
model is a univariate time series model, Moosa (2000) states that the underlying rationale 
is that the impact of other macroeconomic variables on the exchange rate is “embodied 
in, and reflected by, the actual behaviour of the exchange rate.” 
 
5.3 The Failure of Forecasting Models 
With the inability of forecasting models to outperform the random walk, researchers 
started looking for the reason or reasons for that failure. Meese and Rogoff (1983a) 
attributed their findings to some econometric problems, including simultaneous equations 
bias, sampling errors, stochastic movements in the true underlying parameters, model 
misspecification, and failure to account for nonlinearities. Meese (1990) added other 
explanations such as improper modelling of expectations and over-reliance on the 
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representative agent model. Corte et al. (2009) attribute the failure to beat the random 
walk to the use of improper criteria. Rossi (2006), meanwhile, attributes the advantage of 
the random walk over economic models to parameter instability in the models and argues 
that the reduction of parameter instability would produce better economic models that are 
capable of beating the random walk.  Bacchetta and Van Wincoop (2006) attribute the 
poor explanatory power of exchange rate models to the weakness of international 
macroeconomics while Moosa and Bhatti (2010) attributed the failure of econometrics 
forecasting models to their inability to explain the stylised facts about movements in 
exchange rates such as bubbles followed by crashes and volatility clustering. 
 
When it comes to the failure of forecasting short-term movements in exchange rates, 
Flood and Rose (2008) attribute that failure to what they refer to as “imperfect knowledge 
economics” (IKE). IKE states that the quest for the ultimate prediction model for the 
market outcome is futile and that the economic models produced by academic economists 
in forecasting the exchange rates are no better than flipping a coin. They attribute short-
term fluctuations to market participant irrationality rather than macroeconomic 
fundamentals. The same conclusion is reached by Frydman and Goldberg (2008) under 
the name of “imperfect knowledge expectations.” Cheong et al. (2012) conclude that the 
short-term exchange rate follows a martingale process, which is a model of a fair game 
where knowledge of past events never helps predict the mean of future winnings. Flood 
and Rose (1999) use a UIP-based model of exchange rates and find that exchange rate 
models perform poorly in the short run even if agents are perfectly rational. Likewise, 
Meredith and Chinn (1998) show that UIP performs better at longer horizons. Alquist and 
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Chinn (2008) find support for the monetary model at longer horizons and argue that the 
reason is that the UIP condition generally hold at longer horizons. 
 
Lane (1991) lists six reasons for the apparent failure of the monetary model of exchange 
rates. These reasons are: (i) the demand for money estimates in recent years was 
unreliable, (ii) the assumption that the parameters in the demand for money functions are 
equal in both countries; (iii) the assumption of purchasing power parity (PPP) and the 
related assumption of stationarity of the real exchange rate; (iv) the assumption of 
uncovered interest rate parity (UIP), implying either risk neutrality or that exchange rate 
risk is entirely diversifiable; (v) the assumption of exogeniety of the money supply, 
which rules out the possibility of policies initiated by feedback; and (vi) the possibility of 
bubbles which, if present, would contribute to the empirical failure of the monetary 
model, since it is difficult to distinguish them from omitted variables or from 
specification errors. Moreover, Neely and Sarno (2002) state that even with the benefit of 
twenty years of observation, evidence that monetary models can consistently and 
significantly outperform a naïve random walk is still elusive (Mark and Sul, 2001; Faust 
et al, 2003). 
 
In their paper walk, Meese and Rogoff use magnitude-only criteria to evaluate forecasting 
models. The apparent puzzle is why exchange rate forecasting models cannot outperform 
the random walk in terms of the RMSE and similar metrics. Moosa and Burns (2013) test 
for the statistical significance of the difference in the RMSE of the random walk and 
exchange rate model and find that the random walk cannot be outperformed—that is, the 
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RMSE of the random walk is numerically smaller and statistically different to that of 
various monetary models.  
 
Engel et al. (2007) explain that “beating the random walk is too strong a criterion for 
accepting a model”. The random walk forecast for a particular point in time is the 
previous period’s rate, which means that the forecasting error is the period-to-period 
change. If the exchange rate is not volatile, the error will be small, in which case it will be 
difficult for any model to beat the random walk. If, on the other hand, the rate is volatile, 
the RMSE of the random walk will increase, but so will the RMSE of the model as it is 
more difficult for any model to forecast a volatile than a less volatile exchange rate. If 
this is the case, then the failure of exchange rate models to outperform the random walk 
in terms of the RMSE becomes rather intuitive. 
 
Although a forecasting model might work well for a period of time, it would not retain 
this forecasting ability for long. Cheung et al. (2005) conclude that “the results do no 
point to any given model/specification combination as being very successful. On the 
other hand, it may be that one model will do well for one exchange rate, but not for 
other.” Concurring with them, Rogoff and Stavrakeva (2008) argue that most attempts 
that employ panel forecasting techniques and new structural models are inconclusive 
once their performance is evaluated over different time windows or with alternative 
metrics.  
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The length of the sample period also has a big effect on the outcome of the forecasting 
model. Anaraki (2007) argues that the Meese and Rogoff “sample period is too short to 
capture the sharp movements in financial variables in the mid-1980s and late 1990s, 
much less to cover the Japanese recession and recent oil shocks.” Extending the sample to 
2005, Anaraki finds that the forecasts are more accurate. He concludes that “simply 
extending the data from one decade to three decades improves the predictability power of 
the fundamental models based on RMSE and MAE criteria dramatically.” Other studies 
use extended samples but fail to outperform the random walk in terms of the magnitude 
of forecasting error. These studies include Kirikos (2000), Cheung et al. (2005), and 
Engel and West (2005) that extend their sample to 24, 27, and 27 years, respectively. The 
inability to outperform the random walk in these studies may be attributable to the use of 
low-frequency data, as suggested by Anaraki (2007). 
 
Some studies suggest that data frequency could impact the forecasting power of exchange 
rate models. Anaraki (2007) suggests that one of the primary reasons the random walk 
cannot be outperformed is the use of annual or quarterly data because “many monetary 
variables adjust in intervals shorter than a quarter.” This suggestion is proven wrong by 
Johnston and Sun (1997) who use quarterly data to find evidence indicating that the 
random walk can be outperformed by exchange rate models that incorporate 
macroeconomic fundamentals such as output, inflation, and interest rates. Likewise, Mark 
and Sul (2001) use quarterly data to produce forecasts that have a numerically lower 
RMSE both in and out-of-sample compared to the random walk forecasts. They find 
greater predictability in sample for CAD, DEM, FRAN, and JPY vis-à-vis the USD. 
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When forecasting accuracy is assessed out-of-sample, the model produces a numerically 
lower RMSE compared to the random walk in three of the four cases (excluding the 
CAD).  
 
5.4 Forecasting Revival 
After Meese-Rogoff’s article and the inability to produce a model that can outperform the 
random walk, researchers started investigating the reasons for the failure of forecasting 
models. The majority of economists attribute the failure of the forecasting models against 
the random walk to their inadequacy. They believe that exchange rate models do not 
provide a valid representation of exchange rate behaviour (Cheung and Chinn, 1999). 
Evans and Lyons (2002) state that “Macroeconomic models of exchange rates perform 
poorly at frequencies higher than one year” and that “the explanatory power of these 
models is essentially zero”. But, that depressed feeling among researchers was lifted up 
after MacDonald and Taylor (1994), Chinn and Meese (1995), Mark (1995), Mark and 
Choi (1997) and Engel and West (2005) all claimed that exchange rate models can beat 
the random walk when looked at from a practitioner’s point of view.  
 
Short-Horizon Forecasting 
It is suggested that forecasting short-term movements in exchange rates is more difficult 
than forecasting for the long term. Engel et al. (2007) attribute the inability of forecasting 
models to predict short-run movements in exchange rates to the proposition that exchange 
rates are driven primary by expectations rather than economic fundamentals. 
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Using monthly observations for USD/GBP, USD/JPY, and USD/DM-EURO for the 
period January 1976 to December 2004, Corte et al. (2009) employed a number of 
forecasting models to evaluate these models. They found evidence on the short horizon 
that the forward premium model beats the random walk and that combined forecasts 
consistently outperform the constant variance random walk benchmark. Tawadros (2001) 
examines the predictive power of the monetary model and similarly concludes that 
forecasting performance improves at longer horizons. In his study, forecasts for 
AUD/USD are generated at the 1-, 3-, 6-, 12-, 18- and 24-month horizon. Using a 
dynamic error correction specification of the monetary model, Tawadros produces a 
numerically lower RMSE for all six forecasting horizons. However, the relationship 
between forecasting performance and the forecasting horizon is not linear. Using 
quarterly data for the period January 1976- January 1990 for the U.S. dollar and the 
Australian dollar, Hoque and Abdul Latif (1993) found that the restricted vector 
autoregressive model was able to explain the behavior of the exchange rate between the 
two currencies better than the unrestricted model, particularly for short horizons. 
 
Long-Horizon Forecasting 
Despite what is thought to be the empirical failure of exchange rate macroeconomic 
variables-based models, these model are not as bad as they seem, as Engel et al. (2007) 
argue that many models tend to fit well in out-of-sample, but they tend to fit better in the 
long term. The same result is stated by Rogoff (2002) who suggests that forecasting 
models tend to outperform the random walk at very long time horizons of three to four 
years. Mark (1995) shows that economic models can outperform the random walk in 
  
 
104 
 
forecasting in-sample and out-of-sample exchange rates over long horizons for more than 
2-3 years. 
 
Much of the literature points to evidence indicating that exchange rate models have 
greater predictability at longer horizons (two to four years) rather than at shorter horizons 
(one month to one year), as suggested by Meese and Rogoff (1983b), Chinn and Meese 
(1995), MacDonald (1999), Groen (2000), La Cour and MacDonald (2000), Mark and 
Sul (2001), Taylor et al. (2001), Kilian and Taylor (2003), Clark and West (2006), Engel 
et al. (2007), Alquist and Chinn (2008), Molodtsova and Papell (2009), and Wang and 
Wu (2009). Using monthly and quarterly data series, they were unable to provide 
convincing evidence of predictability at short horizon. 
 
Several studies have identified a four-year forecasting horizon as improving the 
forecasting accuracy of exchange rate models. Mark and Sul (2001) present evidence that 
long-horizon changes in exchange rates are predictable using out-of-sample forecasting 
and quarterly data for four exchange rates. Similar results are published by Mark (1995) 
and Chinn and Meese (1995) who show greater predictability at three-to-four-year 
horizons. Alexius (2001) finds that UIP and purchasing power parity (PPP) produce 
better forecasts than the random walk at a ten-year horizon. Meanwhile Jorda and Taylor 
(2009) find that the use of the change in exchange rate over the previous month, interest 
rate differential, and the inflation gap between the two countries improved the forecasting 
model’s output in the long run. The same result of the ability to beat the random walk in 
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the long run is also seen by MacDonals and Taylor (1994), Mark and Choi (1997), Groen 
(2000), and Kilian and Taylor (2003). 
 
5.5 The Monetary Model 
The monetary model is perhaps the most frequently used forecasting model in the 
literature (Neely and Sarno, 2002). The use of sophisticated econometric techniques, 
panel data, and long spans of data has convinced some researchers that monetary models 
can forecast a small but statistically significant part of the variation in exchange rates 
(Mark and Sul, 2001). Moosa’s (1994) monetary model does not seem to be useless as a 
representation of the long-run behaviour of exchange rate. MacDonald and Taylor (1994) 
explain how the monetary model has the ability to outperform the random walk.  
 
Moosa and Burns (2014a), use six currency combinations involving USD, JPY, GBP, and 
CAD for the period January 1990 – July 2010 and conclude that a flexible-price monetary 
model can outperform the random walk when it comes to direction accuracy and 
profitability. Furthermore, MacDonald and Taylor (1994) show that the monetary model 
can be a valid representation of the exchange rate determination process in the long run 
using monthly data for the British pound vis-à-vis the US dollar over the period 1976-
1990. Moreover, they show that their chosen error correction model easily outperforms a 
number of exchange rate models, including the simple random walk model. Tawadros 
(2001) examines the Australian dollar vis-à-vis the US dollar exchange rate using 
monthly data over the period 1984-1996. The dynamic monetary model is shown to 
outperform the random walk model at all forecasting horizons, with the degree of 
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improvement over the random walk increasing as the forecasting horizon is extended. 
These results suggest that when treated as a long-run equilibrium condition, the monetary 
model of exchange rate determination may be useful in forecasting the exchange rate. On 
the other hand, Neely and Sarno (2002) show that evidence suggesting monetary models 
can consistently and significantly outperform the naïve random walk is still elusive.  
 
5.6 Forecasting Evaluation Considerations 
Moosa and Burns (2014b) state that most economists cast doubt on the appropriateness of 
the evaluation of predictive accuracy without dismissing it entirely as Engel et al. (2007) 
suggest. The underlying arguments are based on three aspects: (i) in-sample versus out-
of-sample, (ii) the use of random walk with drift as opposed to random walk without 
drift, and (iii) the use of other measures such as direction accuracy and profitability as 
opposed to measures of error magnitude. 
 
In-Sample or Out-of-Sample 
The literature suggests that exchange rate models have greater explanatory power in-
sample, as opposed to out-of-sample, when compared to the random walk. In their paper, 
Meese and Rogoff (1983a) used out-of-sample forecasting, but the literature shows that 
the choice between an in-sample and out-of-sample forecasting is a debatable topic. The 
rationale behind this contention is that the main objective of forecasting models is to 
predict the future and not explain the past. Many researchers agree with that view, such as 
Sarno and Taylor (2002) when they argue that although empirical exchange rate models 
occasionally generate apparently satisfactory explanatory power in-sample, they 
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generally fail badly in out-of-sample forecasting tests, in the sense that they fail to 
outperform the random walk. This means that a forecast should be conducted on an out-
of-sample basis. Moosa and Burns (2013) consider the use of out-of-sample forecasting 
as more appropriate.  
 
Fildes and Makridakis (1995) suggest that “the performance of a model on data outside 
that used in its construction remains the touchstone for its utility in all applications.” 
Engel et al. (2007) argue that in-sample forecasting is an unreliable benchmark because 
of the possibility of over-fitting or data mining and that out-of-sample forecasting power 
is a higher hurdle and the standard by which exchange rate models should be judged. 
Tashman (2000) makes the statement that “forecasters generally agree that forecasting 
methods should be assessed for accuracy using out-of-sample tests.” He also suggests that 
in-sample errors are likely to understate forecasting errors and that over-fitting and 
structural changes may worsen the difference between the in-sample and out-of-sample 
errors. Thus, a model will perform better in-sample, which should be considered an 
unreliable benchmark. Engel et al. (2007) state that out-of-sample forecasting power 
relative to the random walk is an unreliable gauge for measuring the models. 
 
Significant evidence has been found for in-sample predictability but not for out-of-sample 
predictability, reflecting the lack of reliability of in-sample tests under the null of no 
predictability. Moosa (2000) states that one of the problems associated with 
macroeconomic forecasting is the effect of structural breaks, such as changes in policy or 
macroeconomic targets. Granger and Hallman (1990) pointed out that one of the main 
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drawbacks about model formulation is that while the specification search procedure 
produces models that fit the data spuriously well, it also makes the standard techniques of 
inference unreliable. Ashley et al. (1980) insisted that a “sound and natural approach” to 
test the predictive ability is to rely primarily on the out-of-sample forecasting 
performance. They warned about the riskiness of building conclusions about causality 
entirely on in-sample performance, stressing the likelihood of “spurious inference” when 
out-of-sample verification is not employed. Inoue and Killian (2002) highlight 
“unreliable inference,” which means that in-sample tests of predictability may spuriously 
indicate predictability when there is none. This means that the predictability test would be 
unreliable if it has a tendency to reject the null of no predictability more often than it 
should at the chosen significance level. Kilian and Taylor (2003) look at the sample size 
and provide evidence indicating that in small samples out-of-sample tests may have 
considerably lower power than in-sample tests, given the same test size.  
 
On the other hand, Moosa (2013) argues that the choice between in-sample and out-of-
sample forecasting might not matter because “if out-of-sample forecasting is conducted 
on a one-step-ahead basis (as per the Meese and Rogoff approach), there is no reason 
why the in-sample forecasting performance will be necessarily superior to the out-of-
sample performance.” Engel and West (2005) contend that the “theorem tells us that out-
of-sample prediction power relative to a random walk is not a reliable gauge to judge 
exchange rate models”. Inoue and Killian (2002) demonstrate that strong in-sample 
evidence and weak out-of-sample evidence are not necessarily an indication that in-
sample test are not reliable. 
  
 
109 
 
 
Random Walk With or Without Drift 
Based on their original paper, Meese and Rogoff (1983a) used the random walk model 
both with and without drift to predict changes in the exchange rate. The random walk 
with drift is specified as  
                                                         (5.3) 
where   is the drift factor and    is the error term. Faust et al. (2003) state that “it is a 
familiar fact in this literature that the random walk without drift outperforms the random 
walk with drift in forecasting” and that “the random walk without drift is a harder model 
to beat.” Rossi (2013) makes a similar remark by suggesting that that “the toughest 
benchmark is the random walk without drift.” Meese and Rogoff (1988) find that the 
regression forecasts from structural form models are never significantly superior to a 
driftless random walk model and that no economic model for exchange rate forecasting 
could out-forecast a zero-drift random walk.  
 
Moosa and Burns (2013) demonstrate that the choice between the random walk with and 
without drift can have important consequences in a forecasting exercise such as this. 
They disagree with Meese and Rogoff (1988), Faust et al. (2003), and Rossi (2013) when 
it comes to which is harder to outperform, the random walk with drift or without drift. 
They look at the issue from two perspectives. The first one is based on direction 
accuracy—a random walk without drift cannot outperform a random walk with drift for 
volatile time series such as bilateral exchange rates. The reason is that the random walk 
without drift does not predict any change and therefore has no direction accuracy, 
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whereas the random walk with drift predicts the direction of change correctly on at least 
some occasions. The second one is that if the drift factor is significant, then using a 
random walk without drift means that the naïve model suffers a loss of information 
relevant to predicting the dependent variable.  
 
Engel and Hamilton (1990) argue that the random walk with drift is a more reasonable 
standard of comparison if the drift term is significantly different from zero. Moosa and 
Burns (2013) argue that “if the random walk with drift is used when the drift factor is 
insignificant, the random walk will appear misleadingly better in forecasting the direction 
of change than it actually is”, Engel (1994) uses a random walk with or without drift as 
the benchmark and conclude that there are no substantive differences in the results, but 
this result may be specific to Engel’s study. Moosa and Burns (2014b) disagree with him 
by stating that while this proposition may be valid for forecasting accuracy in terms of the 
magnitude of the forecasting error, it is definitely not so with respect to forecasting the 
direction of change. Kilian (1999) finds that exchange rate predictability can increase or 
decrease if the benchmark is a random walk with drift, particularly for shorter horizons. 
While Moosa and Burns (2013) support the approach of Engel (1994) in testing for the 
statistical significance of the drift factor, they disagree with the proposition that the 
results depend on whether or not one uses the random walk with or without drift and 
support the contention of Kilian (1999).  
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Other Measures of Forecasting Accuracy 
Meese and Rogoff (1983a) use measures of error magnitude to evaluate the quality of the 
forecasting model. The use of these measures led to the conclusion among researchers 
and practitioners that a naïve forecasting model would work just as well as professional 
forecasts. Cheung et al. (2005) conclude that poor forecasting performance in terms of 
magnitude does not necessarily indicate the inability of the models to explain exchange 
rate behaviour. Chow et al. (2007) question the validity of such measures to evaluate 
forecasting models by stating that “it seems irrational for profit-maximizing firms to 
‘waste’ millions of dollars generating and buying professional forecasts”. Based on their 
findings they suggest that it might not be appropriate to use magnitude-only measures to 
judge the quality of professional forecasts and that profit should be included as a 
criterion. Their view on the puzzle as to why profit-maximising firms buy forecasts when 
measures of forecasting accuracy indicate that the random walk produces better forecasts 
for free is also shared by other researchers such as Leitch and Tanner (1991) and Moosa 
(2013). 
 
With researchers exploring new measures to evaluate forecasting models, Leitch and 
Tanner (1991) argue that the direction of change may be more relevant for profitability 
and economic concerns than the magnitude of forecasting error, which bears no 
predictable relationship to the profitability of operations based on the forecasts—this 
means that this criterion is an “unpredictable indicator of profits”. Moosa and Burns 
(2012) agree with them by stating that profitability is invariably related to direction 
accuracy, while the random walk is bad in predicting the direction. Engle and Hamilton 
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(1990) support the use of direction accuracy by describing it as “not a bad proxy for a 
utility-based measure of forecasting performance”. West et al. (1993) suggest a utility-
based evaluation of exchange rate predictability.  
 
On the other hand, Boothe and Glassman (1987) compare the value of alternative 
exchange rate forecasting models using two different criteria: accuracy (measured by the 
root mean square error) and profitability. Using CAD/USD and DEM/USD exchange 
rates over the period December 1976 to September1984, they find high profitability in the 
CAD/USD rate despite scoring low in the accuracy measures. They conclude that there is 
no obvious relationship between accuracy measures and profitability.  
 
Cheung et al. (2005) point out that using criteria other than the mean square error does 
not boil down to “changing the rules of the game” and that minimising the mean square 
error may not be important from an economic standpoint, implying that relying on the 
mean square error may result in missing out on other important aspects of prediction such 
as profitability, particularly at long horizons. They also argue that direction of change is 
“perhaps more important from market timing perspective”. Using a Markov-switching 
model to represent 18 exchange rates, Engle (1994) finds that the model cannot 
outperform the random walk, but he provides evidence that the model is superior at 
predicting the direction of change. He believes in using direction accuracy by describing 
it as “not a bad proxy for utility-based measure of forecasting performance”. 
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Moosa (2013) suggests that profitability is the ultimate test of forecasting accuracy. 
Leitch and Tanner (1991) find a strong relationship between direction accuracy and 
profitability, but not between error measures and profitability. Moosa and Burns (2014b) 
found that the flexible-price monetary model outperforms the random walk in terms of 
direction accuracy and profitability. This finding explains the puzzle as to why profit-
maximising firms buy professional forecasts when measures of forecasting accuracy 
indicate that the naïve model forecasts as well as formal exchange rate models.   
 
5.7 Conclusion 
Forecasting is the process of generating expectations. Given the importance of such a 
process, forecasting is not an easy task. In 1983 Richard Meese and Kenneth Rogoff 
came up with what is known as the Meese-Rogoff puzzle. They conclude that forecasting 
models tend to work well in-sample and very poorly out-of-sample. They argue that in 
terms of the root mean square error, the most sophisticated forecasting model is no better 
than tossing a coin when it comes to forecasting. The failure to beat the random walk 
since that date has led some researches, such as Abhyankar et al. (2005), to describe it as 
a “major puzzle in international finance”. Researchers attribute the failure of forecasting 
models and the success of the random walk to many reasons, including simultaneous 
equations bias, sampling errors, stochastic movements in the true underlying parameters, 
model misspecification and failure to account for nonlinearities.  
 
In their study, Meese and Rogoff used magnitude-only measures of forecasting accuracy 
to evaluate the forecasting models. It is argued that profit is the main target for any 
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investor using forecasting models and not how well the model scores in terms of the 
forecasting error. It has been shown in the literature that there is no relationship between 
error measures and profitability, but there is a relationship between direction accuracy 
and profitability, as documented by Leitch and Tanner (1991). These findings have led to 
the introduction of new forecasting evaluation measures such as profitability and 
direction accuracy. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
METHODOLOGY  
 
6.1 Conventional Carry Trade 
In conventional carry trade, decisions are made based on the interest rate differential and 
nothing else. This naïve strategy has proven to be rewarding in most cases despite its 
simplicity. This operation works as follows.  
 
Let    and    be the interest rates for currencies x and y, respectively, and S the spot 
exchange rate between the two currencies measured as the number of units x per one unit 
of y       . If      is the exchange rate at time t+1, appreciation of y against x means 
higher value of S over time (that is,        ) and vice versa. Assuming that    >   , a 
conventional carry trade operation consists of the flowing steps:  
1. At time t we borrow x for the period   till     at   . 
2. The amount borrowed is then converted at   , so we get (
 
  
) units of y.  
3. Invest the y units obtained at     for the period   till    . 
4. At the end of the period        the value of the investment will be (      ) units 
of y. 
5. At time    ,      will be known, the amount of y will be converted back to x at 
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6. At time      which is the maturity date of the loan in x, the loan is repaid at 
          
 
The return (π) on carry trade will be 
  
    
  
               
     (6.1) 
Since 
    
  
    ̇                                                                           (6.2) 
where   ̇    is the percentage change in the exchange rate between   (the initiation of the 
carry trade transaction) and     (when the profit/loss is realised), it follows that  
      ̇                
     (6.3) 
Equation (6.3) can be simplified to the following: 
        ̇   ̇         
     (6.4) 
Since  ̇    , it follows that  
           ̇  
                                                                (6.5) 
which means that the profit realised by taking a short position on x and a long position on 
y is equal to the interest rate differential and the percentage change in the exchange rate 
measured as the price in terms of x of one unit of y. 
 
In conventional carry trade, a long position is taken on currency y and a short position is 
taken on currency x, if      , and vice versa. When a long position is taken on the high-
interest currency and a short position is taken on the low-interest rate currency, the return 
on carry trade π will be as: 
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  {
(     )   ̇   
(     )   ̇   
          
     
     
               (6.6) 
which shows that return on carry trade depends on the interest differential and the 
percentage change in the exchange rate. 
 
6.2 Forecasting-Based Strategy 
The objective of this thesis is to find out if there is any value in forecasting change rates, 
in the sense that a forecasting-based strategy can outperform carry trade in terms of risk 
and return. The forecasting-based strategy works as follows: instead of always taking a 
long position on the high-interest currency and a short on the low-interest currency, 
without any consideration to the potential exchange rate movement, the position will be 
taken based on the interest rate differential just like the conventional carry trade, but the 
expected change in the exchange rate will be taken into consideration as well. The 
expected change in the exchange rate is estimated using a forecasting model, which is the 
monetary model in this thesis. 
 
Carry trade tends to produce better risk-adjusted return or Sharpe ratio if a forecasting 
element is embedded in the decision-making process, as concluded by Moosa and Halteh 
(2012), Li (2011), Schmidbauer et al. (2010), Moosa (2010), Jorda and Taylor (2009) and 
others. For example, Corte et al. (2009) find significant economic benefit to an investor 
who exploits deviations from UIP by forecasting currency returns. Li (2011) evaluates the 
effectiveness of economic fundamentals in enhancing carry trade. He finds that the 
profitability of carry trade and risk-return measures can be enhanced by using forecasts. 
Bhatti (2012) finds that the interest differential is not the only factor determining return 
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on carry trade and that the expected change in the exchange rate of the funding against 
the target currency over the holding period also is also a determining factor. 
 
A forecasting-based strategy is conducted in the same manner as conventional carry 
trade, except that in a forecasting-based strategy the forecast percentage change in 
exchange rate is taken into consideration. In order to forecast the exchange rate, the 
monetary model is used because Moosa (1994), Tawadros (2001) and others conclude 
that “the monetary approach equations also turned in a good performance,” as Husted and 
MacDonald (1999) state. While carry trade uses the interest rate differential as the only 
criterion for conducting the strategy, the forecasting-based strategy takes into account 
both the interest rate differential and the expected percentage change in the exchange 
rate. 
 
In the case of the forecasting-based strategy, we take the forecast exchange rate into 
consideration and use it to calculate the expected return. So, we go long on y and short on 
x if 
(     )   ̇   
 
  
       (6.7) 
On the other hand, we go long x and short on when if 
(     )   ̇   
 
 
        (6.8) 
In that case, the expected return (  ) is  
   {
(     )   ̇   
 
  
(     )   ̇   
 
 
          
(     )  ̇   
 
  
  
(     )  ̇   
 
  
    
   (6.9) 
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where  ̇   
  is the expected or forecasted percentage change in the exchange rate. 
Following Moosa and Halteh (2012),  ̇   
  is generated in-sample from the monetary 
model of exchange rates. Somanath (1986) found that a monetary model with a lagged 
endogenous variable forecasts better than the naive random walk model. MacDonald and 
Taylor (1993, 1994) also claim some predictive power for the monetary model. 
MacDonald and Taylor (1993) examine the monetary model of the exchange rates for the 
German mark and the U.S. dollar over the period January 1976 to December 1990 and 
find that a dynamic error correction model outperforms the random walk at every forecast 
horizon. Using a multivariate cointegration technique, MacDonald and Taylor (1994) also 
find that an unrestricted monetary model outperforms the random walk and other models 
in an out-of-sample forecasting experiment for the pound-dollar exchange rate. The 
monetary model is specified as 
        (         )    (         )    (         )      (6.10) 
where   is the log of the exchange rate,   is the log of the money supply,   is the log of 
the industrial production,   is the nominal interest rate,   is the error term. x and y refer to 
the countries whose currencies are involved—here, country y will have its currency as the 
base currency in the exchange rate. The in-sample forecast of the log exchange rate is  
  
   ̂   ̂ (         )  ̂ (         )  ̂               (6.11) 
where  ̂  is the estimated value of    and so on. To convert the log forecast exchange 
rate to the level of the level of the exchange rate, we have 
    
          
        (6.12) 
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 ̇   
 is equal to      
 /     , which can be used to calculate expected return,  
 . At 
the end of the operation, the actual return would be 
  {
(     )   ̇   
 
(     )   ̇   
            
(     )  ̇   
 
  
  
(     )  ̇   
 
  
   
  (6.13) 
 
The Kuwaiti Dinar (KWD) is somewhat different from other GCC currencies—it is the 
only one that is pegged to an undisclosed basket of currencies to protect it from 
speculation. Based on Business Intelligence’s Middle East report (2007), Marios 
Maratheftis, an emerging markets currencies analyst at Standard Chartered in London, 
thinks that the Kuwaiti Dinar basket is made up of 70% U.S. dollars, 20% euros, 5% 
pound, and 5% Japanese yen, and so does Steve Brice, regional head of research at 
Standard Chartered Dubai. In order to determine the components of the basket, I would 
use the log (KWD/USD) as the dependent variable and the logs of exchange rates of 
major currencies against the U.S. dollar as the explanatory variables. The equation is 
specified as 
                                                      
                (6.14) 
where          ) is the log of the KWD/USD exchange rate and so on,   is the error 
term and the alphas are parameters that reflect the weights. Equation (6.14) tells us that 
the Central Bank of Kuwait calculates the KWD/USD rate by using a formula similar to 
this equation where the coefficients reflect the weights of the individual currencies in the 
basket. This equation is identical to the equation used by the IMF to calculate the 
exchange rate of the SDR (see, for example, Moosa, 2015). 
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The monetary model is used to forecast the USD rate against other major currencies, then 
the KWD forecast exchange rates against other currencies are calculated as cross rates. 
The forecast log exchange rate from equation (6.14) is   
 ̂               ̂   ̂              ̂              ̂            
 ̂          )  (6.15) 
To find the forecast level of the KWD/USD exchange rate, we have 
 ̂                    ̂                 (6.16) 
which can be used to calculate the expected rate of return in the forecasting-based 
strategy. 
 
6.3 The Ability of the Forecasting Model to Beat the Random Walk 
There is a growing recognition that forecasting accuracy should be assessed by criteria 
that relate to the purpose of the forecast. Relying entirely on conventional measures of 
forecasting accuracy is inappropriate if it bears no relation to the purpose of the forecast.  
When asking whether or not fundamentals can predict exchange rate movements, the 
answer “depends on how the question is asked,” and this should relate to the purpose of 
the forecast (Thoma, 2008). Rossi (2013) concludes that the forecast evaluation method 
matters “a lot” when drawing conclusions about the relative forecasting accuracy of two 
competing models. Moosa (2006) demonstrates that notions of forecasting accuracy are 
heterogeneous, and should be defined and measured depending on the underlying 
decision rule.  
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Likewise, Corte et al. (2009) attribute failure to beat the random walk to the use of 
improper criteria that fail to take into account the real economic gains produced by the 
forecasts. Neely and Sarno (2002) conclude that “the literature on exchange rate 
forecasting has shown that the amount of exchange rate variations explained by monetary 
models is—at most—small”, but that the conclusions one draws “depend on the purpose 
of these forecasting exercises, which is little discussed in the literature”. Moosa (2000) 
argues that the most important consideration when assessing exchange rate forecasts is 
whether or not they lead to better decisions. Additional research is needed in this area 
because it is the purpose of exchange rate forecasting that influences the method of 
evaluation, and hence the conclusions reached about relative forecasting superiority 
(Neely and Sarno, 2002). In some circumstances, the direction of change is the only 
criterion of importance when assessing forecasting accuracy. Engel (1994) suggests an 
example of this would be central banks under a pegged exchange rate system where 
intervention is required if the currency is expected to depreciate, “regardless of the size of 
the expected depreciation”. 
 
Meese and Rogoff (1983a) set their own rules for the game and stated that a model is 
better than the random walk if it can produce better (that is, lower) mean error, mean 
square error, and root mean square error. But would changing these rules help to beat the 
random walk? By using a number of forecasting models, Jorda and Taylor (2009) found 
that these models predicted better than the toss of a coin, which is what Meese and 
Rogoff had claimed. Boothe and Glassman (1987) suggested that forecasting model 
accuracy and profitability are more important than the models’ error measurement. Leitch 
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and Tanner (1991) and Moosa (2013) wonder if the goodness of the model is based on 
error measurements and if the output of these sophisticated models is no better than 
tossing a coin, then why do big financial institutions spend millions of dollars on 
forecasting models.  
 
6.4 Measures of Forecasting Accuracy 
Measures of the Magnitude of Error 
The forecasting accuracy measures based on the percentage forecasting error are 
calculated as follows. The mean absolute error (MAE) is the average over the verification 
sample of the absolute values of the errors. The MAE measures the average magnitude of 
the errors in a set of forecasts, without considering their direction. It is calculated as 
    
 
  
∑ |
  
    
  
|                  (6.17) 
 
The mean squared error (MSE) is the average of the squares of the errors, which is 
calculated as 
  
     
 
 
 ∑ (
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               (6.18) 
 
The root mean square error (RMSE) is the square root of the MSE—it is calculated as 
     √
 
 
∑ (
  
    
  
)
 
 
        (6.19) 
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Theil’s inequality coefficient (U) is considered by Fair (1986) to be one of the most 
common measures of predictive accuracy. It provides a measure of how well a time series 
of estimated values compares to a corresponding time series of observed values when 
examining the error magnitude of the forecast. Greenaway-McGrevy et al. (2012) 
indicate that in order for the forecasting model to beat the random walk in terms of the 
magnitude of error, then the Theil’s U should be less than one. Theil’s U is calculated as 
  
√  
   
∑ (
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     (6.20) 
    
When forecast error criteria are used to examine a model’s predictive power, it is proven 
that even the simplest forecasting model can perform as well as the most sophisticated 
one 
 
Measures of Direction Accuracy  
Two measures of direction accuracy are considered. The first is direction accuracy (D), 
which is defined as the percentage of times the forecast predicts correctly the direction of 
changes. It is calculated as 
   
 
   
∑            (6.21) 
where 
  {
 
 
     if    {
     
                
     
                
      (6.22) 
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The other measure is the confusion rate (C), which can be defined as the proportion of 
times the forecast does not predict the direction of change correctly. It is calculated as  
            (6.23) 
 
Corte et al. (2009) attribute the superiority of the basic random walk over other 
econometrics forecasting models to the use of improper measurement criteria. But does 
changing the measurement criteria change the rule of the game? Engel (1994) uses a 
Markov-switching model and found that although the model did not outperform the 
random walk, it was superior at predicting the direction of change. Others, such as 
Cheung et al. (2005) and Marcos et al. (2012), use the model direction accuracy as a 
measurement criterion and show that the predictive power of a forecasting model can 
vary based on the measurement metric used. While Engel (1994) describes direction 
accuracy as “not a bad proxy for a utility-based measure of forecasting performance,” 
Leitch and Tanner (1991) argue that direction accuracy might be more relevant for 
profitability and economic concerns.  
 
Moosa and Burns (2012) suggest what is called the adjusted root mean square error 
(ARMSE), which takes into account the ability to predict the direction of change in 
addition to the magnitude of the error. The ARMSE is calculated as 
       √
 
 
 ∑ (
  
    
  
)
 
 
       (6.24) 
where C is the confusion rate defined by equation (6.23). 
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Measures of Profitability 
In practice, a forecasting model is as good as the profit it would generate, and this is why 
many researchers and professionals started looking at profitability or utility as another 
measuring criterion worth considering. West et al. (1993) suggest a utility-based measure 
of exchange rate predictability rather than the conventional statistical criteria. Using 
accuracy and profitability to evaluate forecasting models, Boothe and Glassman (1987) 
show that although a model might rank high in terms of accuracy, that does not 
necessarily mean high profitability. In their study, the DEM/USD showed high accuracy 
and high profitability, while the CAD/USD had high accuracy but low profitability, 
leading to the conclusion that accuracy and profitability are not strongly related. 
Abhyankar et al. (2005) show that using utility-based criteria in portfolio allocation lead 
to improvement in model performance.  
 
The mean return (  ) is the average return over the period, It is calculated as 
    
 
 
 ∑   
 
       (6.25) 
 
The cumulative return (CR) is the entire amount of money an investment has earned for 
an investor. It is calculated as  
    ∏       
 
         (6.26) 
 
The average compound rate (AACR) is  
      [∏       
 
   ]
 
      (6.27) 
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Measures of Risk  
With all the turmoil in the financial markets, risk is a major concern for investors. Risk is 
typically measured by the sstandard deviation (SD), which is a measure of how much an 
investment’s returns can vary from its average return. It is calculated as  
   √
 
   
∑        
 
        (6.28) 
 
The downside semi standard deviation (DSSSD) is a measure of risk that only takes into 
account negative deviations from the mean. It is calculated as  
      √
 
   
∑   
  
       (6.29) 
where 
   {
    
 
    
      
      
  
 
The value-at-risk (VaR) is a statistical technique used to measure and quantify the level 
of financial risk over a specific time frame. It is used to measure and control the level of 
risk that the investor undertakes. VaR is calculated as the percentile of the empirical 
distribution of the rate of return corresponding to a pre-specified confidence level.  
 
Measures of Risk-Adjusted Return 
The Sharpe ratio is the most common measure of risk-adjusted return. It is used to 
quantify the risk-return trade-off that is defined as reward-to-volatility ratio. It is 
calculated as:   
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                                                      (6.30) 
The Sharpe ratio is also used to compare the risk-adjusted return in carry trades with 
those of the stock market, as suggested by Burnside et al. (2006) and Gyntelberg and 
Remolona (2007). 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the steps of both conventional carry trade and forecasting-based strategy 
are illustrated. The selection criterion for the conventional carry trade is the interest rate 
differential and nothing else. In the forecasting-based strategy, both the interest rate 
differential and the expected exchange rate are taken into consideration.  Performance 
measures are used to compare two strategies. These measures include those based on 
error magnitude, direction accuracy, profitability, risk, and risk-adjusted return. These 
measures will be used to evaluate and compare the performance of each strategy in 
chapter eight. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
A PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF THE DATA 
 
7.1 Data Sources and Description 
This study considers the use of GCC currencies to produce profitable positions when used 
in carry trade and a forecasting-based strategy. The empirical work is performed on 36 
exchange rates that are made up of six GCC currencies and the currencies of six 
countries, Britain, Switzerland, South Korea, Singapore, Canada, and Japan. The data for 
the United States dollar are also included because they are used in the monetary model 
since all GCC countries (except Kuwait) have a pegged exchange rate regime that has the 
U.S. dollar as their anchor currency. 
 
The empirical work is based on monthly time series for exchange rates, interest rates, 
money supply, and industrial production for the period from January 1997 until 
December 2011. All data were obtained from the International Financial Statistics 
database (CD-ROM) published by the International Monetary Fund. The objective of 
relying on a single data source is to help ensure that the data definitions of the variables 
are as identical as possible. Table 7.1 provides details on data descriptions and frequency. 
Throughout the analysis, the investment horizon is one month.    
 
 7.2 Basic Statistics and Graphical Description 
The basic statistical description is shown in Table 7.2. The description of the exchange 
rates for the 36 pairs covered in the study includes the mean exchange rate, which is the 
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average for the period. The study uses skewness, which is a measure of asymmetry in the 
probability distribution of a variable. Negative skewness indicates that the left tail of the 
distribution is longer—therefore, we can observe more negative values than positive 
values in absolute terms. Kurtosis, on the other hand, measures heavy tails and the 
peakiness of a distribution. Hence, it shows how much of the variance is due to infrequent 
large deviations. Skewness and kurtosis are important attributes for comparing the 
riskiness since higher negative skewness for returns indicates a higher possibility of 
observing big losses in returns. Higher kurtosis, on the other hand, both implies a higher 
peakiness and suggests that observing extreme returns is more probable. For 
completeness the minimum and maximum values of exchange rates are also reported. 
 
Carry trade is a strategy that is based on interest rate differential. A higher differential 
encourages investors to engage in such a strategy. Hattori and Shin (2007) found 
evidence that the volume of carry trade increases with an interest rate differential 
increase. Figure 7.1 shows the interest rate differential between currency pairs during the 
sample period. 
 
As mentioned by Moosa (2010), exchange rate movements might be so volatile that they 
can wipe out the interest rate differential targeted by carry traders. Figure 7.2 illustrates 
that relation, showing the interest rate differential minus the percentage change in the 
exchange rate. Negative values indicate losses resulting from the appreciation of the 
funding currency against the investment currency by more than the interest rate 
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differential. Figure 7.2 shows how exchange rate fluctuations can wipe out the interest 
rate differential, upon which the carry traders base their decisions.  
 
7.3 Implications for the Validity of UIP 
Carry trade works when uncovered interest parity (UIP) fails. The failure of UIP is well 
documented in the literature as concluded by Flood and Rose (2002), Chinn and Meredith 
(2004) and others. Carry traders work to explore that failure to generate profit, which has 
led Baillie and Chang (2011) to conclude that carry trade is merely speculation against 
uncovered interest rate parity. Figure 7.3 illustrates how well UIP stood during the 
sample period. In order for UIP to stand, all points should lie on the 45 degree line goes 
through the second and fourth quadrants. Obviously, this is not the case here because 
most of the points tend to lie in quadrants one and two. This is in line with the literature 
that states UIP does not hold since the change in exchange rate is not equal (or at lease 
related) to the interest rate differential.  
 
7.4 Conclusion 
 The data sample described in this chapter will be used to estimate models and carry out 
tests in the following two chapters. Specifically, the time series will be used to (i) 
estimate the monetary model of exchange rate and generate forecasts for the exchange 
rates against the dollar; (ii) calculate forecasts for the cross rates of GCC countries; (iii) 
calculate measures of risk and return on carry trade and the forecasting-based strategy. In 
Chapter 9, the analysis is extended to obtain results for modified carry trade (taking into 
account the drift factor) and carry trade conducted on currency portfolios.   
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Table 7.1: Data Description 
Country Exchange Rate Interest Rate Money Supply Industrial Production Stock Market Index 
U.S.A. N.A. 3m T-bill M4 IP Seasonally Adj  
 
S&P 500 
Britain GBP/USD 3m T-bill M2 IP Seasonally Adj 
 
FTSE 100 
Switzerland CHF/USD 3m Deposit Rate M2 IP Seasonally Adj Swiss Market Index (SMI) 
 
South Korea KRW/USD 3m Deposit Rate M2 IP Seasonally Adj Korea Composite Stock Price 
Index (KOSPI) 
 
Singapore SGD/USD 3m Deposit Rate M2 IP Seasonally Adj 
 
The Straits Times Index (STI) 
Canada CAD/USD 3m Deposit Rate M2 IP Seasonally Adj 
 
Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) 
Japan JPY/USD 3m Deposit Rate M2 IP Seasonally Adj 
 
Nikkei 225 
Saudi Arabia SAR/USD 3m Time Deposit N.A. N.A. Saudi Stock Exchange 
 
Kuwait KWD/USD 3m Time Deposit N.A. N.A. Kuwait Stock Exchange 
 
Bahrain BHD/USD 3m Deposit Rate N.A. N.A. Bahrain Stock Market 
 
Oman OMR/USD 3m Time Deposit N.A. N.A. Muscat Stock Exchange 
 
Qatar QAR/USD 3m Time Deposit N.A. N.A. Qatar Stock Exchange 
 
U.A.E. AED/USD 3m Deposit Rate N.A. N.A. Abu Dhabi Stock Exchange  
N.A. Not Applicable 
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Table 7.2: Basic Descriptive Statistics for Exchange Rates 
 
Exchange Rate Mean Minimum Maximum Kurtosis Skewness 
SGD/AED 0.433 0.329 0.501 -0.835 -0.530 
AED/GBP 6.143 5.14 7.60 -0.567 0.550 
JPY/AED 30.00 20.86 36.40 -0.093 -0.545 
AED/KRW 0.0033 0.002 0.0043 -0.463 0.312 
CAD/AED 0.350 0.260 0.436 -1.456 -0.083 
CHF/AED 0.358 0.280 0.493 -0.772 0.054 
SGD/QAR 0.437 0.332 0.513 -0.827 -0.515 
GBP/QAR 0.166 0.133 0.192 -0.739 -0.185 
JPY/QAR 30.28 21.04 39.76 -0.102 -0.545 
QAR/KRW 0.0033 0.0021 0.0043 -0.468 0.310 
CAD/QAR 0.354 0.263 0.447 -1.447 -0.076 
CHF/QAR 0.361 0.220 0.497 -0.773 0.058 
SGD/OMR 4.129 3.143 4.78 -0.835 -0.53 
GBP/OMR 1.569 1.254 1.851 -0.791 -0.201 
JPY/OMR 286.27 199.02 375.92 -0.093 -0.545 
OMR/KRW 0.0003 0.00023 0.00045 -0.463 0.312 
CAD/OMR 3.343 2.484 4.16 -1.456 -0.0835 
CHF/OMR 3.412 2.078 4.70 -0.771 0.054 
SGD/SAR 0.424 0.322 0.491 -0.834 -0.53 
SAR/GBP 6.27 5.26 7.73 -0.629 0.532 
JPY/SAR 29.39 20.43 38.57 -0.095 -0.547 
SAR/KRW 0.0033 0.0022 0.0044 -0.462 0.311 
CAD/SAR 0.343 0.255 0.427 -1.458 -0.0824 
CHF/SAR 0.350 0.213 0.483 -0.771 0.054 
SGD/BHD 4.22 3.21 4.88 -0.833 -0.531 
BHD/GBP 0.630 0.529 0.779 -0.622 0.534 
JPY/BHD 292.35 203.31 383.87 -0.092 -0.547 
BHD/KRW 0.0003 0.00022 0.00044 -0.460 0.311 
CAD/BHD 3.414 2.536 4.246 -1.457 -0.083 
CHF/BHD 3.48 2.12 4.80 -0.77 0.054 
SGD/KWD 5.429 4.432 5.99 -0.376 -0.825 
GBP/KWD 2.062 1.718 2.443 -1.18 -0.0875 
JPY/KWD 368.19 277.68 433.80 -0.631 -0.663 
KWD/KRW 0.0003 0.000195 0.000312 -0.205 0.271 
CAD/KWD 4.311 3.466 5.22 -1.446 0.131 
CHF/KWD 4.40 2.92 5.88 -0.646 0.198 
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Figure 7.1: Interest Rate Differentials 
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Figure 7.1: Continued 
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Figure 7.1: Continued 
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Figure 7.1: Continued 
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Figure 7.1: Continued 
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Figure 7.1: Continued 
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Figure 7.2: Interest Differential minus Percentage Change in Exchange Rate 
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Figure 7.2: Continued 
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Figure 7.2: Continued 
  
  
  
-6.00
-4.00
-2.00
0.00
2.00
4.00
6.00
8.00
Jan-97 Jan-00 Jan-03 Jan-06 Jan-09
SGD/OMR 
-10.00
-5.00
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
Jan-97 Jan-00 Jan-03 Jan-06 Jan-09
GBP/OMR 
-12.00
-10.00
-8.00
-6.00
-4.00
-2.00
0.00
2.00
4.00
6.00
8.00
Jan-97 Jan-00 Jan-03 Jan-06 Jan-09
JPY/OMR 
-35.00
-30.00
-25.00
-20.00
-15.00
-10.00
-5.00
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
Jan-97 Jan-00 Jan-03 Jan-06 Jan-09
OMR/KRW 
-8.00
-6.00
-4.00
-2.00
0.00
2.00
4.00
6.00
8.00
10.00
12.00
14.00
Jan-97 Jan-00 Jan-03 Jan-06 Jan-09
CAD/OMR 
-15.00
-10.00
-5.00
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
Jan-97 Jan-00 Jan-03 Jan-06 Jan-09
CHF/OMR 
  
 
143 
 
Figure 7.2: Continued 
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Figure 7.2: Continued 
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Figure 7.2: Continued 
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Figure 7.3: UIP Validity Diagram 
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Figure 7.3: Continued 
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Figure 7.3: Continued 
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Figure 7.3: Continued 
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Figure 7.3: Continued 
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Figure 7.3: Continued 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the empirical forecasting results using the monetary model of exchange 
rates are presented. The forecast exchange rates and interest rate differentials are used to 
determine the position taken in the forecasting-based strategy. This is followed by the 
evaluation of the forecasting power of the model relative to the random walk using 
various measures, including the magnitude of error measurements (such as the mean 
error, mean square error, and root mean squared error). These were the criteria used by 
Meese and Rogoff (1983a) to determine the predictive power of the forecasting models. 
The literature has shown that direction accuracy is more relevant to profit than the 
magnitude of error as documented by West et al. (1993), Engle (1994), Moosa and Burns 
(2012) and others. Engle and Hamilton (1990) support the direction accuracy and 
describe it as “not a bad proxy for utility-based measure of forecasting performance”. 
Following Moosa and Burns (2012) and Moosa and Halteh (2012) measures of the ability 
of a model to predict the direction of change include both direction accuracy and the 
confusion rate. 
 
The direction accuracy section is followed by the measurements of profitability including 
mean return, cumulative return, and annual average compounded return. In terms of risk, 
I will be using the standard deviation and value-at-risk and will also use the down-side 
semi-standard deviation similar as in Moosa and Halteh (2012). In terms of risk-adjusted 
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return, the Sharpe ratio is used to compare between the two strategies. The t-test and the 
F-test are used to examine the difference in means and the difference in variance between 
the carry trade strategies return and the stock market return for both the investment and 
the funding currencies.  
 
Despite being pegged to the U.S. dollar, GCC currencies tend to fluctuate in a narrow 
range. The Kuwaiti dinar fluctuates more because it is pegged to a basket of currencies. 
These fluctuations yield different results among the currencies under study. These results 
are presented in a separate section in this chapter. Menkhoff et al. (2012) state that carry 
trade, in its simplest form, performs poorly during high volatility periods. Jorda and 
Taylor (2009) conclude that carry trade performs badly during high volatility periods. 
During the sample period, there were three major financial crises that led to huge 
fluctuations in the foreign exchange market. The performance of both strategies is 
examined, and the results are compared to what is found in the literature. We close with 
conclusions.  
 
8.2 Forecasting Results: The Monetary Model 
MacDonald and Taylor (1994) and Husted and MacDonald (1999) point out that the 
monetary model can outperform the random walk. Following Moosa and Halteh (2012) 
and Bhatti (2012), forecasting using the monetary model is conducted in-sample, rather 
that out-of-sample, because carry trade is conducted on a one-step-ahead basis. While 
Meese and Rogoff (1983a) generated their forecasts on a one-step-ahead basis, Moosa 
(2013) argues that there is no reason why the in-sample forecasting performance will be 
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superior to the out-of-sample performance. By running OLS regression on the monetary 
model, the forecasted exchange rates results are presented in Figure (8.1). The Kuwaiti 
dinar versus the U.S. dollar is forecast using equation (6.12)—the result is shown in 
Figure 8.2.  
Figure 8.1: Actual Values and Forecasts Generated by the Monetary Model 
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Figure 8.2: KWD/USD Actual and Forecast 
 
 
Figure 8.1 shows that during the 2008 global financial crises, the U.S. dollar appreciated 
against KRW, GBP, CAD, and SGD but not against the JPY and CHF. This confirms the 
Ranaldo and Soderline (2010) finding that Swiss franc and Japanese yen act as “safe 
haven” currencies during crisis periods. Similarly, during the Asian crisis in late 1997, 
both the SGD and the KRW depreciated versus the U.S. dollar. The Kuwaiti dinar 
followed a pegged regime from January 2003 until May 2007. During that period, the 
Central Bank of Kuwait adjusted the fixing rate twice as a result of pressure Parliament 
as imported inflation took its toll on people. Other than that, the exchange rate regime has 
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0.26
0.27
0.28
0.29
0.3
0.31
0.32
Dec-98 Dec-00 Dec-02 Dec-04 Dec-06 Dec-08 Dec-10
Forecast KWD/USD Actual KWD/USD
  
 
156 
 
8.3 Measures of Magnitude of Error 
In terms of average MAE for the whole 36 pairs, the average for the random walk was 
1.77 compared to 7.25 for the forecasting model (Table 8.1). The best performing pair in 
terms of MAE for the forecast is SGD/KWD at 1.3—the worst is CHF/KWD at 11.1. In 
terms of MSE, the random walk has 6.65 versus 92.17 for the model. The random walk 
produced 2.47 and 1.72, while the forecasting model produced 9.31 and 6.41 for RMSE 
and ARMSE, respectively. Finally, the average Theil’s inequality coefficient (U) is 3.88, 
confirming the supremacy of the simple random walk over the monetary model. These 
results are consistent with those of Meese and Rogoff (1983a). In terms of the mean 
absolute error (MAE), we see that the random walk outperforms all of the 36 pairs. The 
mean square error (MSE) produces similar results as it is lower for the random walk in all 
cases under consideration. The same goes for the root mean square error (RMSE). Theil’s 
inequality coefficient (U) does not produce any number lower than one for all pairs. This 
implies that the monetary model cannot outperform the random walk. These results are 
consistent with the findings of Mark and Sul (2001), Faust et al. (2003) and Neely and 
Sarno (2002) that the monetary model cannot outperform the naïve random walk in terms 
of the magnitude of error.  
 
8.4 Measures of Direction Accuracy  
In Table 8.2 we can see that the model produces 24 pairs out of 36 pairs that have a 
direction accuracy of over 50%. The SGD/KWD has the highest direction accuracy while 
the CHF/OMR and CHF/BHD have the lowest accuracy rate at 46.37%. The average 
direction accuracy is 52.88%, with an average confusion rate of 47.12%.  
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Table 8.1: Measures of Magnitude of Error 
 
Currency Pair MAE MSE RMSE U 
RW Model RW Model RW Model 
SGD/AED 1.1 4.50 2.21 40.15 1.49 6.34 4.26 
AED/GBP 1.84 6.33 6.03 70.3 2.46 8.38 3.41 
JPY/AED 1.98 7.75 6.45 86.3 2.54 9.29 3.66 
AED/KRW 2.11 8.39 14.1 111.9 3.76 10.58 2.81 
CAD/AED 1.41 6.88 3.64 90.6 1.91 9.52 4.98 
CHF/AED 2.50 9.84 10.27 156.9 3.20 12.5 3.91 
SGD/QAR 1.1 4.50 2.3 40.2 1.5 6.3 4.2 
GBP/QAR 1.9 6.2 6.2 61.3 2.5 7.8 3.12 
JPY/QAR 2 7.7 6.4 86.3 2.5 9.3 3.72 
QAR/KRW 2.1 8.4 14.1 111.9 3.8 10.6 2.79 
CAD/QAR 1.4 6.9 3.7 90.7 1.9 9.5 5.00 
CHF/QAR 2.5 9.8 10.3 156.9 3.2 12.5 3.91 
SGD/OMR 1.1 4.5 2.2 40.2 1.5 6.3 4.2 
GBP/OMR 1.6 6.1 4.8 59.6 2.2 7.7 3.5 
JPY/OMR 2.0 7.7 6.4 86.3 2.5 9.3 3.72 
OMR/KRW 2.1 8.4 14.1 111.9 3.8 10.6 2.79 
CAD/OMR 1.4 6.9 3.7 90.7 1.9 9.5 5.00 
CHF/OMR 2.5 9.8 10.3 156.9 3.2 12.5 3.91 
SGD/SAR 1.1 4.5 2.2 40.2 1.5 6.3 4.20 
SAR/GBP 1.6 6.3 4.6 68.4 2.2 8.3 3.77 
JPY/SAR 2 7.7 6.4 86.3 2.5 9.3 3.72 
SAR/KRW 2.1 8.4 14.1 111.9 3.8 10.6 2.79 
CAD/SAR 1.4 6.9 3.6 90.7 1.9 9.5 5.00 
CHF/SAR 2.5 9.8 10.3 156.9 3.2 12.5 3.91 
SGD/BHD 1.1 4.5 2.2 40.2 1.5 6.3 4.20 
BHD/GBP 1.6 6.3 4.6 68.4 2.2 8.3 3.77 
JPY/BHD 2 7.7 6.5 86.3 2.5 9.3 3.72 
BHD/KRW 2.1 8.4 14.1 111.9 3.8 10.6 2.79 
CAD/BHD 1.4 6.9 3.6 90.7 1.9 9.5 5.00 
CHF/BHD 2.5 9.8 10.3 156.9 3.2 12.5 3.91 
SGD/KWD 0.8 1.3 1.1 2.9 1.1 1.7 1.55 
GBP/KWD 1.5 7.1 4.2 78.3 2.0 8.8 4.4 
JPY/KWD 1.8 8.5 5.00 96.6 2.2 9.8 4.45 
KWD/KRW 1.7 7.8 6.00 98.2 2.4 9.9 4.10 
CAD/KWD 1.4 7.4 3.7 91.9 1.9 9.6 5.05 
CHF/KWD 2.4 11.1 9.7 192.4 3.1 13.9 4.48 
Average 1.77 7.25 6.65 92.17 2.47 9.31 3.88 
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Table 8.2: Measures of Direction Accuracy 
 
Currency Pair Direction Accuracy %  Confusion Rate %  
SGD/AED 55.87 44.13 
AED/GBP 53.07 46.93 
JPY/AED 49.72 50.28 
AED/KRW 60.89 39.11 
CAD/AED 48.04 51.96 
CHF/AED 47.49 52.51 
SGD/QAR 55.87 44.13 
GBP/QAR 53.63 46.37 
JPY/QAR 50.84 49.16 
QAR/KRW 61.45 38.55 
CAD/QAR 48.60 51.40 
CHF/QAR 50.28 49.72 
SGD/OMR 55.87 44.13 
GBP/OMR 50.28 49.72 
JPY/OMR 49.72 50.28 
OMR/KRW 60.35 39.55 
CAD/OMR 48.60 51.40 
CHF/OMR 46.37 53.63 
SGD/SAR 55.31 44.69 
SAR/GBP 50.28 49.72 
JPY/SAR 50.84 49.16 
SAR/KRW 60.89 39.11 
CAD/SAR 48.60 51.40 
CHF/SAR 55.87 44.13 
SGD/BHD 55.87 44.13 
BHD/GBP 50.84 49.16 
JPY/BHD 50.28 49.72 
BHD/KRW 60.34 39.66 
CAD/BHD 48.04 51.96 
CHF/BHD 46.37 53.63 
SGD/KWD 62.82 37.18 
GBP/KWD 54.49 45.51 
JPY/KWD 48.08 51.92 
KWD/KRW 57.05 42.95 
CAD/KWD 50.64 49.36 
CHF/KWD 50.00 50.00 
Average 52.88 47.12 
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8.5 Measures of Profitability 
In terms of mean returns, Table 8.3 shows that the forecasting-based strategy produces a 
higher mean return than carry trade—carry trade produces an average of 0.95%, whereas 
the forecasting-based strategy produces 3.27%. This indicates that applying the 
forecasting strategy improves the mean return by more than two percentage points. On an 
individual comparison basis, we see that JPY/BHD under carry trade produces the 
highest mean return at 4.45%. With the forecasting strategy, BHD/KRW produces the 
highest return at 10.86%. The forecasting-based strategy outperforms carry trade in terms 
of cumulative return by producing an average of 73.92% versus 11.38% for carry trade. 
In terms of cumulative returns for individual pairs under carry trade, JPY/BHD produces 
the highest at 83.03% while QAR/KRW produces the lowest at -26.84%. In the 
forecasting-based strategy, BHD/KRW produces the highest at 349.81% while SAR/GBP 
produces the lowest at -12.45%. By comparing the average annual compound rate 
(AACR) we see that the average for the 36 pairs is 0.60 for carry trade versus 2.88% for 
the forecasting-based strategy. The JPY/BHD rate produced the highest AACR in carry 
trade with 4.06%, while BHD/KRW produces 10.12% in the forecasting-based strategy. 
These results show better returns when the forecasting element is embedded in the 
decision making process. This is consistent with the findings of Corte et al. (2009), Jorda 
and Taylor (2009), Schmidbauer et al. (2010), Moosa (2010) and Li (2011). The results 
also show a strong relationship between direction accuracy and mean return—the pairs 
with the highest direction accuracy rates tend to produce the highest returns. Table (8.4) 
confirms that the interest rate differential is not a good indicator for carry trade return as 
shown by Moosa (2008), Olmo and Pilbeam (2009) and Bhatti (2012). 
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Table 8.3: Measures of Profitability 
Currency 
Pair 
Mean Return % Cumulative Return % AACR % 
CT FB CT FB CT FB 
SGD/AED 2.22 2.21 36.47 36.26 2.09 2.08 
AED/GBP 2.05 0.72 28.60 5.36 1.69 0.35 
JPY/AED 1.11 3.92 11.31 69.42 0.72 3.54 
AED/KRW -0.64 10.83 -11.38 347.91 -0.81 10.09 
CAD/AED 0.64 1.52 6.48 21.42 0.42 1.30 
CHF/AED -0.10 1.46 -10.17 13.49 -0.72 0.85 
SGD/QAR 2.43 2.40 40.61 40.08 2.29 2.26 
GBP/QAR -0.50 1.71 -12.31 22.04 -0.88 1.34 
JPY/QAR 1.31 4.17 14.68 75.88 0.92 3.79 
QAR/KRW -1.92 10.60 -26.84 332.52 -2.09 9.86 
CAD/QAR 0.84 1.45 9.74 20.11 0.62 1.23 
CHF/QAR 0.91 1.28 4.33 10.42 0.28 0.66 
SGD/OMR 3.12 2.12 55.95 34.43 2.98 1.98 
GBP/OMR 1.16 3.59 13.98 63.70 0.88 3.31 
JPY/OMR 2.01 4.23 27.25 77.53 1.62 3.85 
OMR/KRW -0.41 10.55 -18.24 329.35 -1.35 9.81 
CAD/OMR 1.54 1.31 21.70 17.63 1.32 1.09 
CHF/OMR 1.60 1.06 15.73 6.89 0.98 0.45 
SGD/SAR 2.01 2.14 32.17 34.89 1.87 2.01 
SAR/GBP 2.24 -0.61 33.94 -12.45 1.96 -0.89 
JPY/SAR 0.90 3.76 7.78 65.35 0.50 3.38 
SAR/KRW -0.02 10.80 -13.37 345.58 -0.96 10.06 
CAD/SAR 0.42 1.47 3.13 20.66 0.21 1.26 
CHF/SAR 0.84 1.39 3.36 12.17 0.22 0.77 
SGD/BHD 1.87 2.59 29.47 44.28 1.73 2.46 
BHD/GBP 1.24 -0.39 22.04 -9.50 1.34 -0.67 
JPY/BHD 4.45 3.69 83.03 63.53 4.06 3.30 
BHD/KRW 0.25 10.86 -9.74 349.81 -0.69 10.12 
CAD/BHD -1.22 1.50 -19.37 21.09 -1.44 1.28 
CHF/BHD 0.09 1.36 -7.59 11.79 -0.53 0.75 
SGD/KWD 1.28 3.78 22.127 61.923 1.54 3.71 
GBP/KWD 1.44 0.04 21.643 -2.790 1.51 -0.22 
JPY/KWD 0.81 1.83 6.774 21.954 0.50 1.53 
KWD/KRW 0.51 3.22 1.873 44.929 0.14 2.86 
CAD/KWD -0.17 1.84 -4.965 23.517 -0.39 1.63 
CHF/KWD -0.27 3.16 -10.549 39.813 -0.86 2.58 
Average 0.95 3.27 11.38 73.92 0.60 2.88 
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Table 8.4: Return versus Interest Rate Differential 
 
 Currency Pair CT Mean Annual Return 
Mean Interest Rate  
Differential 
SGD/AED 2.22 0.32 
AED/GBP 2.05 0.16 
JPY/AED 1.11 0.42 
AED/KRW -0.64 0.28 
CAD/AED 0.64 0.27 
CHF/AED -0.10 0.34 
SGD/QAR 2.43 0.34 
GBP/QAR -0.50 0.17 
JPY/QAR 1.31 0.44 
QAR/KRW -1.92 0.25 
CAD/QAR 0.84 0.30 
CHF/QAR 0.91 0.37 
SGD/OMR 3.12 0.42 
GBP/OMR 1.16 0.21 
JPY/OMR 2.01 0.52 
OMR/KRW -0.41 0.18 
CAD/OMR 1.54 0.38 
CHF/OMR 1.60 0.45 
SGD/SAR 2.01 0.29 
SAR/GBP 2.24 0.13 
JPY/SAR 0.90 0.39 
SAR/KRW -0.02 0.30 
CAD/SAR 0.42 0.25 
CHF/SAR 0.84 0.32 
SGD/BHD 1.87 0.27 
BHD/GBP 1.24 0.14 
JPY/BHD 4.45 0.38 
BHD/KRW 0.25 0.33 
CAD/BHD -1.22 0.22 
CHF/BHD 0.09 0.29 
SGD/KWD 1.28 0.33 
GBP/KWD 1.44 0.14 
JPY/KWD 0.81 0.38 
KWD/KRW 0.51 0.22 
CAD/KWD -0.17 0.25 
CHF/KWD -0.26 0.31 
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8.6 Measures of Risk and Risk-Adjusted Return 
Table 8.5 shows that risk measures improve with the forecasting-based strategy. The 
average standard deviations (SD) for the 36 pairs improve slightly from 29.88 under carry 
trade to 29.52 under forecasting. However, the big improvement comes in the downside 
semi standard deviation (DSSSD), which is 19.20 under carry trade and 15.84 under the 
forecasting-based strategy. Under carry trade, the BHD/KRW rate produces the highest 
standard deviation at 46.32, while SAR/KRW and BHD/KRW has the highest at 43.92 in 
the forecasting-based strategy.  
 
Value-at-risk is another risk measure that improves when forecasting is used as seen in 
Table 8.6. At the 99% confidence level, carry trade produces an average of 6.21%. The 
maximum expected loss improves with forecasting producing 4.87%. At the 99% 
confidence level, the number of pairs that had their VaR reduced is 24 out of 36. At the 
95% confidence level, the number of pairs that have their expected loss reduced is 27 or 
75% of the sample. The mean VaR at the 95% confidence level improves under 
forecasting from 3.67% to 3.21%. The variance ratio test reveals that the variances are 
not significantly different under the two strategies (Table 8.8). This indicates that the 
forecasting-based strategy has superior risk-adjusted return indicators (Moosa and Burns, 
2013).  
 
The forecasting-based strategy produces better Sharpe rations, as seen in Table 8.7, 
where we can see that the Sharpe ratio improves for 27 pairs out of 36. This is an 
improvement of 75% from carry trade.  
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Table 8.5: Measures of Risk 
Currency Pair Standard Deviation  Downside Semi Standard 
Deviation  
CT FB CT FB 
SGD/AED 18.22 17.96 10.20 10.45 
AED/GBP 29.57 29.63 19.30 18.54 
JPY/AED 30.68 30.44 19.34 16.27 
AED/KRW 46.27 43.90 35.42 19.04 
CAD/AED 23.02 22.98 13.15 12.29 
CHF/AED 38.69 38.65 23.29 21.50 
SGD/QAR 18.41 18.41 10.15 10.99 
GBP/QAR 30.10 30.05 19.88 19.15 
JPY/QAR 30.67 30.41 19.34 16.25 
QAR/KRW 46.22 43.93 36.11 19.14 
CAD/QAR 23.14 23.10 13.27 12.46 
CHF/QAR 38.69 38.68 23.08 21.53 
SGD/OMR 18.06 18.20 10.18 10.34 
GBP/OMR 26.21 25.98 15.42 14.65 
JPY/OMR 30.66 30.43 19.31 16.31 
OMR/KRW 45.16 43.90 35.93 18.97 
CAD/OMR 23.10 23.11 13.26 12.48 
CHF/OMR 38.69 38.71 23.04 21.48 
SGD/SAR 18.00 18.00 10.20 10.44 
SAR/GBP 26.40 26.04 15.48 16.92 
JPY/SAR 30.72 30.48 19.32 16.32 
SAR/KRW 45.24 43.92 35.52 19.08 
CAD/SAR 22.92 22.92 13.08 12.24 
CHF/SAR 38.76 38.64 23.04 21.48 
SGD/BHD 18.00 18.00 10.56 10.44 
BHD/GBP 26.40 2.17 15.6 16.92 
JPY/BHD 30.48 26.04 19.68 16.32 
BHD/KRW 46.32 43.92 35.52 19.08 
CAD/BHD 22.92 22.92 15.84 11.76 
CHF/BHD 38.64 38.64 23.16 21.00 
SGD/KWD 13.31 12.58 7.30 7.20 
GBP/KWD 24.72 24.78 14.72 16.72 
JPY/KWD 27.02 26.98 16.06 14.14 
KWD/KRW 29.45 29.28 19.97 18.85 
CAD/KWD 23.17 23.10 13.00 11.10 
CHF/KWD 37.63 37.50 23.69 19.12 
Average 29.88 29.52 19.20 15.84 
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Table 8.6: Value-at-Risk (VaR) 
 
Currency Pair 99% 95% 
CT FB CT FB 
SGD/AED 3.53 3.92 1.76 2.09 
AED/GBP 7.79 6.08 3.62 3.85 
JPY/AED 5.95 4.74 4.26 3.57 
AED/KRW 11.59 5.30 4.32 3.11 
CAD/AED 4.91 4.16 2.82 2.56 
CHF/AED 6.36 6.37 5.04 4.73 
SGD/QAR 3.53 4.78 1.69 1.95 
GBP/QAR 8.48 6.50 3.69 3.60 
JPY/QAR 6.09 4.66 4.37 3.47 
QAR/KRW 11.61 5.29 4.91 3.12 
CAD/QAR 4.88 4.10 2.86 2.59 
CHF/QAR 6.34 6.38 4.98 4.58 
SGD/OMR 3.35 4.05 1.65 2.07 
GBP/OMR 5.44 5.28 2.99 2.77 
JPY/OMR 5.94 4.67 4.34 3.48 
OMR/KRW 11.68 5.37 4.44 2.91 
CAD/OMR 4.87 4.14 2.77 2.71 
CHF/OMR 6.27 6.35 4.91 4.72 
SGD/SAR 3.53 3.93 1.77 2.07 
SAR/GBP 5.64 5.64 3.39 3.93 
JPY/SAR 6.09 4.72 4.26 3.66 
SAR/KRW 11.56 5.31 4.37 3.10 
CAD/SAR 4.76 4.20 2.87 2.57 
CHF/SAR 6.33 6.33 4.97 4.62 
SGD/BHD 3.54 3.93 2.09 1.91 
BHD/GBP 5.48 5.48 3.52 3.92 
JPY/BHD 6.03 4.70 4.13 3.62 
BHD/KRW 11.51 5.39 4.34 3.17 
CAD/BHD 5.15 4.16 2.98 2.55 
CHF/BHD 6.38 6.35 5.04 4.62 
SGD/KWD 2.64 2.35 1.42 1.25 
GBP/KWD 4.11 5.46 2.89 3.70 
JPY/KWD 5.25 3.60 4.18 3.20 
KWD/KRW 6.39 3.71 5.04 2.91 
CAD/KWD 4.30 2.96 3.59 2.42 
CHF/KWD 6.43 4.82 5.92 4.45 
Average 6.21 4.87 3.67 3.21 
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Table 8.7: The Sharpe Ratio in Relation to Standard Deviation and DSSSD 
 
Currency Pairs Standard Deviation DSSSD 
CT FB CT FB 
SGD/AED 0.122 0.123 0.218 0.211 
AED/GBP 0.070 0.024 0.106 0.039 
JPY/AED 0.036 0.129 0.058 0.241 
AED/KRW 0.014 0.247 0.018 0.569 
CAD/AED 0.028 0.066 0.049 0.124 
CHF/AED 0.003 0.038 0.004 0.068 
SGD/QAR 0.132 0.131 0.239 0.218 
GBP/QAR 0.017 0.057 0.025 0.089 
JPY/QAR 0.043 0.137 0.068 0.257 
QAR/KRW 0.041 0.241 0.053 0.554 
CAD/QAR 0.036 0.063 0.064 0.116 
CHF/QAR 0.023 0.033 0.039 0.059 
SGD/OMR 0.173 0.117 0.306 0.205 
GBP/OMR 0.044 0.138 0.075 0.245 
JPY/OMR 0.066 0.139 0.104 0.260 
OMR/KRW 0.009 0.240 0.011 0.556 
CAD/OMR 0.067 0.057 0.116 0.105 
CHF/OMR 0.041 0.027 0.069 0.050 
SGD/SAR 0.111 0.119 0.197 0.205 
SAR/GBP 0.085 0.023 0.145 0.036 
JPY/SAR 0.029 0.123 0.046 0.231 
SAR/KRW 0.000 0.246 0.001 0.567 
CAD/SAR 0.018 0.064 0.032 0.120 
CHF/SAR 0.022 0.036 0.037 0.065 
SGD/BHD 0.103 0.144 0.177 0.248 
BHD/GBP 0.047 0.015 0.080 0.023 
JPY/BHD 0.146 0.120 0.226 0.226 
BHD/KRW 0.006 0.247 0.007 0.568 
CAD/BHD 0.053 0.065 0.077 0.127 
CHF/BHD 0.002 0.035 0.004 0.065 
SGD/KWD 0.096 0.300 0.175 0.525 
GBP/KWD 0.058 0.002 0.098 0.002 
JPY/KWD 0.030 0.068 0.050 0.129 
KWD/KRW 0.017 0.110 0.026 0.171 
CAD/KWD 0.007 0.080 0.013 0.166 
CHF/KWD 0.007 0.084 0.011 0.165 
Average 0.04 0.11 0.05 0.21 
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8.7 Hypothesis Testing 
The t-test is used to examine the mean difference between returns on carry trade and 
stock market returns for the currencies under study. The results for the returns of 
conventional carry trade and the GCC stock markets show that only 8 pairs out of the 36 
produce significant differences in mean return. In terms of differences with the 
corresponding currency stock markets, only 5 pairs show a statistically significant mean 
difference. On the forecasting-based strategy side, no pair shows any statistical mean 
difference with any stock market.  
 
In examining the variance with the F-test, we see that all pairs show statistically 
significant variance ratios, except for BHD/KRW. This pair does not produce a 
statistically significant variance ratio against the Bahrain stock market in both 
conventional carry trade and the forecasting-based strategy. 
 
8.8 The Best Performing Currencies 
The best and worst performing currencies in each category are identified in Table 8.9, 
taking the average for GCC currency against the other six currencies (SGD, GBP, JPY, 
KRW, CAD, and CHF). Under conventional carry trade, the KWD is the best performing 
currency when it comes to the magnitude of the forecasting error, direction accuracy and 
risk measures. On the other hand, OMR is the best performer when it comes to 
profitability and risk-adjusted return. With the forecasting-based strategy, the KWD again 
shows the best results.  
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Table 8.8: Results of Hypothesis Testing 
Currency 
Pair 
t-Test F-test 
GCC Stock 
Market vs. CT 
and FB 
Non-GCC Stock 
Market vs. CT 
and FB 
GCC Stock 
Market vs. CT 
and FB 
Non-GCC Stock 
Market vs. CT 
and FB 
CT FB CT FB CT FB CT FB 
SGD/AED 1.13 1.13 0.22 0.23 26.63* 17.91* 17.91* 17.90* 
AED/GBP 1.12 1.28 0.25 0.57 9.83* 9.79* 2.59* 2.58* 
JPY/AED 1.23 0.91 0.80 1.38 9.13* 9.27* 3.58* 3.63* 
AED/KRW 1.29 0.10 1.34 0.05 4.20* 4.46* 4.19* 4.45* 
CAD/AED 1.30 1.20 1.19 0.99 16.28* 16.28* 5.10* 5.09* 
CHF/AED 1.34 1.16 0.76 0.46 5.75* 5.75* 2.16* 2.16* 
SGD/QAR 2.22* 2.23* 0.19 0.19 28.87* 28.85* 17.05* 17.05* 
GBP/QAR 2.54* 2.26* 0.86 0.33 10.80* 10.83* 2.51* 2.51* 
JPY/QAR 2.30* 1.95 0.84 1.43 10.40* 10.57* 3.58* 3.64* 
QAR/KRW 2.50* 1.10 1.51 0.02 4.79* 5.07* 4.20* 4.40* 
CAD/QAR 2.41* 2.33* 1.14 1.00 18.27* 18.32* 5.02* 5.03* 
CHF/QAR 2.30* 2.25* 0.57 0.49 6.53* 6.54* 2.15* 2.16* 
SGD/OMR 1.00 1.17 0.07 0.24 18.62* 18.32* 17.72* 17.44* 
GBP/OMR 1.29 0.90 0.48 0.11 8.84* 8.99* 3.30* 3.36* 
JPY/OMR 1.13 0.77 0.98 1.44 6.46* 6.56* 3.59* 3.64* 
OMR/KRW 1.41 1.41 0.22 0.01 2.98* 3.15* 4.20* 4.45* 
CAD/OMR 1.24 1.28 0.98 1.03 11.38* 11.36* 5.04* 5.03* 
CHF/OMR 1.15 1.23 0.43 0.54 4.05* 4.05* 2.15* 2.15* 
SGD/SAR 1.56 1.54 0.26 0.24 28.98* 29.04* 17.79* 17.82* 
SAR/GBP 1.50 1.88 0.22 0.92 13.97* 13.87* 3.37* 3.34* 
JPY/SAR 1.65 1.28 0.76 1.34 9.95* 10.10* 3.56* 3.61* 
SAR/KRW 1.69 0.34 1.36 0.05 4.60* 4.88* 4.19* 4.45* 
CAD/SAR 1.75 1.61 1.24 1.00 17.94* 18.01* 5.12* 5.14* 
CHF/SAR 1.62 1.55 0.58 0.47 6.28* 6.29* 2.15* 2.15* 
SGD/BHD 0.02 0.14 0.283 0.16 7.05* 7.12* 17.72* 17.90* 
BHD/GBP 0.07 0.46 0.371 0.86 3.41* 3.40* 3.36* 3.35* 
JPY/BHD 0.49 0.34 1.48 1.33 2.47* 2.45* 3.62* 3.59* 
BHD/KRW 0.29 1.57 1.32 0.06 1.12 1.19 4.19* 4.44* 
CAD/BHD 0.64 0.09 1.63 0.99 4.37* 4.37* 5.10* 5.11* 
CHF/BHD 0.34 0.11 0.73 0.48 1.54* 1.54* 2.15* 2.16* 
SGD/KWD 1.89 1.49 0.97 0.56 26.46* 28.43* 24.90* 26.75* 
GBP/KWD 1.78 2.08* 0.04 0.36 7.36* 7.33* 3.65* 3.63* 
JPY/KWD 1.92 1.75 0.49 0.69 6.16* 6.18* 4.68* 4.70* 
KWD/KRW 1.95 1.49 1.74 1.35 5.19* 5.25* 7.47* 7.55* 
CAD/KWD 2.13* 1.78 1.37 0.91 8.38* 8.44* 4.64* 4.67* 
CHF/KWD 1.98* 1.43 0.08 0.61 3.18* 3.20* 1.73* 1.74* 
* indicates statistical significance at 95% confidence level. 
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Table 8.9: Currency Performance (Forecasting Accuracy and Profitability) 
Indicator Best Worst 
CT FB CT FB 
Forecasting Error 
 
    
MAE KWD KWD QAR AED 
MSE KWD OMR BHD KWD 
RMSE KWD KWD QAR AED 
U QAR KWD 
 
Direction Accuracy 
 
    
D 
 
KWD OMR 
Profitability 
 
    
Mean Return OMR OMR QAR KWD 
Cumulative Return OMR OMR QAR KWD 
AACR 
 
OMR OMR QAR KWD 
Risk  
 
    
SD KWD KWD QAR QAR 
DSSSD 
VaR (99%) 
VaR (95%) 
KWD 
KWD 
OMR 
KWD 
KWD 
KWD 
QAR 
QAR 
KWD 
QAR 
QAR 
SAR 
 
Risk-Adjusted Return  
 
    
Sharpe Ratio (SD) OMR OMR QAR SAR 
Sharpe Ratio (DSSSD) OMR OMR KWD SAR 
 
 
8.9 Carry Trade and Financial Crises 
Due to the highly leveraged nature of carry trade, it is vulnerable to exchange rate 
volatility. Jorda and Taylor (2009) show that carry trade performs badly during high 
volatility periods. Kohler (2008) defines a crisis as times of large market downturns or as 
periods of exceptionally high volatility. 
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 Ranaldo and Soderlind (2010) have compiled a list of economic, political and natural 
disaster events by a news search, which they use to study the performance of several 
major currencies on those dates. Economic disasters include financial crises, defaults or 
bankruptcies. Political disasters include wars, terrorism and bombings. Natural disasters 
include hurricanes, tornados, tsunamis and earthquakes (Table 2.2). They conclude that 
financial crises have the most effect on currency markets than all other types of crises. 
  
Stock markets do not necessarily crash in times of disasters although return is typically 
negative. However, high interest currencies always perform poorly in these times as all 
currencies depreciate against the U.S. dollar in times of disasters. This confirms the “safe 
haven” properties of the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency as documented by Maggiori 
(2011). Despite the fact that the global financial crisis started in the U.S., with Lehman 
Brothers’ bankruptcy, the U.S. dollar appreciated during that period. Adrian et al. (2009) 
argues that the reason for the appreciation of the U.S. dollar during that period was the 
funding liquidity. This is particularly true for the many financial institutions that were 
building up their balance sheets with short-term debt. Having the GCC currencies pegged 
to the U.S. dollar—and giving it the most weight in the KWD basket—does not mean 
they would perform well when used in carry trade during financial crises.  
 
The volatility and the return of both carry trade strategy and forecasting-based strategy 
are examined during the three largest financial crises: the East Asia financial crisis, the 
global stock market crash, and the global financial crisis. The results reported in Table 
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8.10 confirm the findings of Menkhoff et al. (2012) that carry trade in its simplest form 
performs poorly during high volatility periods. 
 
Table 8.10: Carry Trade during Financial Crises 
Crisis Period Standard Deviation Mean Return CT Mean Return FB 
6/97 – 1/98 39.12 0.82 17.16 
1/97 – 5/97 
2/98 – 7/08 
27.84 1.91 2.11 
8/08  12/11 34.56 1.76 4.28 
1/97 – 12/11 29.88 0.95 3.27 
 
The standard deviation for the whole sample period was 29.88, but it went up during the 
East Asia financial crisis and global stock market crash that occurred in July 1997 and 
October 1997, respectively to 39.12. As a result, the mean return for the period went 
down to 0.82% versus an average of 0.95% for the entire period. On the other hand, the 
forecasting-based strategy produced higher than average returns by achieving 17.16% for 
the same period. This confirms Eun and Sabherwal (2002) and Corte et al. (2009) who 
state that forecasting-based strategies yield large economic gains over the random walk 
benchmark. The global financial crisis from August 2008 to December 2011 confirmed 
these results. The standard deviation went up to 34.56 resulting in a drop in mean return 
for that period to 1.76% for carry trade and 4.28% for the forecasting-based strategy. This 
compares with 0.95% and 3.26% for carry trade and forecasting based strategy during the 
entire period, respectively. 
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8.10 Conclusion 
The results presented in this chapter show that the monetary model cannot outperform the 
random walk in out-of-sample forecasting when forecasting accuracy is assessed 
according to metrics that take into account the magnitude of the forecasting error only. 
The random walk produced better results in all error measurement criteria such as MAE, 
MSE, RMSE and Theil’s inequality coefficient (U). However, the model performs well in 
terms of direction accuracy and profitability. The results show that a forecasting-based 
strategy is superior to carry trade in terms of measures of return, risk and risk-adjusted 
return.  
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CHAPTER NINE 
 
SOME EXTENSIONS 
 
 
 
9.1 Introduction 
Chapter 8 examined risk and return on carry trade in its simplest form, which consists of 
taking a short position on a low-interest currency and a long position on a high-interest 
currency. The performance of this operation was compared with the performance of a 
forecasting-based strategy in which the expected change in the exchange rate is taken into 
consideration. In this chapter extensions are considered to find out if carry trade can be 
made more profitable. The first extension is to take into account the drift factor into 
consideration, which means that instead of using the assumption of random walk without 
drift, the assumption of random walk with drift will be used instead. The operation is 
called modified carry trade. The second extension is that instead of using individual carry 
pairs, carry trade is conducted by using currency portfolios. 
 
9.2 Modified Carry Trade (Random Walk with Drift) 
It is interesting to find out if carry trade can be more profitable when the drift factor, if it 
is statistically significant, is taken into consideration. When carry traders look at the 
interest rate differential as the source of return, they assume that the exchange rate 
behaves like a random walk without drift. While the evidence indicates that exchange 
rates move like a random walk without drift over a short horizon (week-to-week, for 
example), the drift factor tends to be  significant over long horizons. Some evidence 
actually indicates that calculating the drift factor and embedding it into the decision-
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making process enhances the profitability of carry trades (Moosa and Burns, 2013). Engel 
and Hamilton (1990) argue that (in theory) the random walk with drift is a more 
reasonable standard of comparison when the drift factor is significantly different from 
zero. Following Meese and Rogoff (1983a), the drift factor for the random walk is 
measured as the average value of the percentage change in the exchange rate. 
 
Assume that    and    are the interest rates for currencies x and y, respectively, and S is 
the spot exchange rate between these two currencies measured as the price of one unit of 
y. Hence the appreciation of y against x means a higher value of S over time (where 
       ) and vice versa. For a horizon of one period, the random walk without drift is 
specified as 
                (9.1) 
where,    is the error term. For a horizon of n, the random walk without drift is written as 
               (9.2) 
 
Under the random walk without drift, the expected percentage change in exchange rate is 
zero, but because of the high volatility in the foreign exchange market, this is unlikely to 
be the case. The random walk with drift corresponding to equations (1) and (2) are the 
following  
                 (9.3) 
and 
                 (9.4) 
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where   is the drift factor, which can be estimated by running a regression of the 
percentage change in the exchange rate on a constant, in which case the drift factor is the 
intercept term in the regression. Hence we have 
  ̇                                                       (9.5) 
where   ̇ is the percentage change in the exchange rate. In general  ̇   
 =  ̂, where n is 
the horizon. The estimated value of the drift factor ( ̂  is basically the percentage change 
in the exchange rate. If the drift factor is taken into consideration, the return on modified 
carry trade is 
  {
(     )     ̂
(     )    ̂
           
   
    
              (9.6) 
 
Hypothesis testing on the means and variances will tell us if modified carry trade is more 
profitable than simple carry trade. 
 
We started by estimating the drift factor for horizons ranging between one and 12 
months, using all possible currency pairs. The results reported in Table 9.1show the 
statistical significance of the drift factor over the number of lags. Out of the 36 currency 
combinations, 24 produce statistically significant drift factors. In Table 9.2 the drift factor 
is annualised. For example, the three month CHF/QAR drift is -0.34%, implying that this 
exchange rate is expected to decline by 0.34% after three months. So if a carry trader 
conducts a position where he goes long QAR and short CHF, he should expect that the 
CHF/QAR exchange rate to depreciate by 0.34% over the next 3 months. If he is 
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planning to hold this position for one year, he should expect the QAR to depreciate 
against the CHF by 1.36%. 
 
Table 9.1: Statistical Significance of Drift Factor 
 
Currency 
Pair 
Horizon Coefficient t statistics p-value Significant 
CHF/KWD 4 -0.004132 2.017* 0.0454 Yes 
CHF/BHD 4 -0.004664 2.288* 0.0233 Yes 
CHF/SAR 4 -0.004662 2.285* 0.0235 Yes 
CHF/OMR 4 -0.004663 2.286* 0.0235 Yes 
CHF/QAR 3 -0.003435 1.983* 0.0489 Yes 
CHF/AED 4 -0.004663 2.286* 0.0234 Yes 
CAD/KWD 4 -0.003504 2.248* 0.0260 Yes 
CAD/BHD 5 -0.003789 2.402* 0.0370 Yes 
CAD/SAR 5 -0.003787 2.104* 0.0369 Yes 
CAD/OMR 5 -0.003788 2.096* 0.0375 Yes 
CAR/QAR 5 -0.003792 2.092* 0.0379 Yes 
CAD/AED 5 -0.003789 2.098* 0.0373 Yes 
KWD/KRW 1-12 - - - No 
BHD/KRW 1-12 - - - No 
SAR/KRW  1-12 - - - No 
OMR/KRW  1-12 - - - No 
QAR/KRW  1-12 - - - No 
AED/KRW 1-12 - - - No 
JPY/KWD 5 -0.004601 2.150* 0.0331 Yes 
JPY/BHD 4 -0.004533 2.280* 0.0238 Yes 
JPY/SAR 4 -0.004530 2.279* 0.0239 Yes 
JPY/OMR 4 -0.004531 2.281* 0.0238 Yes 
JPY/QAR 4 -0.004534 2.295* 0.0229 Yes 
JPY/AED 4 -0.004531 2.281* 0.0238 Yes 
SGD/KWD 3 -0.001479 2.045* 0.0426 Yes 
SGD/BHD 10 -0.003894 2.046* 0.0423 Yes 
SGD/SAR 10 -0.003890 2.044* 0.0425 Yes 
SGD/OMR 10 -0.003892 2.042* 0.0427 Yes 
SGD/QAR 10 -0.003898 2.032* 0.0437 Yes 
SGD/AED 10 -0.003894 2.045* 0.0424 Yes 
GBP/KWD 1-12 - - - No 
BHD/GBP 1-12 - - - No 
SAR/GBP 1-12 - - - No 
GBP/OMR 1-12 - - - No 
GBP/QAR 1-12 - - - No 
AED/GBP 1-12 - - - No 
* Statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. The critical value of the t statistics is 1.96. 
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Table 9.2: Annualised Drift Factor 
 
Currency Pair Horizon  Estimated Drift ( ̂) Annual Drift 
CHF/KWD 4 -0.41% -1.23% 
CHF/BHD 4 -0.47% -1.41% 
CHF/SAR 4 -0.47% -1.41% 
CHF/OMR 4 -0.47% -1.41% 
CHF/QAR 3 -0.34% -1.36% 
CHF/AED 4 -0.47% -1.41% 
CAD/KWD 4 -0.35% -1.05% 
CAD/BHD 5 -0.38% -0.912% 
CAD/SAR 5 -0.38% -0.912% 
CAD/OMR 5 -0.38% -0.912% 
CAR/QAR 5 -0.38% -0.912% 
CAD/AED 5 -0.38% -0.912% 
JPY/KWD 5 -0.46% -0.1.104% 
JPY/BHD 4 -0.45% -1.35% 
JPY/SAR 4 -0.45% -1.35% 
JPY/OMR 4 -0.45% -1.35% 
JPY/QAR 4 -0.45% -1.35% 
JPY/AED 4 -0.45% -1.35% 
SGD/KWD 3 -0.15% -0.60% 
SGD/BHD 10 -0.39% -0.468% 
SGD/SAR 10 -0.39% -0.468% 
SGD/OMR 10 -0.39% -0.468% 
SGD/QAR 10 -0.39% -0.468% 
SGD/AED 10 -0.39% -0.468% 
 
 
By looking at Table 9.3, it can be seen that modified carry trade produces higher returns 
for 12 currency pairs—for the other 12, the mean return is lower than what is produced 
by simple carry trade. By looking at average improvement in the mean return over the 24 
pairs, it can be seen that the mean return has improved from 0.98% for simple carry trade 
to 1.53% when the drift factor is considered.  
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Table 9.3: Mean Return 
 
Currency Pairs Simple CT Modified CT Change 
SGD/AED 1.82 -0.08 -1.898 
JPY/AED 0.95 2.05 1.094 
CAD/AED 0.58 -0.41 -0.987 
CHF/AED -0.74 1.07 1.808 
SGD/QAR 2.04 1.41 -0.622 
JPY/QAR 1.15 3.37 2.221 
CAD/QAR 0.78 0.12 -0.654 
CHF/QAR 0.47 4.31 3.835 
SGD/OMR 2.70 1.87 -0.833 
JPY/OMR 1.84 4.04 2.198 
CAD/OMR 1.46 0.63 -0.835 
CHF/OMR 1.14 3.72 2.585 
SGD/SAR 1.65 0.68 -0.973 
JPY/SAR 0.75 3.57 2.825 
CAD/SAR 0.37 -0.20 -0.573 
CHF/SAR -0.41 1.59 2.002 
SGD/BHD 2.06 0.72 -1.341 
JPY/BHD 3.81 3.75 -0.062 
CAD/BHD -0.29 0.00 0.290 
CHF/BHD -0.48 0.31 0.790 
SGD/KWD 1.52 0.90 -0.620 
JPY/KWD 1.60 1.81 0.206 
CAD/KWD 0.02 -0.31 -0.330 
CHF/KWD -1.35 1.78 3.125 
Average 0.98 1.53 0.55 
 
The standard deviation for the sample, as seen in Table 9.4, improves slightly after taking 
the drift factor into consideration, and the average standard deviation for the sample 
improves from 14.38 to 14.09. Out of the 24 pairs, the standard deviation declines for 13 
pairs, with most of the improvement seen in the SGD/QAR pair where the standard 
deviation goes down from 7.25 to 5.68.   
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Table 9.4: Standard Deviation of Return 
Currency Pairs Simple CT Modified CT 
SGD/AED 7.01 5.67 
JPY/AED 18.19 18.20 
CAD/AED 13.37 13.52 
CHF/AED 18.86 19.02 
SGD/QAR 7.25 5.68 
JPY/QAR 18.06 17.90 
CAD/QAR 13.43 13.59 
CHF/QAR 21.38 21.05 
SGD/OMR 7.30 5.92 
JPY/OMR 18.14 17.89 
CAD/OMR 13.52 13.72 
CHF/OMR 19.01 18.85 
SGD/SAR 7.28 5.89 
JPY/SAR 18.31 18.08 
CAD/SAR 13.42 13.57 
CHF/SAR 18.98 19.09 
SGD/BHD 7.19 5.90 
JPY/BHD 18.04 18.17 
CAD/BHD 13.42 13.57 
CHF/BHD 18.94 19.11 
SGD/KWD 8.46 8.42 
JPY/KWD 14.64 14.64 
CAD/KWD 13.31 13.42 
CHF/KWD 17.58 17.32 
Average 14.38 14.09 
 
The Sharpe ratio, which is the ratio of mean return to standard deviation, shows 
improvement after taking the drift factor into consideration. Most of the improvement is 
seen in the SGD/OMR rate, as in Table 9.5. The average Sharpe ratio for the 24 pairs 
improves from 0.068 to 0.109.   
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Table 9.5: The Sharpe Ratios for Simple and Modified Carry Trade 
 
Currency 
Pairs 
  
Mean Return Standard Deviation Sharpe Ratio 
Simple Modified Simple Modified Simple Modified 
SGD/AED 1.823 -0.076 7.006 5.668 0.260 -0.013 
JPY/AED 0.951 2.046 18.189 18.205 0.052 0.112 
CAD/AED 0.576 -0.411 13.369 13.523 0.043 -0.030 
CHF/AED -0.742 1.066 18.863 19.018 -0.039 0.056 
SGD/QAR 2.036 1.414 7.253 5.679 0.281 0.249 
JPY/QAR 1.146 3.367 18.062 17.896 0.063 0.188 
CAD/QAR 0.778 0.124 13.432 13.589 0.058 0.009 
CHF/QAR 0.473 4.308 21.378 21.045 0.022 0.205 
SGD/OMR 2.700 1.867 7.305 5.923 0.370 0.315 
JPY/OMR 1.842 4.040 18.136 17.892 0.102 0.226 
CAD/OMR 1.465 0.629 13.519 13.723 0.108 0.046 
CHF/OMR 1.135 3.720 19.013 18.846 0.060 0.197 
SGD/SAR 1.649 0.676 7.276 5.887 0.227 0.115 
JPY/SAR 0.749 3.574 18.309 18.083 0.041 0.198 
CAD/SAR 0.375 -0.198 13.419 13.569 0.028 -0.015 
CHF/SAR -0.414 1.588 18.985 19.093 -0.022 0.083 
SGD/BHD 2.058 0.718 7.192 5.903 0.286 0.122 
JPY/BHD 3.813 3.750 18.041 18.169 0.211 0.206 
CAD/BHD -0.288 0.002 13.421 13.570 -0.021 0.000 
CHF/BHD -0.477 0.313 18.941 19.113 -0.025 0.016 
SGD/KWD 1.519 0.900 8.458 8.424 0.180 0.107 
JPY/KWD 1.602 1.808 14.637 14.635 0.109 0.124 
CAD/KWD 0.020 -0.311 13.314 13.422 0.001 -0.023 
CHF/KWD -1.346 1.779 17.577 17.321 -0.077 0.103 
Average 0.98 1.53 14.38 14.09 0.068 0.109 
 
 
Modified carry trade also produce a larger number of positive returns. The percentage of 
positive returns is higher for 16 out of the 24 pairs. The average improvement for the 16 
pairs is 7.61% and the overall average improvement for the whole 24 pairs is 3.26% 
(from 52.99% to 56.25%). Most of the improvement is in the SGD/QAR pair where the 
percentage of positive returns goes up from 51.18% to 68.75% (that, is an increase of 
17.57%).  The results are shown in Table 9.6. 
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Table 9.6: The Percentage of Positive Returns 
Currency Pairs Simple CT Modified CT Difference 
SGD/AED 51.18% 56.25% 5.07% 
JPY/AED 53.98% 55.81% 1.84% 
CAD/AED 51.43% 50.00% -1.43% 
CHF/AED 50.57% 50.58% 0.01% 
SGD/QAR 51.18% 68.75% 17.57% 
JPY/QAR 53.41% 60.47% 7.06% 
CAD/QAR 52.00% 51.18% -0.82% 
CHF/QAR 54.24% 59.20% 4.96% 
SGD/OMR 55.29% 67.50% 12.21% 
JPY/OMR 55.68% 61.63% 5.95% 
CAD/OMR 56.00% 57.65% 1.65% 
CHF/OMR 52.84% 60.47% 7.62% 
SGD/SAR 51.18% 60.00% 8.82% 
JPY/SAR 52.84% 59.30% 6.46% 
CAD/SAR 50.86% 50.59% -0.27% 
CHF/SAR 51.70% 51.16% -0.54% 
SGD/BHD 55.88% 58.75% 2.87% 
JPY/BHD 61.36% 58.72% -2.64% 
CAD/BHD 49.71% 51.18% 1.46% 
CHF/BHD 51.14% 48.84% -2.30% 
SGD/KWD 53.90% 55.63% 1.73% 
JPY/KWD 57.89% 53.06% -4.83% 
CAD/KWD 49.02% 48.99% -0.03% 
CHF/KWD 48.37% 54.36% 6.00% 
Average 52.99% 56.25% 3.26% 
 
The results of hypothesis testing for the difference in mean returns (t-test) and the 
variance ratio (F-test) between the return on both strategies can be seen in Table 9.7. The 
results show that the difference between means is statistically significant in only one pair, 
the SGD/AED, while for all the other pairs it is statistically insignificant. Although no 
test of significance for the Shapre ratio available, having a significant mean return and 
insignificant variance could be interpeted at a significant Shape ratio (Moosa and Burns, 
2012). 
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Table 9.7: Hypothesis Testing on the Equality of Means and Variances 
Currency Pair Equality of Means (t) Equality of Variances (F) 
SGD/AED 2.71* 1.53* 
JPY/AED 0.56 1.00 
CAD/AED 0.68 1.02 
CHF/AED 0.19 1.02 
SGD/QAR 0.87 1.63* 
JPY/QAR 1.15 1.02 
CAD/QAR 0.45 1.02 
CHF/QAR 1.69 1.03 
SGD/OMR 1.14 1.52* 
JPY/OMR 1.14 1.03 
CAD/OMR 0.57 1.03 
CHF/OMR 1.27 1.02 
SGD/SAR 0.04 1.53* 
JPY/SAR 1.48 1.03 
CAD/SAR 0.39 1.02 
CHF/SAR 0.98 1.01 
SGD/BHD 1.85 1.48* 
JPY/BHD 0.03 1.01 
CAD/BHD 0.20 1.02 
CHF/BHD 0.39 1.02 
SGD/KWD 0.64 1.01 
JPY/KWD 0.12 1.00 
CAD/KWD 0.21 1.02 
CHF/KWD 1.29 1.03 
* indicates statistical significance at the 95% confidence level. 
 
 
 
9.3 Carry Trade with Currency Portfolio 
In the field of international finance, it is known that diversification yields better risk-
return trade-off. The same thing applies to carry trade. Darvas (2009) shows how 
catastrophic extensive leveraging could be when the market moves in the wrong 
direction. However, he also shows that with a well-diversified, highly leveraged carry 
trade portfolio produced annualised return of 46% for the period from 1976 to 2008 
compared to 5% for less leveraged portfolios. Jorda and Taylor (2009) show that by using 
an equally-weighted portfolio, returns improve as dose the Sharpe ratio. Consistent with 
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Lustig and Verdelhan (2007), who were the first to look at a cross section of carry-trade 
portfolios, Menkhoff et al. (2012) fin that carry trade portfolios, when composed on the 
basis of interest rate differentials, produce an excess return of more than 5% per annum 
even after accounting for transaction costs and market turmoil. Flassbeck and La Marca 
(2007) finds that more diversified carry trade portfolios produce a better profitability/risk 
profile than smaller, more speculative ones in the last twenty years. In terms of the 
profitability/risk profile, carry trade outperformed the S&P 500 for the past 30 years. 
Barroso and Santa-Clara (2013) conclude that a naïve equally-weighted carry-trade 
portfolio produced a Sharpe ratio of 0.91 for the period 1976-2010 compared to 0.41 for 
the U.S. stock market. 
 
The catastrophic side is shown by Darvas (2009) by conducting carry trade for 11 major 
currencies as pairs and portfolios over the period 1/1976 till 4/2008 with a margin of 4%. 
Those portfolios (comprising the Japanese yen, Australian dollar, New Zealand dollar, 
Norwegian krone and Swedish krona) were bankrupted at a high level of leverage. The 
Sharpe ratio tends to decline with the increase of leverage for both pairs and portfolios, 
despite finding that returns tend to increase with leverage. The conclusion is that higher 
leverage leads to increase in volatility. Consistent with results found in the literature, 
Burnside et al. (2011) found that when carry trade is applied to portfolios of currencies, it 
yields high average payoffs, as well as Sharpe ratios that are substantially higher than 
those associated with the U.S. stock market.  
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Apurv (2010) shows that the carry-trade strategy, when applied to portfolios of developed 
and emerging market currencies, yields a high Sharpe ratio even after adjusting for 
transaction costs. Also, when combining the diversification with forecasting, it enriches 
the final results. Barroso and Santa Clara (2013) state the following  
 
The strategy combining the relevant signals increases the Sharpe ratio relative to an 
equal-weighted carry portfolio from 0.57 to 0.86, out-of-sample, and after transaction 
costs. We found that including currency strategies in an optimized portfolio increases the 
Sharpe ratio by 0.51 on average, out-of-sample. Furthermore, adding currency strategies 
consistently reduces fat tails and left skewness. This contradicts crash-risk explanations 
for returns in the currency market. 
 
DeMiguel et al. (2009) compare the naive equally-weighted portfolio with various 
optimising strategies. Of the 14 models they evaluate, none are consistently better than 
the equally-weighted portfolio in terms of Sharpe ratio, certainty-equivalent return, or 
turnover. Hochradl and Wagner (2010) argue that carry trade portfolios have the potential 
to attract speculative capital as they outperform benchmark stock- and bond-index 
investments. Barroso and Santa-Clara (2013) optimize currency portfolios where weights 
are assigned based on interest rate differentials or Sharpe ratios, showing they would 
offer large economic gains over a well-diversified equally-weighted portfolio. 
 
Dobrynskaya (2010) finds that the carry trade currency portfolios have lower downside 
risk and lower expected returns than the stock portfolios, but the downside risk premiums 
in the currency and stock markets are similar. Wagner (2012) states that while the carry- 
trade strategy collects risk-premia, its economic value is small on a bilateral basis—
however, carry trade portfolios have the potential to generate economic value. Mayer 
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(2010) demonstrates that carry trade is a profitable strategy with a low downside risk if 
conducted on multi-currency portfolios, particularly if the portfolios are “enriched” with 
emerging market currencies. The reason for such enrichment of returns may be explained 
by Dobrynskaya (2010) who argues that the currencies of emerging markets provide a 
higher risk premium, perhaps due to the limits to arbitrage involved in trading these 
currencies. 
 
In this exercise a weighted average of the portfolio components are based on the Sharpe 
ratio of the conventional carry trade and the Sharpe ratio for the forecasting-based 
strategy. The weighted average interest rate for currency y is calculated as 
                                  (9.7) 
where   is the weight, and   is the interest rate. For currency x, the equation takes the 
following form 
                                (9.8) 
 
The foreign exchange effect is calculated as 
  ̇      ̇      ̇      ̇      ̇                 (9.9) 
where     is the weighted average of the interest rate for the portfolio constituting the 
long position,     is the weighted average of the quoted currencies in the portfolio 
constituting the short position, and   ̇  is the weighted average of the percentage change 
in the exchange rate. Based on the conventional carry trade, we go long on y and short on 
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x when     >     and we go short on y and long on x if     <    . The return on the 
operation is given by  
     
   {
(       )   ̇   
 
  
(       )   ̇   
 
 
          
(       )
(       ) 
   (9.10) 
which is an extrapolation of equation (6.5) to the case of currency portfolios. By 
embedding the forecasted exchange rate in the selection procedure, the expected 
exchange rate percentage change in the portfolio is  
  ̇   
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   (9.11) 
where   ̇ 
  is the expected exchange rate average percentage change of the portfolio. So, 
when taking the forecasted exchange rate into consideration, then we go long on y and 
short on x when 
(       )    ̇   
                                               (9.12) 
Alternatively, we go long on x and short on y when 
(       )     ̇   
 
 
                                             (9.13) 
 
In these cases, the return is  
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(       )   ̇   
 
 
          
(       )   ̇   
 
  
(       )   ̇   
 
  
             (9.14) 
 
The results obtained are compared using the mean return, standard deviation, and the 
Sharpe ratio. By eliminating the pairs with negative Sharpe ratios, 21 portfolios can be 
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constructed. The components of these portfolios are presented in Table 9.8. The weights 
of the components of the portfolios are presented in Tables 9.9 and 9.10. The risk and 
return results are presented in Table 9.11 for three operations and the associated weights. 
CT is the conventional carry trade (without forecasting) when the weights are calculated 
from the Sharpe ratios produced by conventional carry trade of the underlying currency 
pairs. FB is the forecasting-based strategy where the weights are calculated from the 
Sharpe ratios produced by the forecasting-based strategy of the underlying currency pairs. 
FBW is the forecasting-based strategy where the weights are calculated from the Sharpe 
ratios produced by conventional carry trade of the underlying currency pairs. As an 
example, suppose that the Sharpe ratio for two currency pairs are 0.132 and 0.172. In this 
case, the first currency pair will have a weight of 0.43 (0.132/(0.132+0.172), whereas the 
second pair will have a weight of 0.57(0.172/(0.132+0.172).  
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Table 9.8: Portfolio Components Based on Carry Trade Sharpe Ratios 
 
Portfolio Investment 
Currencies 
Funding Currencies Pairs 
AED 2 AED , GBP SGD , AED SGD/AED, AED/GBP 
AED 3 AED , GBP SGD , AED , JPY SGD/AED, AED/GBP, JPY/AED 
AED 4 AED , GBP SGD , AED , JPY , CAD SGD/AED, AED/GBP, JPY/AED, CAD/AED 
QAR 2 QAR SGD , GBP SGD/QAR, GBP/QAR 
QAR 3 QAR SGD , GBP , CAD SGD/QAR, GBP/QAR , CAD/QAR 
QAR 4 QAR SGD , GBP , CAD , CHF SGD/QAR, GBP/QAR, CAD/QAR, CHF/QAR 
OMR 2 OMR SGD , GBP SGD/OMR, GBP/OMR 
OMR 3 OMR SGD , GBP , JPY SGD/OMR, GBP/OMR, JPY/OMR 
OMR 4 OMR SGD , GBP , JPY , CAD SGD/OMR , GBP/OMR , JPY/OMR , CAD/OMR 
OMR 5 OMR SGD , GBP , JPY , CAD , CHF SGD/OMR , GBP/OMR , JPY/OMR , CAD/OMR ,CHF/OMR 
SAR 2 SAR , GBP SGD , GBP SGD/SAR ,SAR/GBP 
SAR 3 SAR , GBP SGD , SAR, JPY SGD/SAR , SAR/GBP , JPY/SAR 
SAR 4 SAR , GBP SGD , SAR , JPY , CAD SGD/SAR , SAR/GBP , JPY/SAR , CAD/SAR 
SAR 5 SAR , GBP SGD , GBP , JPY , CAD , CHF SGD/SAR , SAR/GBP , JPY/SAR , CAD/SAR , CHF/SAR 
BHD 2 BHD , GBP SGD , BHD SGD/BHD , BHD/GBP 
BHD 3 BHD , GBP SGD , BHD , JPY SGD/BHD , BHD/GBP , JPY/BHD 
BHD 4 BHD , GBP , KRW SGD , BHD , JPY SGD/BHD , BHD/GBP , JPY/BHD , BHD/KRW 
BHD 5 BHD , GBP , KRW SGD , BHD , JPY , BHD , CHF SGD/BHD , BHD/GBP , JPY/BHD , BHD/KRW , CHF/BHD 
KWD 2 KWD SGD , GBP SGD/KWD , GBP/KWD 
KWD 3 KWD SGD , GBP , JPY SGD/KWD , GBP/KWD , JPY/KWD 
KWD 4 KWD , KRW SGD , GBP , JPY , KWD SGD/KWD , GBP/KWD , JPY/KWD , KWD/KRW 
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Table 9.9: Weights Based on Carry Trade Sharpe Ratios 
 
AED                   
  SGD   GBP   JPY   CAD     
2 0.61   0.39             
3 0.51   0.32   0.17         
4 0.45   0.29   0.15   0.11     
                    
QAR                   
  SGD   JPY   CAD   CHF     
2 0.76   0.24             
3 0.62   0.20   0.17         
4 0.56   0.18   0.16   0.10     
                    
OMR                   
  SGD   GBP   JPY   CAD   CHF 
2 0.80   0.20             
3 0.61   0.16   0.23         
4 0.49   0.13   0.19   0.19     
5 0.44   0.11   0.17   0.17   0.11 
                    
SAR                   
  SGD   GBP   JPY   CAD   CHF 
2 0.57   0.43             
3 0.49   0.38   0.13         
4 0.46   0.35   0.12   0.08     
5 0.42   0.32   0.11   0.07   0.08 
                    
KWD                   
  SGD   GBP   JPY   KRW     
2 0.62   0.38             
3 0.52   0.32   0.16         
4 0.48   0.29   0.15   0.09     
                    
BHD                   
  SGD   GBP   JPY   KRW   CHF 
2 0.69   0.31             
3 0.35   0.16   0.49         
4 0.34   0.16   0.48   0.02     
5 0.34   0.15   0.48   0.02   0.01 
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Table 9.10: Weights Based on Forecasting Strategy Sharpe Ratios 
 
AED                       
  SGD   GBP   JPY   KRW   CAD   CHF 
2 0.84   0.16                 
3 0.45   0.09   0.47             
4 0.24   0.05   0.25   0.47         
5 0.21   0.04   0.22   0.42   0.11     
QAR                       
  SGD   GBP   JPY   KRW   CAD   CHF 
2 0.70   0.30                 
3 0.40   0.18   0.42             
4 0.23   0.10   0.24   0.43         
5 0.21   0.09   0.22   0.38   0.10     
6 0.20   0.09   0.21   0.36   0.09   0.05 
OMR                       
  SGD   GBP   JPY   KRW   CAD   CHF 
2 0.46   0.54                 
3 0.30   0.35   0.35             
4 0.18   0.22   0.22   0.38         
5 0.17   0.20   0.20   0.35   0.08     
6 0.16   0.19   0.19   0.33   0.08   0.04 
SAR                       
  SGD   JPY   KRW   CAD   CHF   GBP 
2 0.49   0.51                 
3 0.24   0.25   0.50             
4 0.22   0.22   0.45   0.12         
5 0.20   0.21   0.42   0.11   0.06     
KWD                       
  SGD   GBP   JPY   KRW   CAD   CHF 
2 0.99   0.01                 
3 0.81   0.00   0.18             
4 0.63   0.00   0.14   0.23         
5 0.54   0.00   0.12   0.20   0.14     
6 0.47   0.00   0.11   0.17   0.12   0.13 
BHD                       
  SGD   JPY   KRW   CAD   CHF   GBP 
2 0.55   0.45                 
3 0.28   0.24   0.48             
4 0.25   0.21   0.43   0.11         
5 0.24   0.20   0.40   0.11   0.06     
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Table 9.11: Detailed Results of Portfolios 
 
  
  
Mean Return 
  
  
Standard Deviation  
  
  
Sharpe Ratio 
 
CT FB FBW 
 
CT FB FBW 
 
CT FB FBW 
AED                       
2 1.53 1.30 1.65   12.70 14.06 12.68   0.12 0.09 0.13 
3 1.41 3.61 2.03   13.17 18.74 13.11   0.11 0.19 0.15 
4 1.37 -0.53 -0.04   11.89 16.72 11.97   0.11 -0.03 0.00 
                        
QAR                       
2 2.15 3.91 3.28   18.65 21.17 18.49   0.12 0.18 0.18 
3 1.93 2.58 2.56   17.27 16.86 17.19   0.11 0.15 0.15 
4 1.83 3.61 2.94   17.41 18.52 17.26   0.10 0.20 0.17 
                        
OMR                       
2 2.63 1.82 1.19   13.41 15.13 13.61   0.20 0.12 0.09 
3 1.73 2.65 2.70   13.24 15.64 13.11   0.13 0.17 0.21 
4 2.31 2.20 2.05   13.71 13.66 13.76   0.17 0.16 0.15 
5 2.23 2.02 1.48   13.95 13.10 14.05   0.16 0.15 0.11 
                        
SAR                       
2 1.43 -0.72 -1.15   13.16 14.46 13.18   0.11 -0.05 -0.09 
3 2.15 na -1.79   13.01 na 13.06   0.17 na -0.14 
4 1.29 na -1.70   12.11 na 12.06   0.11 na -0.14 
5 1.22 na -2.12   11.23 na 11.10   0.11 na -0.19 
                        
BHD                       
2 1.51 na -2.56   12.50 na 29.42   0.12 na -0.09 
3 3.16 na 6.21   18.45 na 17.66   0.17 na 0.35 
4 2.53 na 9.44   18.01 na 15.52   0.14 na 0.61 
5 2.53 na 9.22   17.93 na 15.57   0.14 na 0.59 
                        
KWD                       
2 -0.10 3.35 1.38   16.05 12.69 15.99   -0.01 0.26 0.09 
3 -0.45 2.70 1.08   14.76 12.90 14.76   -0.03 0.21 0.07 
4 1.26 2.24 1.88   16.05 8.79 15.98   0.08 0.25 0.12 
     FBW = Forecast-based portfolios using carry trade Sharpe ratios as weights. 
na = not applicable, because one or more component has negative Sharpe ratio. 
 
The results of conducting this exercise of assigning weights for the portfolios and 
comparing with its components are seen in Table 9.12 and Figure 9.1. 
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Table 9.12: Main Findings 
  Mean Return Standard Deviation Sharpe Ratio 
CT 1.70 14.7 0.116 
FB 2.20 15.17 0.145 
FBW 1.89 15.22 0.124 
In CT and FBW the CT Sharpe ratios are used to determine the weights of the components, while in FB the Sharpe 
ratios of the forecasting-based strategy are used to assign the weights of the components.   
 
 
Figure 9.1: Mean Return for Portfolios 
 
 
Comparing the results of the 56 portfolios under investigation, we can see that the 
mean return for the portfolios improves when the forecasting-based strategy is used 
(the mean return goes up from 1.70% to 1.89%). The mean return is even better when 
the Sharpe ratios of the forecasting-based strategy are used to allocate the weights of 
the portfolio components, giving us a return of 2.20%. Looking at the standard 
deviation of the portfolios (Figure 9.2), we can see that it is slightly higher when the 
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forecasting-based strategy is introduced—the standard deviation goes up from 14.7 to 
15.22.  
Figure 9.2: Standard Deviation for Portfolios 
 
 
In Figure 9.3 we can see that the Sharpe ratio of the portfolios improves when the 
forecasting-based strategy is used—it goes up from 0.116 to 0.120. The Sharpe ratio 
improves even further when we used the Sharpe ratio of the forecasting-based strategy 
components in assigning the weights. By doing that, the Sharpe ratio of the portfolios 
goes up from 0.116 (in the case of carry trade) and 0.120 (for the forecasting-based 
strategy using the weights of the carry trade components) to 0.146 when the Sharpe 
ratios of the forecasting-based strategy are used. 
 
 
  
 
193 
 
Figure 9.3: The Sharpe Ratios for Portfolios 
 
 
The results for conducting hypothesis testing for the difference in mean returns (t-test) 
and the test of variance (F-test) are reported in Table 9.13. The results show that the 
difference between means of the return on the CT and FBW portfolios is statistically 
significant in the SAR 3,4,5 and the BHD 4,5 portfolios, while the remaining 
portfolios do not show statistical significance for the difference between means. 
Looking at the variance ratio test resultss, it can be seen that it is statistically 
significant only for BHD 2,4, while for all the other portfolios it is statistically 
insignificant. Although no test of significance for the Sharpe ratio is available, having 
a significant mean return and insignificant variance could be interpeted as a 
significant Shape ratio (Moosa and Burns, 2012).  
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Table 9.13: Results of Hypothesis Testing 
Portfolio CT vs FBW CT vs FB 
F Statistic t Statistic F Statistic t Statistic 
AED     
2 1.00 0.09 1.23 0.16 
3 1.01 0.44 2.02* 1.28 
4 1.01 1.12 1.97* 1.24 
QAR     
2 1.02 0.57 1.28 0.83 
3 1.01 0.35 1.05 0.36 
4 1.02 0.61 1.13 0.94 
KWD     
2 1.01 0.81 1.60* 2.11* 
3 1.00 0.91 1.31* 1.03 
4 1.01 0.35 3.33* 0.67 
OMR     
2 1.03 1.01 1.27 0.54 
3 1.02 0.70 1.40* 0.60 
4 1.01 0.18 1.01 0.07 
5 1.01 0.50 1.13 0.15 
SAR     
2 1.00 1.85 1.20 1.47 
3 1.00 2.86* na na 
4 1.01 2.34* na na 
5 1.15 2.84* na na 
BHD     
2 2.30* 1.70 na na 
3 1.09 1.60 na na 
4 1.34* 3.89* na na 
5 1.26 3.77* na na 
* indicates significance at the 95% confidence level.  
 
 
9.4 Conclusion 
In this part of the study, it is demonstrated that carry trade can be more profitable if 
the drift factor of the random walk is taken into consideration. Conducting carry trade 
using currency portfolios produces better return than the average return of carry trade 
using individual single pairs. However, the forecasting-based strategy produces a 
lower mean return of 2.20% compared to 3.27%. The portfolio produced a better 
Sharpe ratio of 0.146 compared to 0.11. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
10.1 Recapitulation 
This thesis documents the results of conducting carry trade using Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) currencies. At the outset, it was stated that this thesis aims on 
shedding some light on three issues formulated as the three questions. At this stage it 
is perhaps useful to restate the three questions: (i) is carry trade in GCC currencies 
profitable?, (ii) would exchange rate forecasting enhance profitability?, and (iii) can 
exchange rate forecasting models outperform the random walk in forecasting?  
 
In answering these questions, empirical work was conducted on 36 currency pairs 
where GCC currencies were a part in all of them. In regards to the first question one, 
the results obtained from this research confirm the literature findings that carry trade 
is a profitable strategy as concluded by Burnside et al. (2006), Moosa (2008), Jorda 
and Taylor (2009), Menkhoff et al. (2012) and others. The results also confirm the 
proposition put forward by Darvas (2009) that the use of emerging market currencies 
would enhance the profitability of carry trade. 
 
In answering the second question, it has been argued by Leitch and Tanner (1991) that 
the main reason for using forecasting models is to generate profit rather than beating 
the random walk in terms of the magnitude of error. Moosa (2013) also suggests that 
the ultimate test for any forecasting model is its ability to generate profit. The 
literature shows that profitability is more associated with direction accuracy than the 
magnitude of error as concluded by Boothe and Glassman (1987), Leitch and Tanner 
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(1991), Engle (1994), Cheung et al. (2005) and (more recently) by Moosa (2014) and 
Moosa an Vaz (2015). The results produced by this research are consistent with the 
literature where we found that embedding forecasting into the decision making 
process enhanced direction accuracy and consequently profitability.  
 
In answering the third question, regarding the ability of forecasting models to 
outperform the random walk, the following is concluded. It has been well documented 
that no forecasting model can beat the naïve random walk in terms of magnitude of 
error as concluded by Meese and Rogoff (1983a). The results obtained from this 
research are consistent with their findings, showing that the monetary model is unable 
to outperform the random walk in terms of the magnitude of error. Burns (2014) 
argues that although the naïve model is unbeatable in terms of the magnitude of error, 
this does not mean that the random walk produces superior forecasts. The results from 
this research supports Burns’ (2014) findings by illustrating that although the 
monetary model could not produce a lower RMSE, it produced better direction 
accuracy, returns, profitability and Sharpe ratio.  
 
10.2 Summary of Chapters 
Chapter one gave a general picture about the issues that would be addressed in the 
thesis and the motivation behind conducting the research. The chapter also shed some 
light on emerging markets in general and their ability to enhance profitability and 
reduce risk for foreign investors. The chapter also talks about the GCC countries in 
terms of their economies and their importance in the global market, due to the large 
role they play in the oil market. 
 
  
 
197 
 
Exchange rate regimes were presented in chapter two, including the classification of 
regimes according to the IMF. The differences between de facto and de jure regimes 
are explained and the reasons why countries tend to practice other than what they 
announce is also discussed. The exchange rate regimes of the GCC currencies are 
presented, showing the pros and cons of such regimes. Adopting a fixed exchange rate 
regime using the U.S. dollar as an anchor currency is costing the GCC countries a 
lot—alternative exchange rate regimes are presented.  
 
Chapter three comprises a detailed literature review on carry trade. The main 
conclusion drawn from this literature review is that carry trade is a profitable strategy, 
particularly when the interest rate differential is high and market volatility is low. 
Return on carry trade is somewhat similar to return on the S&P 500 but with less risk, 
which means that carry trade produces a higher Sharpe ratio. The simplicity of carry 
trade makes it a very popular strategy that is conducted by both individuals and 
financial institutions on a large scale. Carry trade is described as a leveraged strategy, 
making it vulnerable to any exchange rates swings that may lead to a domino effect 
that affects the stability of currencies. The literature shows that the reason behind the 
success of carry trade is the failure of uncovered interest rate parity (UIP). 
 
Chapter four examines the literature on interest rate parity, which is a corner stone for 
exchange rate models and measuring market integration. Interest rate parity is divided 
into covered interest parity and uncovered interest parity. Covered interest parity is 
the condition whereby the relationship between interest rates and the spot and forward 
currency values of the two countries are in equilibrium. Uncovered interest rate parity 
is the condition that the interest rate differential between two countries would be equal 
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to the expected change in the exchange rate. The literature shows that there are some 
observed deviations from covered interest rate parity due to many reasons that were 
discussed in the chapter. The chapter also examines the reason for the failure of 
uncovered interest parity. These deviations lead to what is known as covered and 
uncovered interest rate arbitrage.  
 
Chapter five looks at the literature review on exchange rate forecasting and the 
Meese-Rogoff puzzle. In 1983 Meese and Rogoff challenged the research community 
that no forecasting model can beat the naïve random walk in terms of the magnitude 
of error. The failure to beat such a challenge led to a pessimistic effect on the field of 
exchange rate modelling. Explanations for such failures have been presented, 
including sampling errors, improper criteria and others. While profit maximising 
firms aim to increase their profits, the lack of correlation between the error magnitude 
and profitability led researchers to explore new measures for evaluating forecasting 
accuracy that are more related to profitability. Such measures are presented and 
discussed in the chapter, where literature shows that direction accuracy is more 
associated with profitability than the magnitude of error. 
 
The methodology used in the research is discussed in chapter six with measurement 
criteria used to evaluate both strategies (carry trade and forecasting-based). The 
monetary model used to forecast exchange rates used for selecting positions is 
explained. The Kuwaiti dinar forecasting method is also discussed in the chapter, 
since Kuwait adopts currency pegging regime unlike the rest of the GCC currencies 
that are pegged to the U.S. dollar. Chapter seven is dedicated to a preliminary data 
examination. 
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The empirical results are presented in chapter eight. By comparing the two strategies, 
it was concluded that the results were consistent with the literature. It has been 
concluded that the monetary model is unable to outperform the random walk. On the 
other hand, the results show that using forecasting models led to improvement in 
returns and risk-adjusted returns.  
 
Some extensions to the research are presented in chapter nine. These extensions 
include the use of the drift factor in determining carry trade positions. The results are 
consistent with those of Moosa and Burns (2013) who found that the use of a drift 
factor would boost the profitability of carry trade. Carry trade was conducted by using 
portfolios where the weights of the portfolio components are determined by the 
Sharpe ratio. The results are consistent with the literature, showing an improvement in 
both profitability and risk. Carry trade is documented as working poorly during high 
exchange rate volatility periods. The chapter examines both strategies during financial 
turmoil periods where exchange rate volatility was high.  
 
 10.3 The Main Findings  
Based on the empirical results obtained from chapter eight, the main findings on the 
performance of GCC currencies when used in carry trade can be stated as follows: 
 
1. In terms of measures of the magnitude of error (MAE, MSE, and RMSE), it is 
clear that the monetary model cannot beat the random walk in terms for all 36 
pairs. These findings are consistent with literature which shows that forecasting 
models cannot beat the random walk in terms of the magnitude of error. All 36 
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pairs under study have a Theil’s inequality coefficient (U) of more than one, 
confirming the superiority of the simple random walk over the monetary model. 
 
2. When it comes to direction accuracy (D) and confusion rate (C), it is clear that 
when embedding forecasting in the selection process led to an improvement in 
predicting direction changes, then 24 out of the 36 pairs under study show greater 
than 50% accuracy. Conventional carry trade (random walk) produced more 
percentage positive returns in 21 out of the 36 pairs, which is more than the 
forecasting-based strategy. Despite having less percentage positive returns, the 
forecasting-based strategies produced higher mean returns than conventional carry 
trade, implying that forecasting models have the ability to capture bigger returns 
than the random walk. 
 
3. In terms of profitability, the forecasting-based strategy outperformed carry. 
Applying a forecasting-based strategy dramatically improved mean return by 
244.21% as compared to 0.95% for carry trade and 3.27% for the forecasting-
based strategy. Out of the 36 pairs investigated, the mean return improved in 26 
pairs as a result of applying the forecasting-based strategy. In terms of cumulative 
return, forecasting enhanced it from 11.38% to 73.92% for the average of the 36 
pairs. Average annual compound rate (AACR) shows a huge improvement from 
0.60% for the conventional carry trade to 2.88% when the forecasting-based 
strategy is used. It can be seen that when it comes to profitability, the monetary 
model outperforms the random walk. This finding explains why financial 
institutions pay huge amounts of money for forecasting models—at the end of the 
day profit is what shareholders will be looking for. 
  
 
201 
 
 
4. In comparing risk measures, the standard deviation improves slightly from 29.88 
to 29.52 as a result of the use of forecasting. But the big improvement comes in 
the downside semi standard deviation (DSSSD) which improves from 19.20 to 
15.84. All in all, this illustrates the improvements in risk measures when 
forecasting models are used.  
 
5. The use of forecasting models leads to an improvement in both profitability and 
risk of carry trade. This improvement can be translated into better risk-adjusted 
return results. By examining the Sharpe ratio we saw an improvement from 0.04 
in conventional carry trade to 0.11 in the forecasting-based strategy. By 
calculating the Sharpe ration based on the DSSSD, the results show that 
embedding forecasting in the selection process leads to an improvement from 0.05 
to 0.21. This indicates that the monetary model outperforms the random walk 
when it comes to risk-adjusted return. In terms of Value-at-Risk (VaR) at the 99% 
confidence level, the results improve from 6.21% to 4.87% and in the case of the 
95% confidence level the improvement is from 3.67% to 3.21%.  
 
Looking at the main findings, it can be concluded that using GCC currencies in 
conventional carry trade is a profitable activity. Enhancing carry trade with 
forecasting leads to improvement in profitability, accuracy, risk and risk-adjusted 
return. The random walk, as shown in the literature, outperforms the forecasting 
model in terms of the magnitude of error. 
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10.4 Supplementary Findings 
Modified Carry Trade (Random Walk with Drift) 
Carry traders tend to assume that exchange rates move as a random walk without a 
drift. As a result they do not take the drift factor into account when conducting carry 
trade. It is true, as literature shows, that exchange rates tend to move without drift in a 
short horizon, but it also shows that statistically significant drift might occur in 
medium and long time horizons. Taking a statistically significant drift factor into 
consideration and embedding it in the decision process proved to be very rewarding. 
The following results were obtained: 
 
1. When conducting OLS regressions, 24 pairs out of the 36 pairs under study 
produced statistically significant drift factors over horizons of less than one year. 
2. Looking at the profitability factor for the 24 pairs, the average mean return 
improves from 0.98% to 1.53%. 
3. In terms of risk, considering the drift factor in the selection process leads to an 
average reduction in the standard deviation for the 24 pairs by 2.02%, which is 
from 14.38 to 14.09. 
4. In terms of risk-adjusted return, the Sharpe ratio improved in 21 pairs out of the 
24 under study. 
 
Considering the drift factor in the decision making process leads to an improvement in 
terms of all criteria. It can be seen that the drift factor is definitely something worth 
looking at by both researchers and practitioners.  
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Carry Trade with Currency Portfolio 
It has been shown that carry trade portfolios tend to produce better returns and better 
Sharpe ratios. By creating carry trade portfolios using GCC currencies, the results turn 
out to be consistent with the literature. The main findings are the following: 
 
1. By using the Sharpe ratio for both carry trade and the forecasting-based strategy to 
assign the weights, the results show that the mean return for the 56 portfolios is 
1.70%, up from 0.95% for the mean return for the individual 36 pairs under study. 
That mean return improves when applied to portfolios based on forecasting and 
even improve the Sharpe ratios of the forecasting-based strategy are used to assign 
weights to the portfolio components. 
2. The average Sharpe ratio created by the portfolios is higher than the average 
Sharpe ratio produced by individual currencies. Furthermore, the Sharpe ratio for 
the portfolios improves when the Sharpe ratios of the forecasting-based strategy 
are used to conclude the weights of the components. 
 
Carry trade in its simple form is a profitable strategy as seen throughout the thesis, but 
it has been demonstrated that profitability can be enhanced while reducing the risk 
associated with it by creating portfolios.  
 
10.5 Concluding Remarks 
This thesis showed us how profitable GCC currencies can be when used in carry 
trade. This simple strategy is conducted on a massive scale in financial markets where 
carry traders are always anxious to find new ways to explore it more. It has been 
found that taking account of the drift factor into the decision making process and 
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creating diversified carry trade portfolios would enhance returns and reduce the risk 
associated with the strategy.         
 
This thesis, in my view, has dealt adequately with the three questions posted at the 
very beginning. I hope that fellow economists who come across this work will agree 
with my view. It is also hoped that this work will motivate further research into the 
interesting and stimulating issues addressed in this thesis. 
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